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Abstract

This thesis develops the Fuel Interdiction and Resulting Cascading Effects
(FI&RCE) model. The study details the development and experimental testing of a
framework for assessing the interdiction of a refined petroleum production and
distribution network. FI&RCE uses a maximum flow mathematical programming
formulation that models the transit of fuels from points of importation and refinement
through a polyduct distribution network for delivery across a range of end user locations.
The automated model accommodates networks of varying size and complexity. FI&RCE
allows for parameters and factor settings that enable robust experimentation through
implementation in MATLAB 2014 and the commercial solver CPLEX (Version 12.5).
Experimental design allows the investigation of interdiction or disruption on supply and
network infrastructure locations in order to support the strategic analytical needs of the
user. Given a target set, FI&RCE provides measured responses for the resulting fuel
availability and a valuation of economic loss. The value of economic loss feeds a
Leontief based input-output model that assesses the cascading effects in the studied
economy by implementing a mathematical program that optimizes the remaining
industrial outputs. FI&RCE demonstrates a framework to investigate the military and
cascading effects of a fuel interdiction campaign plan using a realistic case study.
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CASCADING EFFECTS OF FUEL NETWORK INTERDICTION
I. Introduction
1.1 Background
Refined petroleum distribution networks are the economic lifeblood of the United States
and many other countries. The network that provides the commodities essential to modern life
is transparent to most consumers. Nearly every refined product consumed in the US is
delivered via a complex pipeline network. The gasoline, diesel, and heating oil that sustain
American quality of life generally only travel by truck from a local distribution hub to the end
user or retail location a few miles away (Cafaro and Cerda, 2004:3). The efficiency of a
petroleum pipeline system enables its presence in much of the world for use in oil and gas
production and downstream delivery of refined products.
Despite their efficiency, these distribution networks have demonstrated historically
significant vulnerability. Military organizations are particularly dependent on petroleum. The
US Department of Defense is among the world’s largest organizational consumers of refined
petroleum (Schwartz et al., 2011) and maintains its own complex distribution network. The
petroleum requirements of modern warfare have enticed the targeting strategies of military
planners since at least the beginning World War II. Early examples of this include the oil plan
that emphasized the targeting of Germany’s refinery and synthetic fuel operations in Eastern
Europe while the transportation plan affected German railway networks that delivered the
refined products (Mark, 1992: 226). By September of 1944, the Allies had reduced production
of aviation gasoline required by the Luftwaffe, decreasing German refinery output to less than
55% of military requirements (Hall, 1998: 226-227). In the Pacific Theater, the combination of
anti-ship mines, aerial bombardment, and naval interdiction to include US submarines reduced
1

the oil imports of Imperial Japan to a negligible level by the beginning of 1945 (Yergin, 1992:
358). By the time Curtis LeMay’s B-29s attacked the Japanese refinery and distribution
networks beginning in May 1945, there was little ongoing production left to impede due to the
strangulation of raw materials (Hall, 1998: 330).
The Allied Forces of World War II were equally innovative in the delivery of refined
products to their own Armies, which compromised half of all war stocks shipped across the
Atlantic. The adoption of standardized octane levels in vehicle development reduced the
required number of fuel products to a single blend each of gasoline and diesel. A complex
pipeline system deployed from England to forward combat areas bypassed the heavily taxed
truck transport system known as the Red Ball Express. Truck shipments that did occur utilized
the German-designed 5-gallon fuel jug (the ubiquitous Jerry can) that could be efficiently
transferred by a single soldier between vehicles and units (Yergin, 1992: 382). The only widely
documented fuel shortage that significantly impacted Allied operations beyond the initial
Normandy beachheads famously occurred when the Allied Ground Force overextended its lines
of communication during the rapid breakout of Northern France in August of 1944. Most
operations ground to a temporary yet strategically critical halt, particularly in the Third Army
sector under Patton. The strategic ramifications of the fuel prioritization policies amongst the
Allied Armies during this period are still debated by historians (Yergin, 1992: 386-388).
The Suez Crisis in 1956 demonstrated the liability of reliance on petroleum tanker
maritime traffic during the Egyptian seizure of the Suez Canal. More significantly, this crisis
also provided an early example of the inherent insecurity of pipeline systems when Syria
prevented the flow of oil through the Iraq Petroleum Company’s pipeline (Yergin, 1992: 496).
The net impact of this aspect of the Suez conflict was the demonstration of global dependency
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on petroleum stock supplies and the vulnerability of the world economy based on production
location in the Middle East and known delivery methods.
The United States Government implemented an oil embargo as a strategic tool against
Moammar Ghaddafi’s regime in Libya during the lead up to Operation El Dorado Canyon in
1986. The implementation of this embargo was two-fold. President Reagan capitalized on the
abundance of supply in the world oil market to justify the economic risk of banning imports of
Libyan crude. Additionally, the State Department invalidated the passports of all American
citizens in Libya to include oil company employees and executives (Stanik, 2003: 70). The
diplomatic goal of these boycotts was to limit US economic investment in Libyan oil at a time
when crude consuming states enjoyed a global surplus. These actions successfully reduced oil
traded to the US from Libya to less than one-third of its previous level and served as a
diplomatic precursor to multiple military strikes (Stanik, 2003: 68).
More recently, the Gulf War in 1991 saw the deliberate interdiction of much of Iraq’s
downstream capacity including the targeting of 28 refinery locations. Planners specifically
limited the duration of humanitarian consequences by avoiding the complete destruction of
refineries and abstaining from the targeting of crude production. However, this strategy still
caused major outages in electrical production and lengthy interruptions in the availability of
gasoline, cooking and heating fuels, and other civilian commodities. While the Gulf War did
not last long enough to exhaust Iraqi military fuel stockpiles, the hardships inflicted on the
civilian population endured well after the cessation of hostilities (Hall, 1998: 594).
The United States and its allies do not monopolize the ability to interdict petroleum
networks. A terrorist attack on the Abqaiq oil field owned by Saudi Aramco failed to achieve
an effect on production, but did cause the world oil markets to spike by over $2 per barrel (Al-
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Rodhan, 2006: 2). Although the extensive layers of security thwarted the complex attack, the
event compelled the Saudis and other major producers to reassess and expand the physical
protection of their vast networks from increasingly emboldened extremist organizations. A
successfully executed attack on a large producer such as Saudi Arabia or a centralized
production and transport center such as Al-Shuaiba in Kuwait could have global ramifications
by impacting a significant portion of daily production. A similar circumstance occurred
recently when Kuwait’s oil refineries went offline due to a localized power outage in January
2014 (Reuters, Kuwait, 2014).
1.2 Problem Statement
A petroleum product distribution network may be vulnerable for a variety of reasons.
Conflict, natural disasters, economic conditions, and man-caused environmental catastrophes
have all contributed to the disruption of petroleum network flow. The occurrence of such
disruptions is well-known and documented. Additionally, modern military air power has
shown a vast ability to effectively interdict these networks as described in Section 1.1. The
cascading effects are more difficult to assess and analyze. The impact of network disruption
could follow an aerial interdiction campaign or a natural disaster such as a hurricane. Strategic
planners require the appropriate methodology and tools to determine how an interdiction or
disruption incident will affect local and global markets in terms of the immediate impacts and
cascading effects. Military planners may require the ability to interdict the petroleum supplies
of an armed adversary without crippling the local economy and quality of life. Strategists may
also intend to minimize impacts on the global economy and commodity trades.
The problem statement has two primary components. First, how would the interdiction
of a refined petroleum distribution network impact the delivery of energy products to the end
4

user? What end users would suffer the greatest impacts in functionality? The second
component considers other effects of these impacts. What cascading effects would manifest
throughout the economy of the country or region in question? How would these effects impact
the productivity of various industries in the country analyzed?
These components form the basis of the network evaluation outcome: How can military
planners interdict a petroleum network in order to limit the availability of refined products to an
adversary while controlling the magnitude of collateral economic and civil impacts both locally
and around the globe?
1.3 Methodology
The methodology utilized includes development of a petroleum network model that
considers multiple factors that are common to the distribution networks of refined petroleum
throughout the world. This proposed model includes refineries, storage facilities, and
transportation networks using various supply methods, distribution points, and delivery
parameters. The proposed model includes a mathematical programming implementation that
enables the user to experimentally interdict components of the petroleum product network in a
manner consistent with the desired contingency.
The network methodology provides insight on the immediate impacts on product flow
through the network given disruptions within the network that are characterized as nodes or
edges. The proposed network representation predicts the impacts of interdicting the network
and extends the results to estimate cascading effects. This requires consideration of the
supported economy and the affected network structure. The methodology generates an estimate
of the reduction in refined product flow to various locations in the interdicted network.
Additionally, the approach must assess the network for an appropriate amount of time specified
5

by the user and update the conditions of the system appropriately. Given the assessment of the
degradation of network flow capacities, the results inform an input-output model that estimates
the magnitude of cascading second and third order effects throughout dependent industries.
Because the flow of refined petroleum products is completely integrated into so many
other industries, the expected decline in availability is essential to determination of these
cascading effects. Examples of industries that directly rely on these products include
transportation, power generation, agriculture, and mining. In a modernized society, almost
every other element of the national economy and daily life is affected to some degree by the
availability of energy. In lesser developed societies, the absence of consistent electrical grids
and other basic utilities may be commonplace (Yergin, 1992: 634-635).
Follow on modeling presents potential solutions to estimate cascading effects. The
effects are grouped into market effects including energy price fluctuations, corporate effects,
and industry productivity effects. Network effects estimate the impact on the system including
storage depletion, distribution corrections, and end user availability.
The contribution of this study is to extend the commodity flow into follow on industrial
applications including electrical generation, agriculture, and transportation. The associated
consumer networks include uses in quality of life and labor participation impacts. The
commodity flow extends the network from the point of refinement, throughout the distribution,
and ceases when the end user consumes the commodity. The finalized methodology allows the
evaluation of the cascading effects on the end user based on commodity availability and price.
The analytical results differentiate which user requirements remained unmet and which users,
including critical strategic locations, obtain sufficient refined petroleum commodities.
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1.4 Assumptions and Limitations
The primary assumption supporting this approach is access to highly precise data
regarding the economy and petroleum network under consideration. This assumption is limited
by the availability of this type of data. The specifics of petroleum production are often a
closely held secret. Statistics and production figures available from various sources are often
estimates of information that is considered state or corporate secrets by the producer (Inkpen
and Moffett, 2011: 388). Data sets developed from open source publications require
augmentation to allow for a reasonable assessment of the network capacities in order to
estimate essential elements that are not otherwise available. These augmentations can result
from criteria based selections, engineering formulations, or from generalized values that are
consistent with parameters found within refined petroleum networks that exist worldwide.
The model does not influence the supply and availability of crude stocks. Although the
availability of crude supplies to refiners may change substantially within the context of the
larger problem, the model assesses interdiction of the product distribution network with the
assumption that the flow of crude stocks remains sufficient. Because of the vast availability of
petroleum stocks, the number of potential suppliers, and the hesitancy of state actors to
intentionally target raw petroleum due to adverse effects to the raw source and the environment,
this network begins at the point of refinement and assumes a consistent supply of crude reserves
from current or future sources (Inkpen and Moffit, 2011: 11-19).
The demand levels within the network are set at a constant that is determined from the
pre-interdiction levels. This assumption is necessary to implement an aggregate model and is
based on the shadow demand that will exist in the event that the network cannot achieve known
demand levels. Additionally, this is an essential simplifying assumption for the Input-Output
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model that requires consistency within the interactions generated by import-export market
forces.
The major limitation to this approach is its estimation of conditions at system capacity.
The model determines how the multi-commodity network will perform given conditions that
maximize its flow rate, particularly to selected critical nodes. The interest of the modeler is to
measure how interdictions to the network impact the delivery and availability of supplies. In
order to isolate the effects of the interdiction, it is necessary to remove the efficiency
parameters that would otherwise determine the most lucrative shipping plan for the network
manager. The network manager instead seeks to maximize flow based on network capacities in
anticipation of or reaction to a disruption.
An additional limitation is that the model is best suited to a national oil company with
complete process control of the hydrocarbon market from crude development through retail
sale. Fortunately, this structure is present in most national oil companies (NOCs), which
control 90% of the world reserves and dominate the downstream infrastructure of many
regional economies (Inkpen and Moffit 55-63). This may not be a serious restriction to a state
run system in a time of conflict or emergency if there is sufficient reserve capital to maintain or
increase production.
1.5 Scope
This model focuses primarily on the middle distillate sector of refined petroleum.
Middle distillates include diesel fuel, heating oil, military jet fuels, and most varieties of
military grade fuels. Middle distillates are of particular interest due to their military
application. Because middle distillates compromise a significant portion of fuel oils and
transportation fuel (Inkpen and Moffett, 2011: 456), the proposed network model examines the
8

effects of a network interruption on these specific sectors. Although these products are of the
most military significance, the production and distribution of gasoline is also included in order
to provide a credible measurement of cascading effects. The model considers the impacts on
the availability of middle distillates along with gasoline and the cascading effects on the
electrical generation, heating, transportation, and other critical sectors.
1.6 Summary
The proposed methodology informs a mathematical model that implements a network
solution for a relevant case study. This case study uses experimental design to interdict a
refined petroleum distribution network and records response data on relevant statistics. These
responses are analyzed to determine the types of targets that are most effective at network
interdiction. The data also provides the inputs necessary to analyze the significance of
cascading effects within dependent networks.
Using the methodology and analysis presented in this study, an analyst may gain insight
on how various interdiction strategies will impact a multi-commodity network. Additionally,
the use of similar modeling techniques can inform campaign planning and national strategy
when considering requirements to deplete an adversary’s capabilities or in anticipation of a
natural disaster. The estimates of availability and economic losses allow the analyst to gain
perspective on the magnitude of cascading effects across a range of industries that are affected
by a disruption of petroleum flow. The consolidated results including availability and
cascading effects will allow the analyst to provide a decision maker with a complete assessment
of the effects of a disruption of refined petroleum flow.
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II. Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
A review of the literature identifies a diverse body of applicable operations research
techniques and procedures that supports the scope of this research. The distribution of refined
petroleum products using network flow models, multi-commodity flow, and optimization of the
downstream sector of the petroleum industry are well studied and documented. Additionally,
network interdiction appears consistently throughout the literature review in the form of general
methodologies and specific applications that are relevant to petroleum network flow and
pipeline systems. Although the primary impacts of this type of interdiction are relatively
straight-forward, the results are important in the determination of follow on effects. The
proposed model requires a suite of tools that will identify the impacts of various contingency
events that may interdict the storage, distribution, end users, and supply availability of refined
petroleum products in a specified economy. The proposed model will assess cascading impacts
in regional industries and global markets. The literature includes extensive research on
cascading effects that encompasses the span of critical infrastructure supported by refined
petroleum networks. Specific studies enumerate potential impacts on a variety of case specific
locations. Finally, there is a breadth of research considering global impacts of petroleum
network disruptions.
Many recent publications explore the impact of Hurricane Katrina on the oil and gas
industry at refineries in the United States. This information proves useful when considering the
global impacts of localized disruptions. Additional studies examine potential market effects of a
catastrophic event at a refinery location or distribution hub. These market impacts could
envelop the industries of power generation, transportation, consumer energy products such as
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heating and cooking fuels, as well as agriculture. The literature review revealed various
optimization techniques and other modeling strategies necessary to inform the modeling
approach and follow on analysis.
A unique aspect of petroleum production and distribution is the almost universal
applicability of operations research to identifying and implementing models and solutions.
Optimization applies to refinery mix problems as well as distribution networks. Heuristics,
empirical modeling, stochastic modeling, and simulation are all widely utilized tools in the
development of transportation network efficiency. Market databases are also required to meet
the vast consumer demand for petroleum products in the world economy. International Oil
Companies (IOCs) include some of the world’s largest refiners such as Royal Dutch Shell and
ExxonMobil. National Oil Companies (NOCs) are state owned counterparts of IOCs and
control most of the world’s petroleum reserves. IOCs and NOCs invest significantly in the
tools and expertise required to maximize the profitable output from downstream refinement and
delivery operations (Inkpen and Moffett, 2011:465-470). The span of resulting research allows
researchers to identify nearly every field of operations research represented in both theoretical
instances and applications to actual network disruption. This theme appears consistently
throughout the literature.
2.2 Commodity Network Modeling
Network modeling is an essential topic that contributes to the development of the thesis
methodology. Network optimization in many forms is a critical component of planning in oil
production and refinement capacities. The downstream oil industry is a highly complex supply
chain and requires highly efficient and integrated management of its operations in order for
producers to gain market advantage (Neiro and Pinto, 2004). More complex operations that
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involve both production and refinement require specialized large scale optimization models that
trace stock prices and market forces throughout the decision cycle of an international oil
company (Inkpen and Moffett: 2011, 442). Network optimization appears prominently in
literature regarding the petroleum industry and is heavily utilized and implemented throughout
the decision cycle of fossil fuel energy production. An additional application appears in
scheduling of production and distribution of these products through a network of limited
capacity. The consideration of a network model is essential to determining the impacts and
cascading effects due to disruption. Therefore, an appropriate network model should consider a
wide range of refinement and distribution capabilities while remaining sufficiently versatile for
application in a range of scenarios.
The refined petroleum distribution network of the United States is based almost entirely
on an extensive and robust network of liquid fuel pipelines that move products from the point
of refinement almost all the way to the point of sale. Shipments travel the last few miles in a
truck from the local distribution node to a fueling station where they are accessible to the
consumer (Cafaro and Cerda, 2004). A similar supply chain is present in much of the world as
NOCs strive for competitive systems of distribution. Rail traffic occasionally supplements
interregional pipeline delivery of refined petroleum products. However there are limited global
locations with the sufficient rail infrastructure to maintain product flow that is comparable to a
major pipeline (Trench, 2001: 2). For this reason, it is unlikely that a rail solution could replace
a disrupted pipeline and impossible to achieve with truck transportation. Rail and truck
alternatives can provide limited supply capability that is sufficient to maintain a military
apparatus in economies where the platforms are available in sufficient numbers. However, the
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terminals and road networks necessary to load and transport these platforms are vulnerable to
disruption as well.
Refined petroleum products fit a category of problem defined as a multi-commodity
flow. The multi-commodity flow problem is described as a supply, distribution, and storage
network that is commonly utilized by multiple products. The potential size and complexity of
these types of models have increased with the expansion of applications. Robust computational
capabilities accommodate the increasing size of these problems, which are increasingly
implemented among various industries (McBride: 1998, 33). Familiar petroleum products such
as diesel, gasoline, and fuel oil transit common production and distribution facilities from the
point of refinement through receipt by the end user. These products each traverse an
independent network of storage facilities while sharing common transportation means through
multi-product polyduct pipelines (Cafaro and Cerda, 2004).
A mathematical program formulation can represent the multi-commodity flow for N
networks of K number of commodities sharing common infrastructure. Each product is
modeled as an exclusive sub-network component of the multi-commodity flow. This network
requires the construction of a matrix, N, that represents the sub-networks N1 through NK as
described in diagonal matrix (1) . The interactions within N can allow for each network to
compete for resources within the a network formulation while utilizing available storage and
production capacity (McBride: 1998, 33).

 N1


N 




N2
...
N K 1
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N K 

(1)

Software packages are available to solve large multi-commodity network flow problems
and can obtain solutions to problem sets with large numbers of variables, nodes, and
constraints. Many competing algorithms exist to solve this type of problem program, including
those with the CPLEX commercial solver. McBride presents comparisons of commercial
algorithm applications, showing viable options for solving industry applications of increasing
size (McBride: 1998, 33:35).
Mixed integer linear programs (MILPs) and non-linear programs are highly applicable
to petroleum multi-commodity flow because they allow the modeler to determine which
elements of the network are operable for a particular product at any given time. Because
refineries, pipelines and distribution hubs usually process products sequentially, the MILP
allows analysts to specify which elements of the network will handle specific products over an
appropriate timeframe using a binary decision variable. This results in a scheduling plan that
can accommodate demand and implement the profitable distribution of refined products to the
end user that meets the constraints of production runs and product batch availability. Magatao,
et al. (2006) proposed this framework for use in commodity scheduling across a pipeline
network. Cafaro and Cerda (2004) also employed this concept into an integrated network by
introducing an MILP that integrates multiple pipelines and products using continuous
formulations. This result predicted the effects on depot storage facilities that service a variety
of end users. The utility of this function to an interdiction modeler is dependent upon the
specificity of available data and the optimization function utilized. Batch scheduling is a
necessity in efficient distribution planning, but not essential to a model of maximum flow.
Cafaro and Cerda (2012) consider a technique to develop mixed integer linear or nonlinear programs to develop models capable of scheduling and programming the network supply
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chain that supports the vast oil and gas demands of the North American consumer. The study
detailed a robust optimization model of a mesh-structured pipeline network that resources four
oil refined products, four destinations, and a pair of refineries. A mesh-structured pipeline is
defined as a network consisting of multiple interconnected distribution systems servicing
production sources and providing delivery to various destinations. The mesh-structure also
includes storage capabilities that allow for the influx of products into the distribution network
as required. The mesh-structure is present in most distribution networks and is particularly
applicable for commercial aviation and military airlift where significant amounts of various fuel
types require ample storage located along a complex supply chain (Inkpen and Moffet, 2011:
495-496). The formulation includes an iterative list of constraints available from industry on
what products can use various transmission nodes and links and in what capacity. This solution
enables producers to improve integration of oil production, transportation, and refinement in
their planning and decision making (Cafaro and Cerda, 2012).
Neiro and Pinto (2004) provide a generic model of a petroleum supply chain that
utilizes mixed integer techniques to optimize supply operations in consideration of the complete
process. Their implementation of non-linear techniques allows for additional consideration of
the variability in the supply chain and market effects. The article encompasses the process from
the point of exploration and traces the commodity stream through refinement and distribution
networks that are essential to industry success. Their problem statement envelops the
formidable decision making process required to obtain, refine, blend, and distribute multiple
products to a vast network of storage locations and consumers. The conclusion promotes the
continuous sharing of information along the supply chain to best support the decision process at
each step of production (Neiro and Pinto, 2004).
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The Neiro-Pinto model includes elements of the processing unit reduced to a single
refinery model, a tank model that mixes refined ingredients and stores final products, and a
pipeline model that distributes these products throughout the supply chain, where profit is
optimized. This approach is applicable to the current study, because it allows the consideration
of specific nodes capable of processing middle distillates. The results indicate that coordinated
strategies that consider planning and production throughout all stages of the process are
necessary to maximize the productivity and profit of a petroleum supply chain (Neiro and Pinto,
2004). The formulation provides justification of conservation of flow applicability to refined
petroleum products. Additionally, the network constraints must meet demand requirements in
order to remain feasible. These concepts are reflective of common practice within the
downstream petroleum industry.
Al-Qahtani and Elkamel (2008) develop a general petroleum network model. They
described a transforming energy marketplace where refiners and producer remain competitive
by considering a holistic network that can quickly respond to changing market conditions. They
recommend a process that optimizes the network by minimizing production expenses and
capitalizing on unutilized system potential. The authors recommend techniques that allow
linearization of complex functions including materiel processing, product selection, capacities,
and demand functions. The case study considers a multi-site refinery network using a variety of
petroleum stock. The authors suggest that this model is efficient and applicable to all levels of
planning during steady state operations in terms of stock costs and demand (Al-Qahtani and
Elkamel, 2008). The simplification of the network to a linear model provides an example of
how a military analyst might streamline their planning processes when confronted with limited
time and data at the expense of result precision or accuracy.
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In a follow on article, Al-Qahtani and Elkamel (2010) describe geographically diverse
refinery networks entitled, ''Robust planning of multisite refinery networks: Optimization under
uncertainty.'' The authors propose a stochastic extension of the multisite refinery problem that
considers variation in market conditions. A stochastic approach may be necessary to capture
the random and often unpredictable nature of market effects. Al-Qahtani and Elkamel propose
a two stage stochastic MILP that uses robust optimization in order to minimize annualized costs
associated with the production network. The resulting model highlighted the volatility of the
petroleum marketplace and recommended a robust optimization planning approach to account
for the potential variations in market and supply effects. The authors present a familiar
deterministic model of a network of refineries and apply the effects of these market
uncertainties using a non-linear component to implement the robust optimization. The test
model implements this robust optimization model using a three site refinery network to identify
its sensitivity to changes in market and supply factors (Al-Qahtani and Elkamel, 2010).
This simulation aspect of their approach employs a Monte Carlo sampling system to
assign appropriately generated values to probabilistic inputs. The model is tested against a
single refinery and a network of refineries to determine what insights may be realized. The
authors demonstrate that there is an improvement in model stability to variations in stock,
product, and demand factors that affect profit that is scaled by the risk attitude of the investor
(Al-Qahtani and Elkamel, 2010). In the event of a disruption, a similar stochastic technique
allows the modeler to produce random variation in the duration of infrastructure outages or the
effectiveness of strategic policy implementations such as an embargo.
An alternate approach involved sequential decision making strategies to maximize the
returns of a downstream petroleum market. Mendez et al. (2006) explore a variation of mixed
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integer linear programs that use a combination of optimization and short term scheduling theory
in oil refinery operations. This proposed approach seeks to combine solutions of petroleum mix
optimization with efficient scheduling in order to maximize industry economic success while
consistently meeting demand (Mendez et al., 2006). In a period of conflict, similar short term
strategies may apply to sourcing the priority end users with acceptable petroleum products.
This type of solution represents a potential decision process that an adversary could utilize in
planning petroleum distribution during a situation where supply and demand constraints change
more rapidly. An approximate dynamic approach would iterate updates to the model with
changes in end user inventories and infrastructure availability over time progression.
Mendez et al. (2006) introduce an off-line blending problem that implements a proposed
MILP. The methodology involves generation of initial product recipes at the refinery in
consideration of non-linear processes. The approach determines whether the proposed product
lines are within specification tolerances and informs a scheduling model that specifies the
destination and volume of transportation shipments to meet the most profitable demand levels.
The authors utilized three example problems based on various production schedules to
determine the adequacy of the model in implementing the proposed solutions. The authors
conclude that the convergence of sequential linear programs to produce a point solution was an
effective formulation technique to solve this complex and multi-stage problem (Mendez et al.,
2006).
Ejikeme-Ugwu et al. (2011) describe an approach that focuses on the effects of market
demand while limiting price variation or supply interruptions. The authors develop a refinery
planning model where a two stage stochastic linear program develops an initial model and adds
stochastic elements related to market parameters such as stock cost, supply availability,
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planning factors, and prices. The authors utilize a method referred to as sample average
approximation in order to generate an optimal solution in an environment that is sensitive to
demand uncertainty. The model then implements a recourse process to improve the
optimization resolution and results (Ejikeme, et al., 2011). The advantage of this approach is
its applicability to a network where demand varies widely based on perceived availability,
collapsing infrastructure, illicit network outflows, and other realities that accompany a
distribution network in a conflict zone.
As refinery networks compound with transportation hubs, pipelines, and other
infrastructure, the size of the problem set becomes increasingly complex. This complexity can
result in extensive requirements in solution time and computing power that require resolution.
A heuristic approach to solving multi-pipeline programming is presented by Herran et al.
(2012). The authors attempt to increase the model efficiency of a mixed integer linear
programming methodology. The proposed method uses techniques for searching areas around a
known solution using global search meta-heuristics. The authors identify the contribution of
transportation costs to petroleum product price as a relevant matter because it allows refiners to
realize the highest savings in operational costs. Refinery processes have very little variation
once constituted and are not easily altered or streamlined without significant capital investment.
Crude stock prices act as a neutral contributor to pump prices because refiners generally
purchase feed stock from the global market at similar prices. Since refiners generally pay
similar prices for crude stock, they are able to pass this cost uniformly to the customer (Herran
et al,. 2012). This model explains why end user energy prices tend to adjust uniformly amongst
competing vendors.
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Additional solution techniques for problems with increasing complexity are presented
by Gunnerud et al. (2010). The authors employ large scale optimization techniques utilizing
the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition in order to assess non-constant rate offshore oil production
near Norway. The model constrains production factors such as transport capacities and raw
material availability. These dynamic constraints often progress throughout the entire network
and require a real-time solution that optimizes the network while accounting for these changing
factors (Gunnerud et al., 2010).
The authors recommend a real-time approach that decomposes a system of many
decision variables and dynamic constraints to produce clusters that contain each commodity
subsystem problem within the process. They apply linearization techniques to each cluster and
initialize Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition to produce a parallel implementation of the master
problem that produces a feasible solution in a fraction of the time required for competing
approximations (Gunnerud, et al., 2010).
A stochastic model that also utilizes large scale optimization is presented by Oliviera et
al. (2014). The authors propose that many aspects of the supply chain including demand, stock
costs of crude supplies, selling prices, and other highly variable factors are the primary drivers
of petroleum network flow. These highly unpredictable indicators dominate the decision cycle
for the production and distribution of refined products and require a two-stage stochastic
program that applies supply chain optimization in order to achieve a reasonable solution
(Oliveira et al., 2014).
The authors propose a model that is formulated as a linear program and coupled with
Benders’ decomposition algorithm in order to build a master-sub problem involving two stages.
The required Markov processes that account for the discussed unpredictability is applied to the

20

second stage of the problem. The authors then experiment with various deterministic and
dynamic cuts in order to reduce the problem to a manageable size. Upon reaching an acceptable
model, a heuristic approach is applied in order to limit the required iterations. The authors
conclude that the approach successfully applies stochastic decomposition to a deterministic
problem with a result that is less than a quarter the processing time of a full-space deterministic
solution method (Oliveira et al., 2014).
Network modeling techniques are sufficiently investigated in the body of research to
allow specific application to middle distillate fuel production and distribution systems.
Networks supported by middle distillate inputs can also utilize a similar framework. The
complexity of the network will compound with the addition of cascading effects that measures
changes in product input on dependent systems. Systems of transportation, agriculture,
consumer use, and other industries link directly with the outputs of the petroleum network
model under consideration in this study.
2.3 Network Interdiction

Network interdiction is a critical component of the problem focus of this study.
Multiple researchers have considered the most effective way to interdict a network, and
petroleum interdiction appears prominently throughout the literature. The most effective
techniques are well documented, but this review focuses on applications to petroleum networks
with potential to assess or limit the impacts on local and world economies. Much of the body
of knowledge resulted from studies that investigated the protection of critical infrastructure
networks from attacks or other contingency disruptions.
Wood (1993) provides an early example entitled, “Deterministic Network Interdiction”
in an application that supported operations against the drug interdiction network in Latin
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America. This approach utilized an interdictor model that minimized the maximum flow of
illicit trade through disruption of network arcs (Wood 1993). This approach has since
expanded into a number of different types of human, commodity, and information networks.
Israeli and Wood (2002) present an interdiction problem that models the interdictor and
the network operator in a leader (attacker) and follower (defender) capacity. This process
requires the operator to possess a capacity to repair or bypass disabled sections of the network.
The attacker will therefore seek to increase the length of the shortest path to the maximum
possible distance or time. The authors apply an approach based on Bender’s decomposition in
order to analyze the network impacts of leaders and followers of varying capacity, and they
reinforce this process with a series of supporting theorems. The most applicable concept to this
thesis is where the authors consider a situation of an arc that is destroyed by the interdictor. The
associated covering algorithm provides a methodology for interdiction modeling of vulnerable
arcs or edges within a network structure. This feature is relevant to a petroleum distribution
pipeline if the structure or capacity of the system is vulnerable to disruption (Israeli and Wood,
2002).
Lim and Smith (2007) expand the interdiction problem to a multi-commodity flow
network. Because refined petroleum mimics a commodity in almost all markets (Inkpen and
Moffett, 2011: 479), this approach is applicable to this study. The authors specifically cite its
utility in a network supply chain. The interdiction model implements a leader follower problem
similar to what is proposed by Israeli and Wood (2002). The subsequent applications include
discrete interdiction using completely destroyed arcs contrasted with a continuous approach that
allows the interdictor to apply non-linear variation to a network arc (Lim and Smith, 2007).
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Granata et al. (2013) describe an alternative interdiction model that disrupts
connectivity by targeting the most vulnerable path called a critical disruption path. The authors
propose a method to identify the critical disruption path within a network. They formulate their
problem using a mixed-integer linear program and employ a branch and price algorithm. This
process begins with a path formulation and simplifies the model by branching from a restricted
relaxed master problem, which models decision variables continuously (Granata et al., 2013).
The authors implemented the solution in CPLEX and compared the results of the branch and
price algorithm to analyze effectiveness.
Brown et al. (2006) present a study into the defense of infrastructure networks deemed
critical to functioning public services. Although focused on terroristic threats to the United
States or its allies, the premise of the article is highly applicable to the notion of cascading
effects. The authors describe an attacker defender model that measures the importance and
vulnerability of an asset while applying appropriate levels of interdiction or risk mitigation to
minimize the overall system impact. A simplified linear model is used to represent crude
petroleum network flow that serves as a basis for further analysis. This application limits the
site specific complexity of a refinery optimization model while retaining the definition
necessary for strategic considerations (Brown et al., 2006).
Brown et al. (2006) use the strategic petroleum reserve in Louisiana, electric power
grids, and supply chain management as case studies. In the case of the strategic reserve, the
authors model the complete system of refineries, ports, and transportation infrastructure and
apply a limited version of their attacker defender model. The study concluded that petroleum
networks are highly fragile and vulnerable to attack compared to other infrastructure (Brown et
al., 2006).
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Kennedy et al. (2011) describe the process of nodal interdiction as an alternative to
research limiting disruption techniques to arcs and edges. This disruption is defined by
disabling an infrastructure target to prevent its operation. The authors recommend an attackerdefender model that implements a maximum flow objective function, and measures the
effectiveness of a nodal interdiction against the existing network. This approach allows the
modeler to determine the maximum capacity of the network and determine the impacts of
disruption. The formulation uses a bi-level maximum flow mixed integer linear program that
disables the network at the nodal interdiction site. This concept is extended to a program that
disrupts nodes and edges simultaneously (Kennedy, et al, 2011). This framework provides
useful insight into a network that operates under maximum flow conditions that might be
present in the event of a petroleum network interdiction. Storage facilities and polyducts may
both be vulnerable to disruption, although disabling a storage tank does not necessarily disrupt
downstream network locations. However, both possibilities will impact fuel availability to end
users that include military applications.
R-interdiction refers the nodes of a network that when interdicted, result in the greatest
weighted distance between a demand node and a most convenient supply node. This concept
informs models that attempt to optimally weaken a network using R number of planned
interdictions at network facilities. Because military planners are generally provided a package
of available sorties or strikes, the R-interdiction model provides a beneficial concept for
simplifying and maximizing the assignment of these resources. Church et al. (2004) describe a
model that iterates the number of strikes, R, and how these strikes might best impede a network
by maximizing the effects of the strikes measured in terms of resulting shortest distances
between nodes (Church et al., 2004). This solution is highly applicable to petroleum supply
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lines since the loss of a storage node can seriously debilitate the flow of commodities to
dependent end users. In the case of refined petroleum, the shortest distance will translate to the
greatest flow rate between nodes using the remaining arc capabilities.
Computer experimentation is an additional tool that is available to consider an
interdiction decision space. Similar to R-interdiction, experimentation allows the development
of courses of action to impede a petroleum distribution network. Depending on the options of
disruption, computer experimentation on a network model would provide the user with detailed
information on the decision space. Sacks et al. (1989) codified the use of statistical computer
models to measure responses to multiple factor settings in a deterministic model. Similar factor
settings could accompany interdiction decisions regarding vulnerable pipelines, storage
facilities, or supply points within the refined petroleum network. The results of such an
investigation can inform statistical analysis and response surface representation by investigating
responses throughout the design space at a limited number of runs (Sacks et al., 1989).
Johnson et al. (2010) demonstrate how high order polynomials can model input-output
interactions that may require significant computational power to otherwise execute. The authors
propose four types of space-filling designs for comparison. Space filling designs are methods
used to efficiently represent a large number of factor settings within a design space. The spacefilling designs that are investigated by the authors include uniform, maximum-entropy, Latinhypercube, and sphere-packing designs (Johnson et al., 2010). Space filling designs are
intended to investigate as much of the decision space as is possible within constraints of time
and computing power. However, an experiment with limited factors or discrete numbers of
factor settings may allow investigation of the entire design space.
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Multiple interdiction models are relevant to determining how to best disrupt a
commodity network. Petroleum refineries are vast and complex operations whose locations
and capacities are widely known. The transportation networks that support product delivery are
similarly complex. Despite the dominance of pipeline systems, distribution may rely on any
number of delivery methods including rail, barge, truck, or freighter. Available storage
facilities may be highly diversified in size, location, and vulnerability (Inkpen and Moffett,
2011: 431). A first world military superpower such as the United States possesses the
capabilities to effectively disrupt these networks. However, complete disruption may not be
achievable. Improperly implemented network interdiction could result in undesirable cascading
effects causing suffering throughout the regional economies with little measureable results in
reducing the capabilities of an adversary. The ability to measure the first order effects of
interdiction is essential to assessing the cascading second and third order impacts on the
affected economies.
2.4 First Order Impacts of Disruption

Empirical analysis provides a tool to predict the price fluctuations of commodities. This
technique is evident in the analysis of the significant refinery interruptions that occurred after
Hurricane Katrina. The use of empirical modeling enables the assessment of how market
shocks and network distributions might impact highly sensitive market conditions such as the
price of refined petroleum products.
Kendix and Walls (2010) describe the use of regression analysis of petroleum industry
indicators. The details of the research include references to the US Department of Energy’s
Information Administration where available data is compiled for almost every necessary aspect
of domestic energy markets. This data includes refinery capacity, storage networks,
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distribution, usage, prices, and a litany of other useful data. The author did indicate that this
data is not available for individual refineries from the Department of Energy, but suggested a
methodology to disaggregate these data sets and determine a relationship between individual
refineries and the fuel markets that they support. The author further identified refinery outages
identified in the United States and linked these events with the time, date, location, duration,
and offline capacity in addition to the type of refinery capacity that went off line (Kendix and
Walls, 2010).
Kendix and Walls also point out a major concern with the use of empirical time-series
data that is present in almost any data set that regresses against price. These time series data
points introduce inherent dependence between data points that is not easily mitigated in the
regression analysis (Kendix and Walls, 2010).
Fink et al. (2010) present a risk-based approach that gauges the overall impact on
market prices caused by a weather disruption. They consider the forecasting of tropical storms
over two decades to examine whether the prices are linked to a weather forecasting horizon.
The authors sourced forecasting data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association
(Fink et al., 2010).
The term ‘crack spread’ refers to the difference between the cost of crude petroleum to a
refiner and the expected price of the products; it is used to define the industry profit margin.
This calculation usually compares the price of two units of gasoline and one unit of diesel to the
cost of three units of crude stock (Inkpen and Moffett, 2011: 459:460). Fink et al. utilize a
‘crack spread’ calculated from the observed changes in the prices of refined products contrasted
with the stock prices of the required crude petroleum as a response variable. The data is
concentrated around the third refinery district of the United States known as Petroleum
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Administration for Defense (PADD III) that includes all Gulf Coast states and their refineries
(Fink et al., 2010).
Changes in forecasts and the associated variations in crack spread statistics allow
analysts to track how the expected landfall location and magnitude of the storm will influence
domestic prices and refiner profits. Because such a disproportionate amount of the refinery
capacity of the United States is located within the path of the Atlantic Hurricane corridor, the
tools utilized provided some robust analysis due to the high number of data points. The crack
spread statistic led the authors to conclude that the changes in the 24 hour forecasting of
tropical storms would significantly influence the trading price of various petroleum
commodities (Fink et al., 2010). This conclusion is applicable in any scenario that includes a
predictable disruption to the refined petroleum network and a reasonable extension to an
expected armed conflict could result in similar forecasting effects on global prices.
Choi and Hammoudeh (2009) investigate the problem of time series data in price
modeling of commodities including crude oil and its refined derivatives. They seek to identify
the occurrence of long memory within the petroleum industry using crude spot price data
collected over two decades. The identification of associated autocorrelation within the data that
falls between parameters associated with long memory patterns is determined by analysis of
price returns from the data set (Choi and Hammoudeh, 2009).
The authors use the presence of long memory to populate an estimate and run multiple
forecasting models that predict future data within a 20 day output. The model implements the
effects of price variations and estimates the length of the market effects with significant
accuracy in crude and most of its products. The results indicate that even a significant break
associated with conflict or economic disaster will not affect the data substantially to cause
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variations from the long memory model of petroleum price for the cases examined (Choi and
Hammoudeh, 2009).
Jason and Kristin Fink (2013) further explore the effects of forecasting on the prices of
oil and gas. The study focuses on the belt of refineries on the US coast of the Gulf of Mexico
and determines that the price fluctuations have actually reacted earlier over the course of a
decade from a 24 hour horizon reaction to one of 48 hours. Reasons for this increase include the
development and refinement of forecasting models that allows a much greater ability to
estimate impacts on the industry. The authors collected similar data to Choi and Hammoudeh
(2009) with an expansion into the most recent decade of occurrences. They developed a risk
assessment methodology and applied an equity return regression model that sources the data
points presented. Reintroducing the notion of ‘crack spread,’ the authors are able to identify the
conditions where events related to a hurricane and associated forecasting will result in notable
changes to the prices of refined petroleum products. Additionally, the authors identify that the
robustness of the capacities available to larger refiners allows them to use remote infrastructure
to react to short markets caused by hurricane disruptions and capitalize on the temporary price
fluctuations. The conclusion reiterates that the model of forecast horizons and attributed price
fluctuations has moved in a direction that increases prices and profits for traders and refiners
(Fink and Fink, 2013).
Blair and Rezek (2008) describes the effects of catastrophic hurricanes in the refinery
region of the US Gulf Coast on various market indicators. Most notably, Blair and Rezek use an
error-correction model to determine how quickly the measurable supply effects pass through the
system to affect prices to the consumer. An empirical model implements error-correction terms
that uses a long run adjustment parameter to determine how quickly price changes occur and
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estimates the timeline of the system’s return to steady state. Blair’s model indicates that this
pass through is extremely quick; there is not significant evidence of market flaws that affect the
price pass through from crude stocks to spot prices of gasoline during the Katrina hurricane
event (Blair and Rezek, 2008).
Kaiser’s (2008) article entitled, ''The impact of extreme weather on offshore production
in the Gulf of Mexico,'' explores the consequences of tropical storms and hurricanes on the oil
industry in the Gulf Coast with a focus on shut-in production using an empirical model based
on historic production coupled with weather events. The author coupled this information with
production statistics from the Gulf of Mexico. Kaiser’s summary of the capacity of the region
highlights the complexity of mathematical analysis of the complex distribution and production
system (Kaiser, 2008).
Kaiser describes the shut down procedures that are explored in the model and the
timeframes for shut down, evacuation, and restoration of capacity. The formulated model uses
seasonal impacts, cumulative impacts, and event impacts to build associated empirical models
detailing the effects of shut-in production at multiple facilities along the Gulf Coast. The author
concludes that the impact on shut-in production is present does not delineate the magnitude
(Kaiser, 2008). In the case of Katrina, the shut-in procedures occurred with sufficient advanced
notice to allow the refiners to conduct a safe shut down procedures. In the event of armed
conflict, there may not be sufficient time to allow proper system shut down, which will
exacerbate the impacts and associated cascading effects.
Kaiser and Pulsipher’s (2006) publication is entitled, ''Modeling the cost of shut-in
production and the value of information in the Gulf of Mexico.” The work describes weather
delay risks in the Gulf Cost petroleum markets. He proposes a methodological framework that

30

will provide a cost estimate related to previously discussed shut-in procedures. The author
provides gradient charts that detail the risk involved with severe weather impact in all locations
within the Gulf of Mexico, many of which contain production or refinement capacity (Kaiser
and Pulsipher, 2006).
Kaiser and Pulsipher (2006) present production recovery and delayed recovery models
that vary based on the number of events and the number of recovery sequences. These
parameters are augmented with a cost adjustment for petroleum and gas using a function of the
discount rate and price over the duration of the shut-down. The empirical model uses a present
value function that estimates the loss of cash flow during a production shut-in. This model is
intended for a corporate entity that might attempt to forecast economic losses based on a
contingency event such as a hurricane. Kaiser and Pulsipher (2006) conclude that the
information is provided by such a model will support the decision cycle that determines the
economic risk of shutdown in addition to other factors of safety and necessity when considering
the proper mitigation strategies for an approaching weather event (Kaiser and Pulsipher, 2006).
This type of data is an important input for the determination of what procedures would allow
production to resume the most efficiently.
The body of research involving refinery disruptions heavily sources empirical evidence
to determine the expected primary effects on price and global markets. This information is
highly valuable in determining market impacts that result from varying degrees of disruption to
a petroleum network. Most essentially, the data sources identified by previous research allows
for estimation of anticipated downtime for a refinery shutdown. This estimation can use
empirical data or create stochastic function using known parameters. While a hurricane is
slightly more predictable than the effects of intentional state inflicted network interdiction,
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there are parallels between the effects on a refinery network and the associated economic
instability. Since empirical evidence and data is available from most of the world’s petroleum
markets, this information will inform an appropriate model to predict the immediate impact to
refined petroleum supply, refinery outages, and product price variations.
2.5 Cascading Effects of Disruption

Once the immediate impacts of a disruption occur, the impacts of price fluctuations and
shortages will begin to reverberate across the infrastructure system. Petroleum provides an
inexpensive and available form of energy in almost every economy in the world. Within the
middle distillate products that are the focus of this study, there is vast potential for extensive
cascading impacts to affect nearly every corner of a society. The events of September 11, 2001
resulted in a renewed focus on infrastructure protection. A significant byproduct of this
research resulted from the analysis of interdependencies in public infrastructure networks.
These networks support each other in many essential ways.
The existence of these interdependencies was highlighted by Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and
Kelly (2001) in a study of the subject of critical infrastructure as part of the US National
Security apparatus. The authors cite a litany of disruptions including telecommunications
satellite failure and electricity generation shortages. As the effects of these failures cascaded to
other industries, the authors noted the appearance of four types of interdependent systems.
Physical interdependencies involve systems with direct inputs and outputs to one another where
the functionality of one network requires inputs from a source network. Cyber
interdependencies occur when automation systems control the execution of multiple physical
networks and result in a vulnerability to informational disruptions. Geographic
interdependencies exist in systems that have significant collocation between the arcs of
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different networks such as with telephone and power lines. Human decision making schemes
may result in logical dependencies that link various networks through responses to dynamically
interacting systems (Rinaldi et al., 2001).
The first order effect involving disruption of oil pipelines appears within the
interdependent model and shows second order effects upon refineries and storage nodes. The
disruption manifests itself in excess inventory at refinery locations and associated depletion at
storage facilities. These physical impacts will cause supply shortages through road and air
transportation networks. These are typical cascading results that the authors classify as linear
or complex depending on the predictability of the outcome. Further classification suggests that
the level of correlation between networks will determine the degree of the impact on associated
systems (Rinaldi et al., 2001). Their article presented an important definitional framework that
informed extensive follow-on exploration of the linkages between industries and their
associated infrastructure networks.
Alcantara and Padilla (2003) considered the potential impact of disruptions to energy
markets as a result of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the Spanish regulatory structure.
The proposed methodology investigates the vulnerability of key economic sectors to regulatory
reductions in energy consumption using a Leontief model. The model proposes linking the
demands of an industry and criticality of the demand to industry production to define the
elasticity of industry production to increasing energy demands. The results highlighted
agriculture, energy production, steel production, transportation equipment, and chemicals as
key sectors of potential impact (Alcantara and Padilla, 2003).
Rinaldi (2004) expanded the discussion of critical infrastructure by recommending a
modeling and simulation approach to investigating interdependency. He highlights the national
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security requirement for determining the various critical network vulnerabilities to terror attack
and cyber attacks among other goals. Rinaldi presents modeling approaches involving supply
chain systems that apply directly to the oil and gas industry. He also recommends the use of
dynamic simulation to determine the downstream impacts of network interdiction. Agent-based
and physics-based models appear as alternatives to investigate physical infrastructure models.
The introduction of Leontief models appears in this article and its definition is essential to
further research in this area. Leontief Input-Output models estimate economic flows in a linear
and time dependent system that accounts for the production, transportation, and distribution of
commodities. Rinaldi describes the applicability of these models to an interconnected network
of public infrastructure (Rinaldi, 2004).
Zimmerman (2004) presents an investigation of incidents that resulted in observable
cascading failures as a result of interdependencies that exist in public infrastructure. The author
iterated the difference between spatial interdependency that relies on co-location of networks
and functional interdependencies that result from a system requiring direct inputs from another
in order to remain functional. A resulting database demonstrated interconnectivity in a variety
of industries including oil and gas pipelines and many networks that they support. Oil pipeline
disruption did not appear as a common observation, but the interruption of gas pipelines
resulted in 19 documented cases of failure in an adjoining industry (Zimmerman, 2004).
Peterson et al. (2006) survey applications to the examination of key infrastructure
interactions. He highlighted the occurrence of interaction for reasons of geospatial proximity,
direct input reliance, and linkages that result from operational strategies of various
organizations. Effects are categorized in terms of PMESII, which the author defines as the
interconnected political, military, economic, infrastructure, and informational systems of a
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society. The author identified three specific systems that are relevant to the study of petroleum
pipeline infrastructure. These models include Athena, CIP/DSS (Critical Infrastructure
Protection Decision Support System), and an Australian government model called CIPMA.
Petersen’s research revealed a significant level of governmental and industrial participation into
the study of second and third order effects caused by system interdependencies. Contributing
US Agencies summarized in the study included the Argonne, Oak Ridge and Los Alamos
National Laboratories as well as Air Force Materiel Command (Peterson et al., 2006).
Haimes and Jiang (2001) develop an interoperability model based on the work of
Leontief that explores the level of dependency between interconnected networks. Santos
(2006) expanded the concept to interconnectivity in economic systems such as finance, service,
and commodity flow utilizing a similar Input-Output model. A terrorist attack is used as a
premise for the economic disruption. The resulting model demonstrates oil extraction and
refinement as two of the top sectors that contain interoperability with other industries. This
data is utilized to produce an estimate of overall economic loss to the US economy based on a
potential disruption. Again, petroleum refinement appears as a significant contributor to
economic loss (Santos, 2006).
Setola et al. (2009) also applied the Input-Output model to critical infrastructure
dependency in an analysis of Italian public utility systems. The approach utilizes an Input
Output Interoperability Model (IIM) to assess the impact of one industry on the function of
another. The approach measures how an industry plays a role in the operations of another
industry using a dependency index. These indices are a row summation of a Leontief
Coefficient that describes the compounding effects caused by significant interdependency. The
Leontief Coefficient is calculated by dividing the input of a product in a specific industry by the
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total outlay of that product output. The measurement determines the relative level of
dependence of an industry on a particular type of input or product. The resulting Leontief
model follows interactions where cascading effects of one industry could result in the collapse
of another dependent industry. The methodology includes analysis of higher order
dependencies where an industry is impacted indirectly through cascading effects using a
relative increment that measures the transmission of impacts along a series of dependent
facilities. The authors analyze expert opinions to determine the impacts and consequences of
infrastructure degradation. The article defines fuzzy numbers as entities that account for
unknown factors that are collected from subject matter expert data. They implement fuzzy
numbers to analyze subjective information from experts (Setola et al., 2009).
Lee et al. (2007) discuss a network flow model of interconnectivity that represents an
interdependent layer network. This approach appears as a mixed integer program that
minimizes implementation cost while considering the impact of shifting commodity
availabilities. The model extends arc-node structures of interdependent supply and demand
relationships between infrastructure networks. Electric power, communication, and
transportation system interoperability in Lower Manhattan appear in the scenario
implementation of the model. The iterative process used to define constraints and variables is
versatile and could provide the basis for a study of petroleum network disruption and its
cascading effects (Lee et al., 2007).
The Lee model adds the critical component of demand shortfalls that are described as a
slack variable within the solution set. The weighted slack of demand nodes describes the
consequence of a network disruption manifesting in unmet demand. This shortfall will
determine the degree that a dependent network is affected and highlight the priority for
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restoration efforts (Lee et al., 2007). The concept of weighted slack contributes an essential
component to predicting cascading effects. Within the context of a petroleum supply network,
this slack may represent the amount of end user demand that is unfulfilled at each distribution
node. A decision variable representing unmet demand allows the consideration of the impact of
unmet demand upon the larger economy or civil infrastructure. This concept will contribute to
the analysis of interdependency by predicting the level of unmet demand caused by network
interdiction.
Nieuwenhuijs et al. (2008) authored a research paper entitled, “Modeling Dependencies
in Critical Infrastructures.” The authors seek an understanding of critical infrastructure
dependencies and propose a model to represent their relative significance. The methodology
measures the impact or effects of dependency by specific quality of the delivered commodity
including volume of food or petroleum, speed of transportation, temperature of heating water,
pressure of gas or water, voltage of electricity, and so forth. The model delineates the
response of the supported entity by the adjusted functionality level that results from the loss in
associated dependent supply during a deterioration period and recovery stage. A time response
measures the impact of the loss in commodity over a specific time period related to the
functionality of the supported system. The model output describes states of operation including
normal, stressed, crisis, and recovery based upon the services and products available. The
authors capture the level of infrastructure movement through various states that are determined
by the response caused from lack of a required commodity (Nieuwenhuijs et al., 2008).
Interdependency results from links between networks that result in a physical or
dependent connection between their functionality. The degree of this interdependency is
determined by the degree to which these links interact with the overall network. Fu et al.
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(2014) developed an investigation into cascading failure of interdependent systems. The degree
that this dependency exists is calculated by the ratio of dependent nodes between two networks.
Additionally, the redundancy of these networks is calculated by the amount of supply nodes
that a dependent node in an adjacent network might enjoy (Fu et al., 2014). In the context of
the problem statement, a highly redundant transportation network might enjoy several potential
sources of diesel distribution from the petroleum supply network. A high degree of dependency
would also exist in a transportation network since a preponderance of nodes required input from
a petroleum distribution network. The impact of this interdependency is evident in the
aggregate performance resulting from a network disruption, which is calculated using the size
of the disruption.
Barker and Santos (2009) describe the essential role of inventory in the mitigation of
supply chain disruptions. A robust supply chain with significant inventory can withstand a
disruption in production or delivery of goods. Higher levels of inventory, while expensive, can
increase the resilience of a distribution network that distributes products supporting critical
infrastructure. The impacts of various levels of inventory manifests through time and is
represented in an input-output model (Barker and Santos, 2009). Similarly, the storage
capacities of petroleum networks allow a network manager the flexibility to respond to various
types of supply disruption. Larger quantities of inventory that are dispersed throughout a
network will provide a time buffer that acts to mitigate the impacts of interdiction.
Other applications of the critical infrastructure interdependency models include
Johansson and Hassel (2010), who provided a case study oriented on a railway. Zhang and
Peeta (2011) provided a study that captures techniques for mapping connectivity between
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physical infrastructures and documents the use of various applications in transportation and
energy system interdependency.
2.6 Construction of a Generic Petroleum Network Model

The petroleum network distribution system comprises of three elements required for
efficient downstream operations. The refinement and distribution of middle distillates requires
a refinery network with local storage, regional storage depot locations, and distribution nodes
available to all varieties of consumers. Each of these nodes must access reliable transportation
that can take the form of pipelines, waterborne vessels, truck transportation, and railways.
(Neiro and Pinto, 2004). The specific medium utilized to transport finished middle distillate
products is specific to each local economy. Pipelines are essential to liquid fuel distribution in
the continental United States. However, specific economies may also rely on alternative
shipment methods as their geography and economic conditions allow.
Refinery operations must receive raw materials in the form of crude production so long
as the supply chain remains operational. Each refinery hub must have sufficient storage
capacity for each type of crude required to generate their desired output in line with projected
market demand. In fact, the role of storage is an essential element to any refinery network and
distribution model, including the middle distillates necessary for military operations. Refineries
require storage capacities available for blending and storage of finished products in addition to
holding tanks for crude stocks. Each of these storage nodes has a very specific minimum and
maximum capacity that requires constant scheduling strategies in order to maintain sufficient
capacity (Pinto et al., 2000). Once derived, petroleum products require sufficient shipment
capacities to reach their initial destination in a timely manner. The distribution hub that
receives the shipments must also meet capacity constraints defined by their minimum and
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maximum storage capabilities. Schedulers must also balance this process with the availability
and capacity of a variety of shipping methods. While pipelines are the primary means in many
highly developed distribution networks, trucks, rail, and barge delivery systems are also capable
of distributing refined products. These alternative methods may allow a network manager to
bypass disruptions in a pipeline based infrastructure.
2.6.1 Refinement Capacities

The design and capabilities of a refinery determine its ability generate finished products
that meet market demand. Various blends of processed crude are mixed as intermediate
distillates within a diesel pool storage unit to form a finished product that meets the
specifications of the expected user. The crude stock, operating variables, and demand
specifications are different for each refinery location. In the case of diesel and other middle
distillates, this can occur through five common processes.
Crude distillation is the initial process for diesel production and results in the production
of naphtha, kerosene, light and heavy diesels. Almost all crude stock undergoes atmospheric
distillation, which involves the heating of desalted petroleum beyond its boiling point at local
pressure. This process renders most of the crude into fractions that are collected in the order of
their volatility for gases or density for particles that remain liquid (Inkpen and Moffett, 2011:
446). Although intermediate diesel products require blending or further refinement before
completion, they could also begin the blending process immediately after atmospheric
distillation (Moro et al., 1998). From a standpoint of interdiction, the atmospheric distillation
process ensures that military grade distillates are inextricably linked from lighter products used
in many industrial and civilian applications. The disruption of distillation processes is a
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This refinement processes is highly non-linear. In addition, its implementation and
results often remain known only to the operators and decision makers within the refinery
complex. The non-linearity is compounded by the necessity of altering operations and
production run settings to accommodate changes in crude stock and demand expectations.
Modeling the interactions of these processes is limited by the availability of data from refiners
as well as the inability to appropriately adjust an existing model to dynamic circumstances
(Beyeler et al., 2012). Because estimations of refinery capacities at global locations are readily
available, refinery models are represented by approximations based upon the maximum
obtainable output for critical types of middle distillates.
For the purposes of contingency modeling, planners might consider estimation of the
contribution provided to the diesel pool by each internal refinement process. However, this
type of estimate requires intimate knowledge of the facility in question, as well as knowledge of
the decision cycle for military and political processes. In addition, such estimates require
expertise regarding methods of disrupting specific product supplies without completely
destroying refinery capabilities and inflicting undesired cascading impacts.
2.6.2 Importation

Economies that cannot refine sufficient petroleum product to meet local demand are
able to utilize transnational pipelines and seaborne freighters to deliver their requirements.
These products require a port of entry and are processed through the common distribution
network for derivatives that are refined domestically (Inkpen and Moffett, 2011:431). The
importation of refined petroleum is a significant vulnerability to many economies and presents
a potential target for embargo or interdiction as described in the Background Section (1.1).
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2.6.3 Storage Nodes

The network manager will impose constraints on the network similar to the marketplace
constraints existing without the uncertainty of disruption. The storage capacity of demand
points, distribution nodes, storage hubs, and production centers dominates the binding
constraints. Sufficient storage capacity must be available at the intended destination in order to
complete a shipment. Storage tanks that are at capacity or incapacitated by a disruption cannot
accept shipments. This is particularly true of pipelines, where queuing of deliveries is not
usually possible because they must maintain a minimum flow rate. Additionally, pipelines can
only operate at the flow rate that meets the restrictions of the receiving storage terminal. This
requires the pipeline to slow its shipment speed whenever the product flow is entering a storage
terminal to ensure that it does not violate the receiving capacity of that location (Trench, 2001:
16). Many other forms of shipment can queue upon arrival at a delivery node. Most notably,
trains, trucks, and waterborne vessels can provide temporary holding of their shipments until
storage capacity is available, although this action reduces the capacity of the shipping arc
during the queuing process. These types of alternatives are historically vulnerable to
interdiction as evident in the Allied Transportation Plan described in Chapter 1.1 Background.
Fuel storage is an essential industry in any country with a refining capacity. Petroleum
and its derivatives are a key component of commodities trading; the ability to receive and store
shipments of liquid energy is essential to the functioning of the refinery industry on both global
and regional levels. Speculators with the capacity to obtain and store refined commodities can
counter the effects of an oil shock such as a distribution network interdiction. These
speculators may include NOCs with refinement and storage capacity. In steady state
operations, the managing agency of the storage node will determine how to optimally profit
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from stored energy as market demand and prices fluctuate normally. In the event of an
anticipated network interdiction, these agencies can counter the impacts of shortages by
injecting stored resources into local markets using storage nodes that are positioned to bypass
any interdiction (Unalmis et al., 2012). Demand will ultimately deplete this storage capacity
until the point of disruption is either bypassed or restored.
While storage nodes do have the capacity to act as transshipment nodes, this is unlikely
during steady state operations. Storage nodes receive shipments from a pipeline for each type
of product demand. There is very limited ability to inject products back into the pipeline from
the supply node because the supply sequencing is set by the initial shipment point. Ultimately,
the resulting effect on the network is that a supply node generally ships specific product
packages to each demand point along a pipeline network. The shipment will bypass
intermediate demand nodes and progress directly to the intended demand point as long as the
shipper has positive control over the network operations (Herran et al., 2010). In the event of a
supply disruption, the storage node may be able to utilize the pipeline to ship to other demand
and storage points along the network, assuming they retain functionality of their pumping
systems.
Storage has an essential role due to its ability to mitigate network disruptions and its
impact on the constraints of the delivery network of refined petroleum. Liquid products require
storage volume, which necessitates an extensive infrastructure of holding facilities for any fuel
network. These facilities represent a significant asset to an adversary who might utilize this
capacity to offset the effects of an interdiction or any general market related shock to prices
(Unalmis et al. 2012). Storage nodes are equally vulnerable because of their fixed location and
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necessity in the supply chain. The consideration of storage capacity is a critical component of
the problem methodology.
The modeler may not have access to detailed data regarding local storage capacities.
However, storage capacity can be estimated as a multiple of the daily demand requirements
based on the distance from the nearest supply location as shown in equation (2). Demand
points that receive and store refined products require a substantial storage capacity and
pumping infrastructure in order to operate. Supply network designers consider several factors
in order to determine the appropriate tank size and configuration at each location. The tanks
must contain enough storage space to satisfy demand based withdrawals while accommodating
each required product separately (Miesner and Leffler 2006, 289-290). Miesner and Leffler
(2006) recommend equation (2) in order to determine the appropriate size of a storage facility
contained within a distribution hub. This formulation is used to estimate the tank size within
the model required for the storage capacity in equation (6). Other methods to estimate storage
capacity could use sales receipts, satellite imagery coupled with geometrical analysis, or
available plans and as-built engineering specifications obtained from the network owner,
subcontractor, or affiliate (Miesner and Leffler 2006, 289-290).

Tank size = (Average Demand * Cycle Time) + Safety Stock +

(2)

Tank Bottoms + Safe Fill Allowance

Within this formula, cycle time represents the lapse between deliveries of each product.
Safety stock provides a buffer that allows planning latitude between arrivals of stock. Tank
bottoms represent the physical lower bound of tank capacity described by Pinto et al. (2000).
Safe fill allowance is similar to safety stock in that it provides a buffer that prevents exceeding
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the capacity of the tank during a delivery (Miesner and Leffler 2006, 290-291). Refined
product distribution points utilize above ground tanks and represent a high value interdiction
target. The loss of this infrastructure prevents distribution points from receiving or distributing
products delivered by the polyduct.
2.6.4 Pipeline Arcs

The pipeline is the most effective method of transporting refined petroleum at a mass
scale over significant interregional distances. Trucking lacks the volume and efficiency
requirements that would allow it to viably replace a major pipeline in most economies. Rail
traffic can accommodate significant interregional movement of refined petroleum products, but
very few locations in the world have significant rail infrastructure to maintain product flow that
is comparable to a major pipeline (Trench, 2001: 2-3). Waterborne vessels cannot reliably
deliver petroleum reasonably close to adversarial military capacities unless the network user
enjoys and maintains enormous geographical advantages that include unimpeded access to a
seaport. The ability to credibly defend such facilities from air or naval attack is also necessary.
A fuel delivery network might employ every available option in order to ensure that customers
are receiving sufficient supply. This is particularly true of an adversarial power that is
bolstering its network delivery options during or in anticipation of a network interdiction.
However, there may not be a viable alternative to a major pipeline or waterborne route with
significant flow rate capacities in even the most robust distribution network. A possible
scenario available to the network manager is to employ available waterborne, road and rail
assets to meet the most critical demand streams such as defense, power generation, and
essential utilities and services. The volume available for shipment is dependent on the
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availability of alternative shipping means under these circumstances. These alternative means
are also subject to disruption.
A polyduct system is an extremely complex shipping procedure that routes multiple
types of petroleum products through a single arc. Substantial arc capacity is required in order
to implement this type of system. Polyducts are usually routed in a single direction since they
connect the supply point directly with the demand or storage location (Herran et al., 2010).
Reversing this process requires a complete stoppage of flow in its primary direction and
presents a highly complex planning challenge. Additionally, most polyduct networks connect
the supply source directly with the demand locations and a reversal is not logistically necessary.
For research scenario purposes, the modeler might assume that the network manager would
commit available resources to restoring capacity rather than reversing flow direction.
In the event of inland pipeline disruptions, the most effective method of regaining
capacity is to invest resources in a bypass or temporary patch of an interdiction point. PEMEX,
the national oil company in Mexico, has demonstrated the capability of temporary pipelines as
the only viable method of replacing the capacity after a recent natural disaster. Hurricane
Ingrid destroyed the vital oil and product pipelines that supported Mexico City supply and
refinery operations in 2013. PEMEX implemented a solution of temporary lines that met
demand after an installation period of only four days. Reconstruction of this pipeline would
have required several months while alternative transportation methods proved either
unaffordable or infeasible due to capacity constraints (“Two Critical Pipelines Down and
Millions of Dollars on the Line, PEMEX looks to Flexsteel,” 2013).
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2.7 Aggregate Planning

In order to improve the versatility of the network, the refiner can disperse products as
widely as possible based on available storage. A possible strategy that the network manager
can employ is to maximize dispersal of their products using existing storage and shipment
infrastructure. The manager possesses much of the logistical capacity to execute a strategy that
ensures a robust network by prioritizing storage nodes based on their criticality and
vulnerability to network interdiction. This strategy would occur using the same apparatus
available to react to natural market fluctuations in supply and demand (Trench, 2001: 7).
Rather than responding to price fluctuations that drive profit, the manager would respond to
demand shortfalls based on the most critical needs as determined by a political or military
apparatus. Since the most critical nodes are the priority for available supplies during a
disruption in the distribution network, these storage hubs will be the first to increase their
supply stockpiles. This strategy is implemented through Aggregate Planning.
Aggregate planning processes allow for a network manager to focus on a larger strategic
objective when determining how to appropriate resources or distribute products across a wide
range of customers. Aggregation involves the consolidation of planning considerations
involving market conditions and capacities. A properly executed aggregate model allows
management flexibility to meet customer requirements within the constraints of available
capacity (Stevenson, 2012: 475). Developing an aggregate plan involves matching the known
customer demand requirements with the capacity of a distribution system. Within the context
of the refined petroleum distribution model, network managers consolidate all user demand
throughout the system based on a series of distribution points. Each distribution point services
a wide variety of customers for each refined product capacity.
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Within the aggregate model, the manager considers their capacity to produce and
distribute a resource to meet a set demand over the duration of an appropriate planning period.
In an aggregate planning, demand is generally modeled as a known constant. Alternatively, the
modeler can introduce a stochastic component that accounts for variations. The manager’s
purpose for utilizing aggregate planning models is to ensure that demand is efficiently met
despite the occurrence of disruptions to supply parameters. This approach can address multiple
types of issues, including bottleneck problems within a network (Nahmias, 2001: 117).
Bottleneck problems such as a disruption in production, distribution network, or inventory
storage capacity manifest in the event of a network interdiction. The implementation of
aggregate planning allows the network manager to mitigate anticipated or unplanned
disruptions by maximizing the utility of production capacity, supply distribution, and storage
facilities.
Aggregate units are determined by the type of material or item that is produced. The
most relevant unit to a petroleum supply chain utilizes volume of barrels per day (BBPD), often
in multiples of hundreds or thousands. Aggregation must also match the appropriate context
that adequately informs the model results (Nahmias, 2001: 116). Because each type of
petroleum product sources a vast range of dependent industries, the petroleum distribution
model will maintain differentiation of product type within the supply chain.
The ability to deliver goods to market is critical in any industry. Uncertainty over the
capacities of a supply chain influences managerial decisions for a network. In the Basic
Economic Order Quantity model, the producer receives an order of exactly Q units from a
demand node. The producer ships this order to arrive exactly when inventories are depleted at
the inventory location in order to meet expected demand. There is no lead time required in this
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model, and orders are designed to meet demand while limiting inventory and storage costs
(Stevenson, 2012: 566). This model utilizes Q as a constant for demand that does not vary over
time. The significance of the variable Q is to indicate the amount that is shipped to a
destination during the time horizon of an aggregated planning model.
The basic transportation problem determines how a product is profitably moved from its
supply point to a distribution node near the end user. While the proposed methodology is
focused on disruption of the maximum flow, elements of the transportation problem still exist.
These elements include the supply points, transshipment nodes, demand requirements, and
conservation of flow. Distribution Resource Planning utilizes the components of a
transportation problem to inform decisions regarding the production and shipment of resources.
This process allows consideration of alterations to demand (Nahmias, 2001:315-322). While
local demand may remain fixed as described in Aggregate Planning, physical system demand is
highly susceptible to disruption. The loss of storage pipeline, or importation capacities will
alter the production requirements for refineries regardless of local demand variation.
Distribution resource planning enables the consideration of physical demand fluctuations in the
system that are proximate to network debilitation rather than demands of the end user.
Nam and Logendran (1992) provided a review of studies investigating Aggregate
Planning Production (APP). They identified research regarding APP using methodologies that
include Linear programming, Linear Decision Rule, Goal Programming, Heuristics, and
Simulations, among others. The publication allows the reader to determine what pertinent
research exists to identify the model best suited to a specific type of problem or to inform a
desired solution methodology (Nam and Logendam, 1992).
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2.8 Conclusion

In conclusion, the authors of the cited works provide a robust analysis that is highly
applicable to the problem statement and description. There is ample research into the proposed
field to warrant further investigation that meets the requirements of the problem statement
while providing an opportunity to employ various relevant modeling techniques. The most
relevant models included mixed integer linear and non-linear programs that sourced either
empirical models or stochastic modeling in order to develop a solution that met the required
parameters. Models that represented cascading network effects will supply the depth of research
necessary to determine where the most significant impacts of refined petroleum disruption will
occur. There was significant diversity of the operations research solutions applied to this field.
Almost every tool in the operations research field is applicable to some portion of the petroleum
production, refinement and distribution problem.
Specifically, empirical modeling was the most prominent approach used to explore and
predict price variations. Linear programming and mixed integer programming applied well to
refinery mix problems and the network flow problems needed to optimize productivity for the
refiners and distributors. Stochastic methods were most applicable to apply uncertainties related
to demand parameters, supply disruption events, and variations in price and stock price
influencers. Heuristics were present throughout as a method of improving computational
efficiency. Network interdiction utilized a composite of large scale optimization and adversarial
programming techniques. Cascading effects models are beginning to implement more specific
network models that could inform the capabilities of a model in a manner that addresses the
problem statement.
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and regional economies will enable decision makers to consider the ramifications of such an
intentional disruption.
3.2 Development of a Petroleum Commodity Network Flow

In the traditional models presented by Pinto et al. (2000) and Neiro and Pinto (2004),
the refiner is concerned with maximizing profit while meeting contractual market demands
without violating the balance of storage capacities. Storage capacities are of primary concern
due to the hard constraint that limits shipments to the minimum and maximum volumes that the
containment units of any one location can physically hold. The model presented by Pinto et al.
defines the profit function as revenues less the sum of the stock cost of crude oil, transportation
costs, holding costs, and delivery costs (Pinto et al., 2000) This model is realistic for most
refinery networks in normal circumstances.
However, an adversary is likely to alter this model in order to provide the necessary
resources for military operations and basic government and civilian function during a period of
anticipated or actual conflict. Alterations to the profitability model are particularly likely when
the adversary possesses a state run NOC. This strategic model uses a prioritized optimization
that maximizes dispersion to key locations using concepts from aggregate planning by
providing available resources to critically vulnerable or essential petroleum users. If
implemented carefully, an adversary would only execute prioritization to prevent or mitigate a
physical shortage in order to preserve the integrity of steady state operations for as long as
reasonably possible. The profit function is instead relegated to a constraint on financial
resources imposed by circumstances on the adversary, should any practical constraint exist.
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3.2.1 Network Formulation Problem Statement

This formulation will develop the mathematical program required to route multiple
types of refined petroleum products from a supply point at a refinery or import depot through a
pipeline network for storage or consumption at demand locations. Transshipment nodes have
the ability to store products, distribute to end users, or ship to subsequent demand locations in
the network. The objective is to maximize flow of each product type to each demand node with
weighted preference assigned to locations that are critical to the network manager.
3.2.2 Definition of Terms

The terms used in the formulation are defined in Table 1. These terms will remain
consistent throughout this thesis report. Any application of this methodology or its terms is
applied across a consistent time period. The model is developed for a specific time period and
incrementally solved for each subsequent time period within the model. The analyst must
standardize all terms including flow rates, demand requirements, and supply in accordance with
the selected time period. This investigation will consistently utilize a daily time period that
explores a 90 day time horizon. Therefore, the model considers a 90 day time horizon and
optimizes in daily time periods. All terms in Table 1 are continuous unless otherwise noted.
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Table 1: Index of Network Model Terms
Sets
jϵD
(m,n) ϵ A
D j ={fϵD:(j,f)ϵA}
Hj ={hϵD:(h,j)ϵA}
iϵS
Sj ={r ϵ S}
Ej ={e ϵ S}
pϵK
Decision
Variables
Qj,p
ym,n,p
ΔStorj,p
RSi,p
ISi,p
SConsj,p
Constants

Definition
Set of all Demand Nodes j in a Directed Network
Set of Directed Pipeline Arcs in Network from node m to node n
Set of all nodes f immediately following node j in a directed network
Set of all nodes h immediately preceding node j in a directed network
Set of Supply Nodes i
Set of Refinery Supply Nodes r providing refined products to node j
Set of Import Supply Nodes e providing refined products to node j
Set of Petroleum Products p
Definition

wj,p
IStorj,p
Demj,p
StorCapj,p
LBStorCapj,p
RCapi,p
ICapi,p
LBFOm,n
FOm,n
Consj,p

Weighted value to network manager for product p at node j
Initial storage inventory of product p at node j updated each time period
Total expected Demand of product p at node j
Storage capacity for product p at node j
Minimum storage capacity for product p at node j
Refinery capacity of product p at supply node i
Import capacity of product p at supply node i
Minimum Flow Rate for arc (m,n) for all products p
Maximum Flow Rate for arc (m,n) for all products p
End User Consumption at node j of product p

Ratio of expected product p demand delivered to demand node j
Flow Rate for arc (m,n) for product p from node m to n
Inventory change of product p storage at node j to adjust available stocks
Refinery output of product p at supply point i
Imported delivery of product p at supply point i
Shortfall in End User Consumption of product p at node j
Definition

3.2.3 Maximum Flow Mathematical Programming Formulation

The complete formulation is defined in Table 2 and represents the mathematical model
that will enable an assessment of a petroleum product supply network in the event of a
disruption. The model uses a daily period for this study that accumulates over a 90 day time
horizon beginning at the time of disruption with the potential for a suitable warm-up period.
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Table 2: Complete Refined Petroleum Flow Network Mathematical Model



Q j , p Dem j , p w j , p 



Q , y , Stor , RS , IS , SCons
 pK jD


(3)

max

subject to: LBFOm,n   ym,n , p  FOm,n

(m, n)  A

(4)

j  D, p  K

(5)

pK

Cons j , p  Storj , p  SCons j , p  Q j , p Dem j , p

j  D, p  K

LBStorCap j , p  Storj , p  IStorj , p  StorCap j , p

(6)

RSi , p  RCapi , p i  S , p  K
ISi , p  ICapi , p

y

hH j

y

hH j

h, j , p

h, j , p





y

f D j



f D j

j, f , p

(7)

i  S , p  K

 Cons j , p  Storj , p  SCons j , p  0

j  D , p  K

y j , f , p  Cons j , p  Storj , p  SCons j , p   RS r , p 
rS j

 IS

eE j

e, p

0

(9)
(10)

 p  K , j  D

ym , n , p  0
RSi , p  0

(m, n)  A, p  K
j  D, p  K
i  S , p  K

ISi , p  0

i  S , p  K

SCons j , p  0

(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)

3.2.4 Objective Function Development

This maximization function requires a term that ensures each essential distribution node
receives a decision variable, Qj,p that indicates the percentage of the expected local demand of
product p that node j will receive. In this model, the variable Qj,p represents a multiplier of
demand that assigns the delivery volumes to each node j. When Qj,p is set to 1, the product
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receipts at the indicated node will equal the expected demand. Should Qj,p exceed 1, the
product receipts will exceed expected demand and allow for addition to the storage volume of
the demand location for product p. Because maximization of storage is essential to a robust
network, increasing or maintaining storage levels at critical nodes is a key management tactic in
the event of an anticipated network interdiction. The effect of the Qj,p Demj,p formulation is to
determine the total deliveries to the storage point at each period. This objective function
decision variable will effectively maximize the commodity flow rate in a manner that best
meets the strategic interests of the network manager. The model determines the most
appropriate value for Qj,p subject to constraints, weightings, and bounds set by the analyst.
The model can determine a positive value that is less than 1 to represent Qj,p. This result
will reduce the product deliveries below the expected demand level and require withdrawals
from inventory storage in order to meet local consumption requirements. The sum-product of
the Qj,p variable with an appropriate scalar for weight wj,p and the product demand at each node
j from its nearest supplier provides the maximization function directing the adversary’s
distribution plan. This allows non-critical nodes to receive daily demand and available surplus
as long as feasible. This function also allows the model to incorporate what an adversary might
attempt to implement in regards to limited resources and distribution capacity because the
analyst can bound Qj,p in order to limit the size of deliveries or withdrawals. However, since
the future interdiction plan may have vastly different objectives than the distribution network
manager, the maximized flow uses the Qj,p multiplier as a decision variable. The key output
will describe the time requirement for an adversary to increase the robustness of their system to
deal with specific demand goals. The adversary can maximize the amount of refined products
that are diversified across the storage capacity of critical locations. Once a disruption occurs,
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the formulation will continue to assign maximum flow to critical nodes where the infrastructure
to complete commodity shipments is still functional.
If appropriate to meet the needs of the decision maker, the network manager may allow
the value of the variable Qj,p to become a negative multiplier. This negative multiplier will
force less critical supply nodes to remove Qj,p percentage of supply from storage and inject that
quantity back into the network. In the event that no supply points can reach a critical node,
appropriately assigning a negative Qj,p value to a preceding demand node will allow critical
nodes to receive shipments from all remaining accessible locations in the network despite a
successful cut of the network topography.
The floating ceiling system of storage used in most storage facilities coupled with the
access location of the fuel spigot renders approximately 20% of the storage contents
inaccessible without causing significant damage to the storage cell (Pinto et al., 2000). For this
study, the value of Qj,p for an undisrupted fuel storage facility is restricted by this lower
capacity bound. The requirement could be removed entirely should it be appropriate in a
prolonged scenario, which allows the model to consider any feasible continuous value for the
variable, Qj,p.
The refiner will assess the criticality based on location of demand node j where delivery
is required. This criticality will result from its distance from the nearest supply node and its
value contribution to supported military and civilian assets. In order to differentiate between
the criticality of nodes included in the network, the weight multiplier, wj,p is included to
determine appropriate prioritization amongst critical nodes selected for a variable value of Qj,p
Demj,p. The value of wj,p results from an assessment of the criticality of the node and the
perceived difficulty in maintaining its supplies. For non-essential nodes, the Qj,p variable is
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initially modeled near 1 in order to resemble a steady state operation. The results of this
maximization function are presented in Equation (3). An assessment of criticality of demand
locations is necessary to inform the weighted assessment that will appropriately implement the
network priorities. This information may be available from intelligence sources, remote
observations of the system, or known locations of critical infrastructure and military
capabilities.



Q j , p Dem j , p w j , p 



Q , y , Stor , RS , IS , SCons
 pK jD

max

(3)

3.2.5 Description of Constraints

These data sets inform the constraint set for operation of the network. Equation (4) is
the defining constraint of flow capacity over a time horizon consistent with the model. For this
case study, the model will implement a daily iteration of a 90 day decision cycle. The amount
shipped by each node through an available arc (m,n) on a specific time period within the
planning range must not exceed the flow capacity of that arc denoted by FOm,n. The flow rate
to each demand node, j is determined by the summation of product types, p moving though
delivery pipeline arc (m,n) from the previous node iterated over a consistent time interval and
defined as ym,n,p. Additionally, since the arc represents a polyduct, all product shipments must
traverse the same arc within the network infrastructure. Since polyduct capacity will often
mirror or exceed the capacity of the supply points, this may not be a determining factor.
However, if available arc capacity, FOm,n decreases as products progress through the system,
this constraint should be extended to all locations with arc capacity restrictions. There is also a
possibility of a lower bound flow rate, LBFOm,n that dictates a minimum flow rate to ensure
continued operation of the polyduct arc (m,n) (Pinto et al., 2000). This constraint will
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contribute significantly to the behavior of the system in the event of an interdiction, and
requires flow to stop completely if it cannot attain a certain minimum operation.

LBFOm,n   ym,n , p  FOm,n
pK

(m, n)  A

(4)

In all cases where demand locations are accessible by the distribution network, the
shipments may satisfy daily demand if Qj,p is appropriately constrained. Even in the event of an
impending interdiction, the availability of supplies is essential to the stability of the network
and the economy it supports. Therefore, the network manager may continue to meet demand
until it is no longer feasible if the goal is to limit secondary economic effects. In this case, Qj,p
is constrained at or above 1. If the network managers desire to reduce the deliveries to a
particular node, Qj,p may be constrained below 1, which will force the node to meet
consumption requirements, Consj,p, by removing a volume from storage, IStorj,p until storage
volumes are depleted. In this model, the variable for storage adjustments, ΔStorj,p is not
restricted to positive values and can affect the storage volume negatively or positively.
Equation (5) enforces this constraint by maintaining or depleting the storage capacity of a node
as necessary to meet distribution objectives.
An essential consideration to this analysis is to determine the ability of the system to
meet local consumption requirements. Since the shortfall in this local demand will manifest
itself in cascading failures within dependent systems, the model should record the presence and
quantity of demand shortfall across all demand nodes. Price adjustments may impact the
demand levels in local markets. However, market driven demand reductions may not diminish
the existence of shadow demand if local prices impede the volume of the products available for
purchase. The lack of available supplies to support the economy and its dependent industries
will negatively impact sector productivity. This result will dictate the severity and location for
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sources of future cascading effects (Lee et al., 2000). The equality constraint in equation (5)
captures the magnitude of demand shortfall, SConsj,p in consumption requirements at each
node, j for product, p based on known or expected demand levels for the daily time period
consistent with the model. This shortfall is bounded between zero and the consumption
parameter, Consj,p at node j across a time factor that is consistent with the model.

Cons j , p  Storj , p  SCons j , p  Q j , p Dem j , p

(5)

j  D, p  K
Storage adjustments calculated by the sum of the product quantity change and the initial
storage quantity at each node, j for product, p must be non-negative or greater than the
minimum storage volume, depending on the site configuration. As previously noted, a floating
ceiling storage cell requires approximately 20% minimum capacity to avoid damage to the
system (Pinto et al., 2000). This adjustment to the storage minimum can be included if
applicable to the network and is summarized in equation (6). The decision variable, ΔStorj,p
determines the volume adjustment of product inventory by type during shipments in the time
period. ΔStorj,p is calculated as the equality between the amounts shipped less the amount
added to storage and the demand for that product p at the specific distribution node j. Equation
(6) defines this equality function and provides an essential component of the model. This
storage adjustment is required to update the model at specified periods over a time horizon.
The change to storage volumes will become the new initial storage constraint, IStorj,p in the
subsequent time period during the model run.

LBStorCap j , p  Storj , p  IStorj , p  StorCap j , p

j  D, p  K

(6)

Supply constraints require that the supply shipments from each supply node do not
exceed the known capacity of that node reduced by the amount of demand received directly at
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the point of refinement. Equation (7) maintains that refinery points, RSi, cannot ship to demand
node j beyond their capacity to produce refined products of each type p. The refinery locations
maintain local supply and distribution points that can ship products as individual storage nodes
within the network. The representation of these storage nodes does not differ from other
transshipment nodes in the network defined as a node, j. This capacity constraint is represented
as RCapj,p. A similar constraint shown in equation (8) is necessary for importation nodes, ISi
which cannot provide input to the system that is greater than available capacity, ICapi,p for any
product p at supply node i.

RSi , p  RCapi , p i  S , p  K

(7)

ISi , p  ICapi , p

(8)

i  S , p  K

Balance constraints will dictate the movement of petroleum products through the
system. This balance constraint ensures that all flows of products, p through the polyducts are
stored, consumed, or shipped to subsequent demand nodes, f. Additionally, the network
manager can ship storage volumes back into the system to reallocate inventory levels. This
flow balance is represented as a free body diagram centered on demand node j and is depicted
in Figure 4.
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Since refineries are often dispersed throughout a petroleum distribution network, the
supply node conservation is only essential where production or importation is a possibility.
Therefore, an input of zero can represent these parameters if the facility is not present or offline.
This balance equation ensures that the refinery products rendered locally or imported are
injected into the network appropriately and shipped to the subsequent nodes in the system.

y

hH j

h, j , p





f D j

y j , f , p  Cons j , p  Storj , p  SCons j , p   RS r , p 
rS j

 IS

eE j

e, p

0

(10)

p  K , j  D

Non-negativity constraints will inform several of the decision variables that are included
in equations (13)-(14). Decision variables not indicated in this equation set are not constrained
in sign.

ym , n , p  0
RSi , p  0

(m, n)  A, p  K
j  D, p  K
i  S , p  K

ISi , p  0

i  S , p  K

SCons j , p  0

(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)

3.2.6 Summary of Mathematical Model

The Q-Demand model is designed to iterate for an appropriate time horizon as selected
by the modeler, so long as the time delineation is consistently applied across all variables. For
the case study and implementation in this research, the model iterates using a daily time period
over a 90 day planning horizon starting at the time of disruption. The modeler may also chose
to assign an appropriate warm up period in order to replicate the network manager’s capacity to
build up the inventory level of supplies. Optimizing this model without interdiction of the
network enables the modeler to represent the warm-up period between the network manager’s
implementation of aggregate inventory planning in order to diversify their supply status through
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the anticipated time of interdiction. However, the model is amenable to any consistent
implementation of time that is sufficiently precise to properly limit the conservation of flow.
The strategist can extend the model for weekly or monthly time periods as necessary to
properly assess the capacities of the network.
The daily iteration of this model enables the collection of accumulated data that will
inform potential strategies for interdiction. The model produces data for supply availability at
each location and unmet demand at each iteration that are critical to determining the viability of
a course of action and the associated cascading effects that may accumulate using different
experimental scenarios. Because the shortfall in demand, SConsj,p is calculated daily under the
study conditions, the summation of this value across all demand nodes, j within the model will
provide a snapshot of the degree that interdiction techniques have negatively impacted the local
economy.
Additionally, the daily storage availability, Storj,p provides a tool to measure the supply
situation at critical nodes as determined by the strategic interests of the campaign planners. The
measurement of this statistic summed across the time periods prior to decisive operations
allows the modeler to estimate the degree to which an interdiction strategy will negatively
impact an adversary’s ability to maintain petroleum supplies that are accessible to critical
locations. For example, this model will use a 90 day time horizon for each experimental
replication. However, the onset of decisive actions by friendly forces is determined from a
detailed concept of operations and will likely occur far sooner than 90 days from the
interdiction. The strategist is primarily interested in the availability of military grade fuel to the
adversary during the lead up to a decisive operation. For the case study in this thesis, that time
period is set to 21 days from interdiction. The manipulation of the parameters within this
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model will allow experimentation using various interdiction strategies. The outcome of these
strategies measured in demand shortfall and fuel availability at critical nodes will inform
predictive analysis on campaign effectiveness and feed the predictive model of cascading
impacts.
3.2.7 Information Requirements

The planner requires significant data sources regarding supply and demand interactions.
Many of these are available from open source data. This is particularly true when the refinery
and distribution operations are part of a publicly traded portfolio. Statistics may be available
from various sources of information.
Planners require information regarding the location and capacity of refineries and
import terminals for refined petroleum products that includes daily operational data. It should
be noted, however, that the network managers and their supported decision makers may forego
commercial needs in the event of an emergency or disruption. Additionally, the model requires
information on the demand nodes and the network architecture that connects them.
Based on the network requirements regarding fuels of military application and
cascading effect, the methodology may include diesel fuel, fuel oil, and kerosene based jet fuel
from the middle distillate spectrum. Gasoline is also included as a critical component due to its
dominance in the refining and distribution network of most petroleum markets, as well as its
implications on cascading effects (EIA, 2014).
3.3 Implementation of Multi-Commodity Flow

The initial concept necessary to establish a coherent network requires the development
of the network architecture based on a multi-commodity flow. Petroleum networks will
transport multiple product types across an extended network of pipelines and storage facilities.
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Formulating this network into an organized model requires the establishment of a series of
matrices that allow the modeler to include the layers of products and apply appropriate
constraints to the system.
The formulation used by McBride (1998) accommodates a refined petroleum network
using aggregate planning methodology. The establishment of a network based on multiple
products traversing similar delivery infrastructure is accommodated by matrix (15). Each NK
sub-matrix in this equation takes the form of the network incidence matrix representing the
flow of a specific type of petroleum product. This incidence matrix for each NK sub-matrix
includes inputs from servicing supply points, the flow balance along transshipment points, and
the removal of demand at distribution nodes for each product, p. The matrix N may be as large
as necessary to accommodate |K| product types but grows in complexity at each addition.
Furthermore, as the constraints develop, the products are restricted to the same production and
distribution infrastructure.
Implementing McBride’s (1998) formulation for multi-commodity flow, the N matrix
will populate with each petroleum product type that is of interest to the modeler. In matrix
(15), the products represented are various fuel types such as gasoline, kerosene (jet fuel), diesel,
and fuel oil and denoted as N1 through NK respectively. These sub-matrices represent the flow
equations for each product type that are implemented using an incidence matrix.

 N1

N 




N2





N3 ...

NK 

(15)

Each NK includes the information on flow balances from |A| supply source inputs and
between |D| demand nodes. The dimensions of each sub matrix NK require columns for each
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supply point, i and polyduct arc (m,n), that connects demand node m with n. Each demand
node, j is represented in |D| rows. The resulting algebraic function across each row represents
the conservation of flow at each node, j within set D. The sub-matrix NK uses inputs
represented as a zero, one, or negative one value that indicates potential gains/inflow (1) , lack
of interaction (0), or losses/outflow (-1) for each associated infrastructure point, i, j, or (m,n).
The flow balance presented in equation (9) and (10) only depicts a single product type,
p at the specified demand node, j with inputs from supply node, i. In order to populate this
conservation of flow data for the entire model, the complete equation set requires the use of
matrix (15). The flow balance for each node j within an individual product type will populate
the sub-matrix NK. The modeler must represent each node within the matrix dependent upon its
pipeline interactions and accessibility to supply nodes, i. This requires that the NK sub-matrix
has columns representing all supply points, i and pipeline interactions, (m,n). The NK submatrix requires a row to account for each demand node, j where the model records the
conservation of flow data. These sub-matrices are then combined by creating a diagonal matrix
N using sub-matrices NK to represent each product type as defined in matrix (15). This
formulation will result in an N matrix that requires dimensions of (|S|+|A|)(|K|2|D|). The
potential size of this problem depends primarily on the number of product types that are
considered.
3.4 Cascading Effects Analysis: Input-Output Models

Wassily Leontief pioneered the study of the equilibrium of economic interactions
(Leontief 1951). This work led to the development of a wide range of applications in both
energy and military modeling that inform research on the ramifications of changes in the
production capabilities of an economy. The Leontief model assumes that economies take the
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form of a number of interdependent sectors that purchase and sell products or commodities to
and from one another. Since petroleum products are often defined as commodities (Inkpen and
Moffett, 2011: 503), this application is particularly relevant to energy production and
distribution. The magnitude to which local industries rely on petroleum fuel products is an
essential component of a Leontief model that defines interactions within an economy. Within
the Leontief model, the refinery process must produce and distribute sufficient output to satisfy
local, foreign, and own use demand factors. The model is centered on an input-output matrix, A
which defines the interaction in terms of monetary value between all industries of interest
within a specific regional or national economy.
Leontief’s model requires three critical assumptions that are applied directly to military
strategy by Snodgrass et al. (2004). The coefficients of production, which are determined by
industry requirements, must be a fixed value for the duration of the use of the model. The
requirement of constant returns dictates that industry outputs change proportionally to an
increase or decrease in resources provided. This is a valid assumption related to petroleum
consumption, as industries utilizing these products will reduce operations proportionally to a
lack in supply until a failure point is reached and complete shutdown becomes necessary
(Haimes and Jiang, 2001: 6). Additionally, resources are considered homogeneous and
generally measured in terms of the monetary value paid for them during the interactions
between sectors (Snodgrass, et al 2004). The use of monetary values is a convenient method
for assessing the interactions in consistent units of measure. An economy that includes
significant top-driven decision factors within an economy may prioritize certain sectors for
receipt of available resources such as fuel. This eventuality can impact the optimization
objective function detailed in equation (17).

71

3.4.1 Definition of Terms for Leontief Input-Output Model

Table 3 describes the terms required to develop an input-output model using the
Leontief mathematical programming formulation. The terms referenced in this table are not
associated with any of the terms from the previous maximum flow network mathematical
program.
Table 3: Definition of Leontief Input-Output Model Terms

ai,j
L
xi,j
Xi, Xj
X
ri,j
Pj
Cj
C
Fi
F
Ri
R

The technology coefficient for the amount of a product from sector i consumed
by sector j as a percentage of total inputs required for operation of sector j
The matrix composed of all Leontief Coefficient elements of ai,j from a particular
economy
The amount or value of products from sector i consumed by sector j
The total outlays (requirements) and the total outputs (production) of industry i
or j. Outlays and outputs must be equal in this formulation.
Vector composed of all values of Xj in an economy
Coefficient of resources i required for use in sector j
The total resources i available to an industry j
Amount of production delivered to end users by industry j
Vector consisting of end user consumption across all industries in an economy
Amount of final demand from industry i
Vector consisting of final demand across all industries in an economy
Amount of exports from industry i
Vector consisting of exports across all industries in an economy

3.4.2 Formulation for Leontief Input-Output Model

Problem Statement: This Input-Output Mathematical Model determines how the
productivity losses in a specific sector reverberate throughout the economy based on
interdependencies between industries. The model maximizes the remaining productivity across
all industries based on limitations placed upon a specific industry or industry component of the
economy. This formulation is adapted from Gallagher et al. (2005).
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Table 4: Mathematical Model for Leontief Input-Ouput Formulation

max
X ,P

subject to:



i n
i 1

Xi



(17)

a11 X 1  a12 X 2  ...  a1 n X n  C 1  X 1
a 21 X 1  a 22 X 2  ...  a 2 n X n  C 2  X 2
...
a n 1 X 1  a n 2 X 2  ...  a nn X n  C n  X n

(19)
r11 X 1  r12 X 2  ...  r1 n X n  C 1  P1
r21 X 1  r22 X 2  ...  r2 n X n  C 2  P2
...
rn 1 X 1  rn 2 X 2  ...  rnn X n  C n  Pn
j m

i n

i n

j

i

i

 Pj  Ri   Fi
X i  X i*
Pj  Pj*

for

i  1, , n
j  1, , m

(20)

(21)

This matrix is then configured as technology coefficients calculated using equation (16).
Technology coefficients, aij are determined by dividing the amount of sector i outputs
consumed in sector j, xij by the total output of sector i, Xj. All xij elements of this equation are
measured in values of the interactions measured by some monetary standard. Each entry in the
input-output matrix, L is converted to a Leontief coefficient using this equation. The resulting
technology coefficient aij represents the proportion of total outlays of industry j that are
consumed by dependent industry i. Restated, this represents the level of input requirements
obtained from a specific industry as a percentage of total inputs into that industry, which are
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defined as their total outlays, or intermediate consumption. The L matrix is simply an
organization of each Leontief coefficient, aij (Gallagher et al., 2005).
aij 

xij
X

i  1, , n, j  1,, m

(16)

j

Casler and Wilbur related this concept specifically to the energy industry using a model
that defines energy intensity as an interaction term within the input-output analysis. This
concept measures the interaction between energy and non-energy sectors in terms of units of
thermal intensity per unit of cost. The authors propose that the technology coefficients
represent input-output measurements defined by thermal intensities and their costs in dollar
amounts rather than the Leontief technology coefficients that aggregate every input-output
matrix entry as a strictly financial interaction (Casler and Wilbur, 1983).
Haimes and Jiang (2001) define the risk of inoperability as the result of reduced output
causing systemic failures in a dependent industry due to a measureable disruption in the
interconnected systems. The risk model approach uses an L matrix that defines the Leontief
coefficients using the risk of inoperability of a particular infrastructure system caused by a
direct disruption in an interconnected industry. Likewise, resource availability and supply are
quantified by the risk of inoperability rather than direct inputs as in the traditional formulation.
This model is adaptable for disruptions that are undefined or stochastic in nature (Haimes and
Jiang, 2001).
Although this formulation of Leontief models is highly useful for the implementation of
interactions between critical networks, its main impact is to measure the risk of a disruption
within various industries. In a follow on article, Haimes et al. (2005) further discuss the
versatility of the inoperability measurements utilized in various Leontief models. The authors
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discuss how inoperability may be measured for application to various types of problems.
Inoperability may extend to shortfalls in production, percentages of demanded production, and
the residual production of a disrupted system (Haimes et al. 2005). The article further describes
how the L matrix in the Leontief model is derived from appropriate construction of make and
use matrices. The make matrix describes industrial commodity production, while the use
matrix describes the consumption of these same commodities within industries as a requirement
for their productivity.
The Leontief input-output model requires an appropriate optimization function that
approximates the expected actions and prioritization of the adversary. There is significant
variation in the impact based on how the network manager might redistribute available
resources. The manager could elect to maintain production across the economy by
implementing the maximization of Xi as defined in equation (17). Alternatively, the manager
could seek to preserve final demands, Fi using equation (18). Any combination of these
components or weighted objective function would allow the modeler to determine the
cascading impacts utilizing the most appropriate objective function for the expected actions of
the network manager (Gallagher et al., 2005). Investigation of these outcomes can extend into
sensitivity analysis. This survey will implement equation (17) in order to maintain production
across all industries in a manner that measures associated cascading effects.

max





(17)

max

 F 

(18)

X ,P

X ,P

i n
i 1

Xi

in
i 1

i

For this study, each experimental run using the model in Table 2 will report a
cumulative tally of unmet demand across the scenario. The model will assign a price to this
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unmet demand based on the market value of the economic losses caused by the disruption. This
output will inform the appropriate setting for the constraint Xi * that is associated with the
refined petroleum market as shown in equation (21). This limitation will reduce the
contributions to the economy of refined petroleum products below its known operating levels.
Haimes and Jiang (2001) generated an application of the Leontief model that adapts the
input-output framework to Interdependent Infrastructure problems that are relevant to the
United States and other global economies. This approach implements a methodology for
determining the risk to critical infrastructure caused by interdependence of industries (Haimes
and Jiang, 2001). This model allows for the addition of rij that indicates the resource
requirement i contribution to the jth infrastructure. Resources include independent
requirements such as labor. The variable Ck and its associated vector C represent the sector k
production outputs that are delivered to market and consumed by the sum of all end users. End
user consumption is not included in intermediate consumption, which is the use of an input in
the production of another product. The model accounts for intermediate consumption between
industries in the L matrix and end user consumption in the C vector.
The problem methodology presented in Table 2 for modeling the capacities of
petroleum distribution network will provide a deterministic output that estimates the magnitude
of a disruption. Therefore, the complexity of the risk assessment criteria and determination
used by Haimes and Jiang (2001) is insufficient to inform the Leontief model. Alternatively,
Gallagher et al. (2005) present an approach that considers the direct impact of military strategy
on an industry and its cascading effects throughout an economy using the formulation presented
by Haimes and Jiang (2001). This representation characterizes the balance equations by
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assessing the magnitude of each sector interaction and is described in equation set (19). The
parameter Pn is the measurement of primary resource availability (Gallagher et al., 2005).
a11 X 1  a12 X 2  ...  a1 n X n  C 1  X 1
a 21 X 1  a 22 X 2  ...  a 2 n X n  C 2  X 2
...
a n 1 X 1  a n 2 X 2  ...  a nn X n  C n  X n

(19)

r11 X 1  r12 X 2  ...  r1 n X n  C 1  P1
r21 X 1  r22 X 2  ...  r2 n X n  C 2  P2
...
rn 1 X 1  rn 2 X 2  ...  rnn X n  C n  Pn

In order to adapt this to the constrained resource environment associated with the
implementation of a military strategy, the authors add flow equation (20) that constrains Pj
resource requirements from exceeding the sum total of its components, final demand, Fi and
Exports, Ri within the trade structure of the country (Gallagher et al., 2005). This constraint is
potentially relevant to a major exporter of refined petroleum, as it takes into account the
implementation of trade sanctions that limit an adversary’s ability to generate income through
trade. This income loss will cascade through the system in a similar method of other industrial
losses.
Finally, Gallagher et al. (2005) present additional constraints to allow for the restriction
of available commodities caused by sector disruptions as a result of military strategy
implementation. These constraints prevent production, Xi or resources, Pj from surpassing the
imposed limitations that are the result of such an implementation, defined as Xi * and Pj* and are
summarized in equation (21).
j m

i n

i n

j

i

i

 Pj  Ri   Fi
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(20)

X i  X i*
Pj  P

*
j

for

i  1, , n
j  1, , m

(21)

Since input-output data often resources annual statistics, the analyst must properly scale
all experimental inputs. For example, if the measured value of economic loss investigates a
cumulative 90 day time period similar to this methodology, the model must properly scale the
value of the response to accommodate an I-O matrix with yearly data. This requirement may
violate Leontief’s assumption that input-output interactions remain static in the short term, but
use of a consistently accumulated data set is essential to achieving a coherent result. The
objective function from equation (17) assigns the reduced level of resources amongst dependent
industries. This model will determine the new operating levels for each industry as a
percentage of their known economic contributions, Xi.
3.5 Interdiction Experimental Design

The interdicting force may have almost unlimited options within the parameters of their
capabilities in order to disrupt a supply network. Operational experimentation provides a
framework to determine methods of exploring the decision space. Experimentation involves
tests of a system in an effort to determine changes to a response. The experimenter can adjust
inputs to affect changes on the response that are observed in the system (Montgomery, 2013: 13). In the network distribution system that is modeled using the methodology outlined in
Section 3.2, the experimenter is interested in what interdiction courses of action might result in
desired variations to product availability to adversarial forces. Additionally, these courses of
action could result in cascading effects that are more difficult to predict.
A factor is a variable that the experimenter can change. Factorial Design includes the
consideration of multiple factors that are adjusted simultaneously within an experimental space.
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The analysis of multiple simultaneous factors is often summarized in an Tk design. A modeler
selects k number of factors and assesses them at increasing levels, T from low to high for each
selected factor. In a system where variation is a factor, replications of the same experiment
may occur (Montgomery, 2013: 5-7). The use a full-factorial design is most appropriate to
consider the largest possible portion of the design space. In computer experimentation, full
factorial designs are appropriate if sufficient time and computing power is available to
implement all possible factor settings. However, in a deterministic model that does not contain
stochastic or randomly selected variables, there is no presence of noise or error to consider. An
augmentation of the deterministic model from Table 2 will include variations in down time
imposed by interdiction that will introduce variation into this experiment.
3.5.1 Factor Selection

The interdictor has multiple courses of action that could allow disruption of the supply
network in accordance with the appropriate operational plan. Appropriate factors required to
analyze the decision space for petroleum network interdiction include disruptions on polyducts
represented as arcs, storage hubs represented as transshipment nodes, or refinery and
importation points represented as supply nodes.
Polyducts require pumping infrastructure at their origin and at intermittent locations
along the route. Pumps, compressors, actuators, and the power plants that fuel them are
necessary throughout a polyduct network (Miesner and Leffler, 2006: 240-258). Variations in
topography could also necessitate booster locations that elevate the network flow. (Miesner
and Leffler, 2006: 72-73). These physical infrastructure points often lie above ground to
facilitate maintenance, and are therefore vulnerable to an interdiction strike.
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Storage capacity is often limited within the refined product distribution network.
Refined fuels have a limited shelf life before they begin to degrade. Additionally, storage
capacity is expensive under normal circumstances. Excess storage would be financially
disadvantageous to the distributor to transport excess product and store it for long periods of
time. Finally, many countries lack the refinery capacity to meet local demand. In some cases,
expensive importation processes must already occur to meet local demand (Inkpen and Moffett,
2011: 476-477). Therefore, it is rarely to the advantage of the refiner or local economy to
import fuel that is significantly beyond required demand unless there is a significant discount
rate that enables financial viability.
The middle distillate refinement process is also a potential interdiction target. As
summarized in Chapter 2, the production of diesel is inextricable from gasoline and other
refined products (Inkpen and Moffett, 2011: 440-446). The planner may resource expertise that
informs a method of isolating diesel production capacity at a specific refinery location.
However, this will only mitigate the disruption of products beyond the target set of middle
distillates. The intensity of the disruption to non-targeted products is estimated by a uniform
distribution between the maximum (b) and minimum (a) points determined by the modeler
using input from experts. Interdiction of a refinery could include but is no limited to kinetic
attacks, cyber attacks, air interdiction attacks, or financial isolation. Additionally, the modeler
may update the results of various types of interdictions during ongoing operations in order to
account for known effectiveness, battle damage assessments, collateral damage, and unforeseen
tertiary impacts on production. For the purposes of this study, the impact of the interdiction on
non-targeted products will use a random input from a uniform distribution between 0 and .25.
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This means that a randomly assigned value will set the remaining production of gasoline at a
disrupted refinery between zero and 25 percent of the previous capacity.
Finally, planners could attempt to implement an embargo against petroleum imports as
discussed in Chapter 1. The success of an embargo depends upon the cooperation of multiple
partner countries and third parties as evidenced by incidents in Iran and Iraq during the 20th
century (Yergin, 1992: 464, 773). A uniform distribution between a maximum (b) and
minimum (a) threshold of embargo success can provide the model with an estimate for the
effectiveness of such an embargo. As evidenced from the embargo policy employed by the
United States in Libya in 1986 and presented in Section 1.2, even a very successful embargo is
not likely to prevent a petroleum rich adversary from exporting petroleum or its derivatives to
resource hungry clients. Therefore, the modeler must make a determination of the range of
effectiveness of a proposed embargo based on the most current political, diplomatic, and
military circumstances of all involved players. For the purposes of this study, the impact of the
interdiction on targeted products will use a random input from a uniform distribution between
.1 and .25. This means that a randomly assigned value will set the remaining importation of
middle distillates at a disrupted refinery between 10 and 25 percent of the previous capacity.
The model represented in Table 2 contains parameters that are easily manipulated by the
analyst to replicate these factors during experimentation. This holds true for all factor types.
The analyst can reduce the availability of a polyduct by lowering the capacity of its flow rate,
FOm,n. This flow rate can fall as low as zero so long as the accompanying minimum flow rate
receives comparable adjustments. Storage facilities have a similar capacity constraint,
StorCapj,p and its lower bound, LBStorCapj,p that are amenable to adjustment according to the
appropriate level of interdiction. Importation and refinement supply points both contain
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capacity constraints, RCapi,p and ICapi,p that the analyst can lower according to the level of
reduction that is appropriate for the strategy under consideration. Additionally, the definition of
the model is sufficient to allow point specific manipulations for location, degree, and product
type. The adjustment of these factors using constraints already included in the model in Table 2
will produce changes in response levels necessary to evaluate the military effectiveness and
cascading impacts of the strategy.
3.5.2 Response Selection

The impact of adjusting the factors within the model is measured by recording an
appropriate response from the results of the model in Table 2 (Montgomery, 2013: 2). There
are two appropriate responses to answer the study questions and inform the analysis of
cascading effects. The first response is the availability of middle distillate grade fuels at the
critical locations at the time when the depletion of an adversary’s fuel stocks is most desirable.
In order to set conditions for a D-Day that denotes the beginning of decisive operations (21
days in this study), interdiction operations occur at an appropriate offset to best degrade the
capabilities of a targeted adversary and seize the initiative. This disruption will deplete the
ability of an adversary to conduct operations and enable the execution of decisive operations by
the supported force (DA, ADP 3-0, 2011: 5). The timing of the decisive operation varies based
on the supported concept of operations and is easily manipulated by summing the data points
across the critical time period during the model run. The analyst can shorten the time iterations
of the model in Table 2 to enable more flexibility in the selection of a critical time period.
The second response of interest is the value of commodities removed from the economy
based on the shortfall in demand, SConsj,p. This shortfall, measured for all product types p, is
priced based on known data points for the economy under consideration. Cumulative data
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regarding unmet demand should be collected throughout the entire period of analysis. The
duration of the analyzed time period, if measured in terms of time phased force and deployment
data (TPFDD), is typically 90 days. This time horizon will vary accordingly based on mission,
unit preparedness, and means of transit for the deploying force (DAF, AFI 10-401, 2006: 176178). The economic impact is measured in product value removed from the economy and
informs the methodology for cascading effects.
3.5.3 Duration of Disruption

The length of the effectiveness of the interdiction lies beyond the control of the
operational planner. Once an interdiction occurs on a critical resource such as petroleum
production, the network manager will execute options to restore capacity. There are frequent
disruptions in the course of normal operations within a petroleum distribution network
consisting of refineries, pipelines, and storage hubs. These disruptions include leaks and
equipment malfunctions (Miesner and Leffler, 2006: 160, 171). The networks include a
capacity to repair and restore these capacities upon a disruption, and this ability extends to
intentional interruptions and acts of nature. There are also alternative resources available to the
network manager in order to augment the capacity of a network to circumvent disruption points.
If there is sufficient rail, road, or barge capacity available, these resources can augment the
capacity of an affected pipeline. However, the time, cost, and geographical constraints of these
methods limit their effectiveness (Trench, 2001: 2-3).
A reasonable implementation of a restoration process is represented by the project
evaluation and review technique, or PERT model applied in project management. This model
utilizes a Beta Distribution in order to provide an estimate of time to completion for a project.
Petroleum network restoration is adaptable to this model. The modeler requires an estimate for
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the minimum, maximum, and most likely time to complete the restoration of the interdicted
resource, defined as a, c, and b respectively. The Beta distribution requires these three inputs to
estimate each of its two parameters, α1 and α2. These distributions are estimated by formulas
(22)-(26) (Epix Analysis, 2014). While this model implements the Beta Distribution to
analyze recovery time, a more appropriate distribution for a case specific target set is easily
applicable to this methodology. Additionally, various distributions are easily interchangeable
within most automated models and simulations.

  ( a  4b  c ) / 6

(22)

1  ((  a)(2b  a  c)) / ((b  )(c  a))

(23)

2  (1 (c  )) / (  a)

(24)

Downtime  random( (1,2 ))((c  a)  a)

(25)

Recovery = Random(exponential(Downtime))

(26)

Each interdiction remains effective for a random time determined by the boundaries of
the PERT model Beta Distribution. Once the period of inoperability is over, the network
component resumes operation. The downtime of the component is determined by a random
number from the Beta distribution that is multiplied by an adjustment factor, which is
summarized in equation (25). The model must record the demand shortages that accrue during
this time period in order to identify the effectiveness and cascading effects of the interdiction.
Additionally, the calculated downtime for each interdiction is implemented to generate a
random number from an exponential function using the random variable for downtime as the
expected value. The results of the random number from the exponential function determines
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the recovery and repair period for partial infrastructure restoration to occur. Restoration of
disruption points occurs discretely and an estimate of the percentage restored for various types
of interdictions is left to the modeler through the use of expert and operational analysis.
Associated levels of interdiction involves relative adjustments to the number of nodes
interdicted, the degree of disruption as a percentage of capacity, and the expected duration of
the disruption. Increasing levels of each interdiction action will span the decision space and
inform the process regarding the factorial design. By selecting a number of critical nodes
where the interdictor desires to impede product delivery, the modeler can develop reasonable
options of interdiction based on the responses of demand shortfalls and supply availability at
critical nodes. Pipeline, storage, refinery, and import locations are all vulnerable to disruption.
The interdictor could potentially target any or all of these vulnerabilities using a variety of
means. Finally, if there are re-strike capabilities available, the modeler could adjust the
minimum time period of interdiction, a, to a value fixed at the latest available date for re-strike.
This is particularly pertinent to disruption of arcs and nodes and may be coordinated with the
proposed initiation of friendly decisive operations. Once the response data is collected and
analyzed, the modeler can assess the significance of factor adjustments and the practical
implications for the strategy.
3.5.4 Hypothesis Testing

The use of experimental design requires the development and testing of hypotheses that the
funs of the model investigate. These hypotheses enable the modeler to investigate various
parameters, factors, and settings within the model and assess response measurements that
appropriately investigate the related study question. For this study, the software package
JMP11 will implement a t-statistic test on the statistical significance of each factor to determine
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what terms are statistically significantly contributors to changes within the response data for
each experiment.
Additionally, there is potential for effects of factor interactions and quadratic relationships
to have an effect on the response. Factor interactions occur when consistent settings from one
independent factor affect the response at a rate that is significantly different at various settings
of another factor (Montgomery, 2013: 4). It is also possible for quadratic effects to occur
within the experiment that require the use of a second-order model. Second-order models
include a squared regression term that best defines a model with significant curvature.
JMP11 uses a screening feature that conducts a t-statistic test in order to recommend factor
terms, interaction terms, and second-order (quadratic) terms for inclusion in the analysis of
variance and resulting empirical model. A summary of the t-statistic calculation for using a
multiple regression hypothesis test is shown in equation (27). This equation requires the
2
sample value of the least squares estimator, j , an estimate of the variance,  , and the

diagonal element of the input matrix, Cjj. (Montgomery, 2013: 465). A number of available
statistical software packages including JMP can easily calculate these parameters. If the value
of to is greater than the index value as shown in equation (28), the parameter is deemed
statistically significant to accept or reject a hypothesis regarding its impact on the response.
The inputs required for equation (28) include significance level, α (always .05 in this study),
number of factors, k, and number of replicates, n.
to 

j

(27)

 C jj
2

to  t /2,nk 1
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(28)

The hypothesis tests allow the experimenter to determine which factors, interactions, and
quadratic terms have significant influence on the model. This will enable an analysis of
variance that determines results based on the influence of factors on the response data that is
collected during experimentation. Once experimentation and data collection is complete, the
use of a regression analysis and a half normal plot within statistical software will highlight
factors, interactions, and quadratic terms that significantly influence the model (Montgomery,
2013: 262-263). A response surface or profile associated with the model will highlight the
response behavior at various factor settings. The hypotheses investigated in the case study in
Section IV are as follows:
Hypothesis 1
 When the factors are limited to supply interdictions in the scenario, measureable

cascading effects may occur, but there will be no statistically significant impact on the
availability of military grade fuels at all supply locations. The experiment will interdict
all supply factors of importation and refinery points in order to test this hypothesis using
equations (27)-(28) and measuring the impact of two supply factors, their interactions,
and all second-order terms for significance.
o H1.1: Supply Interdictions (refinery (Z1) and importation (Z2)) will not

significantly impact the availability of military grade fuels at the critical supply
locations.


H1.1: Z1, Z2, Z1*Z2, Z12, and Z22 = 0

o H1.1A: Supply (refinery and importation) significantly impacts the availability of

military grade fuels at the critical supply locations.
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H1.1A: Z1, Z2, Z1*Z2, Z12, and Z22 ≠ 0

o H1.2: Supply Interdictions (refinery and importation) will not significantly impact

the measureable value of economic losses based on unmet demand.


H1.2: Z1, Z2, Z1*Z2, Z12, and Z22 = 0

o H1.2A: Supply interdictions (refinery and importation) significantly impact the

measureable value of economic losses based on unmet demand.


H1.2A: Z1, Z2, Z1*Z2, Z12, and Z22 ≠ 0

Hypothesis 2
 Network interdiction (critical storage and delivery systems) will provide a statistically

significant impact on the availability of middle distillates at critical nodes with less
cascading impact than disruptions in the pipeline arcs. This hypothesis is best tested by
attempting to reject the opposite statements that network interdiction will not have a
significant impact on either availability or economic losses. The experiment will
interdict the network factors of storage (Z3) and pipeline (Z4) critical infrastructure
locations in order to test this hypothesis using equations (27)-(28) and measuring the
impact of two network factors, their interactions, and all second-order terms for
significance.
o H2.1: Network interdiction (critical storage and delivery systems) will not

significantly impact the availability of military grade fuels at the critical supply
locations.


H2.1: Z3, Z4, Z3*Z4, Z32, and Z42 = 0

o H2.1A: Network interdiction (critical storage and delivery systems) significantly

impacts the availability of military grade fuels at the critical supply locations.
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H2.1A: Z3, Z4, Z3*Z4, Z32, and Z42 ≠ 0

o H2.2: Network interdiction (critical storage and delivery systems) will not

significantly impact the measureable value of economic losses based on unmet
demand.


H2.2: Z3, Z4, Z3*Z4, Z32, and Z42 = 0

o H2.2A: Network interdiction (critical storage and delivery systems) significantly

impact the measureable value of economic losses based on unmet demand.


H2.2A: Z3, Z4, Z3*Z4, Z32, and Z42 ≠ 0

Hypothesis 3
 The disruption of refinery supply, delivery, and storage factors within the context of the

scenario will have a significant impact on the military availability with the most limited
cascading impacts.

This experiment will inform the recommended strategy.

This

hypothesis is tested by attempting to reject the opposite statements that supply and
network interdiction will not have a significant impact on either availability or
economic losses. The experiment will interdict factors with significance in previous
experiments in order to test this hypothesis using equations (27)-(28). Evaluation will
include factors, interactions, and higher-order effects on the responses.
o H3.1: Refinery Supply and network (storage and delivery systems) interdiction in

the scenario will not significantly impact the availability of military grade fuels
at the critical supply locations.


H3.1: Z1, Z3, Z4, Z1*Z3, Z1* Z4, Z3*Z4, Z1*Z3*Z4, Z12 ,Z32, Z42 ,Z13 ,Z33,
Z43 = 0
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o H3.1A: Refinery Supply and network (storage and delivery systems) interdiction

in the scenario significantly impacts the availability of military grade fuels at the
critical supply locations.


H3.1A: Z1, Z3, Z4, Z1*Z3, Z1* Z4, Z3*Z4, Z1*Z3*Z4, Z12 ,Z32, Z42 ,Z13 ,Z33,
Z43 ≠ 0

o H3.2: Refinery Supply and network (storage and delivery systems) interdiction in

the scenario will not significantly impact the value of economic losses based on
unmet demand.


H3.2: Z1, Z3, Z4, Z1*Z3, Z1* Z4, Z3*Z4, Z1*Z3*Z4, Z12 ,Z32, Z42 ,Z13 ,Z33,
Z43 = 0

o H3.2A: Refinery Supply and network (storage and delivery systems) interdiction

in the scenario significantly impacts the measureable value of economic losses
based on unmet demand.


H3.2A: Z1, Z3, Z4, Z1*Z3, Z1* Z4, Z3*Z4, Z1*Z3*Z4, Z12 ,Z32, Z42 ,Z13 ,Z33,
Z43 ≠ 0

Hypothesis 4
 The impacts of a natural disaster disruption within the scenario will not significantly

affect supply availability at critical locations or result in widespread cascading effects.
This experiment will test a smaller disruption caused by a natural disaster in a localized
area using a smaller set of the four potential disruption factors. The experiment tests for
the impacts of electricity and utility outages impacting pumping infrastructure at storage
nodes and pipelines. Additionally, the experiment includes managed disruption of an
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importation and refinery point affected by a risk based shutdown. The experiment will
interdict this reduced factor set in order to test this hypothesis using equations (27)-(28).
o H4.1: The Natural Disaster scenario disruptions will not significantly impact the

availability of fuels at the critical supply locations.


H4.1: Z1- Z4, C(Z1- Z4* Z1- Z4), C(Z1- Z4* Z1- Z4* Z1- Z4),Z12- Z42, Z13Z43 = 0



C() indicates all possible combinations of Z1, Z3, and Z4 interactions

o H4.1A: The Natural Disaster scenario disruptions significantly impact the

availability of fuels at the critical supply locations.


H4.1A: Z1- Z4, C(Z1- Z4* Z1- Z4), C(Z1- Z4* Z1- Z4* Z1- Z4),Z12- Z42, Z13Z43 ≠ 0

o H4.2: The Natural Disaster scenario disruptions will not significantly impact the

value of economic losses based on unmet demand.


H4.2: Z1- Z4, C(Z1- Z4* Z1- Z4), C(Z1- Z4* Z1- Z4* Z1- Z4),Z12- Z42, Z13Z43 = 0

o H4.2A: The Natural Disaster scenario disruptions significantly impact the value of

economic losses based on unmet demand.


H4.2A: Z1- Z4, C(Z1- Z4* Z1- Z4), C(Z1- Z4* Z1- Z4* Z1- Z4),Z12- Z42, Z13Z43 ≠ 0

The results of the hypothesis tests provide validation of the significance of each factor,
potential interactions, and higher order effects on the measured responses in the scenario.
Significant factors, interactions, and higher-order effects will inform analysis of variance in
order to produce an empirical model and response surface that is representative of the system.
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This validation also provides a statistically significant value of the degree economic loss in the
downstream petroleum products industry by assessing a cost to the level of unmet demand. The
value of this economic loss will feed an assessment of cascading effects that determines the
level of impact on dependent industries. When applied to a test scenario, similar analysis can
explore a number of operational strategies under investigation.
3.6 Conclusion

The methodology presented in sections 3.1-3.4 details the process for modeling the
operations of a refined petroleum network using a deterministic mathematical programming
technique, determining impacts of disruption through experimentation, and estimating the
cascading effects using a Leontief model. The complete flow chart representing this solution
methodology appears in Figure 6. The overview shows how a known network architecture and
data set populate a network implementation model. This model conducts a appropriate warmup period to assess the impacts of network management priorities. Experimental factors and
restoration inputs then populate the experimentation phase. The model records responses of
military availability and economic loss on a defined timeline for the analyzed scenario. All
time period solutions update the data set inputs for the subsequent time period. The results
inform a Leontief input-output model with a snapshot of effects for the defined time period and
allow an evaluation of strategic and economic impacts. The combination of these assessments
informs the development of courses of action that best meet the needs of the strategist and
decision maker.
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create the network effectively and collect necessary data as required. Additionally, the
algorithm will implement the scenario Leontief model using the results of the network analysis.
The modeler may apply interdiction or disruption parameters to any desired location, and
observe the results in terms of the two defined responses, availability of military grade fuel and
economic loss to the economy of interest. The results of a relevant case study using this
methodology appear in Chapter 4.
Table 5: PseudoCode Algorithm for QDemand-Leontief Automated Model

Step
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Description
Define NK Matrix Formulation for Multi-Commodity Network
Set Number of products, p and supply points, i numSP
Build Storage Capacities, StorCap, and set initial storage, IStor
Build N multi-commodity network, AFO based on p and NK
Build Demand Matrix, DemQ for each transshipment node
Combine AFO and DemQ into a flow equation set, FOEq and constraints, FOEqC
Initialize change in storage, DeltaStor, and demand shortage, SlackDem
Build Storage Adjustment Equation, StorAdjEq to measure changes to inventory
Constrain demand, DemC, and storage, StorC
Constrain the flow through each arc to known capacities, SumArcFO
Conduct Warm Up Period
for d=1:D
Update Storage Capacity, IStor
Constrain Storage Capacity ,StorMax/StorMin based on IStor value
Update Arc Flow Constraints, UB/LBArcC
Update Supply Constraints, SupC
Format Problem for CPLEX
Aeq/beq for equality coefficient and constraint matrices
Aineq/bineq for inequality coefficient and constraint matrices
Set and constrain objective function, f using upper and lower bounds ub/lb
Execute CPLEX
Collect storage adjustment data, StorAdj for each commodity type by location
Recalculate initial storage levels, IStor at each iteration
END for loop
Initiate Experimental runs
For e=1:E
Repeat steps 1-10
Create Beta and Exponential Distributions for Storage interdiction using a unique
distribution for each disrupted node
Assign downtimes and recovery times for each disrupted node
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26 Create Beta and Exponential Distributions for pipeline interdiction using a unique
distribution for each disrupted node
27 Assign downtimes and recovery times for each disrupted arc
26 Create Beta and Exponential Distributions for refinery interdiction using a unique
distribution for each disrupted refinery. Assign uniform distribution to non-military
grade products as required.
27 Assign downtimes and recovery times for each disrupted refinery
29 Initialize Network Interdiction Model
For d = 1:D
30 Update Storage Capacity, IStor
31 Apply storage interdictions to storage capacity using designed experiment, EXPMT
If EXPMT(entry)>assigned node
Limit Storage Capacity based on time, d>downtime
End If
32 Update Storage Capacity using experiment parameters from step 31
33 Apply pipeline interdictions to arc capacity using designed experiment, EXPMT
If EXPMT(entry)>assigned arc
Limit Arc Flow Capacity based on time, d>downtime
End If
34 Update Arc Capacity using experiment parameters from step 33
35 Apply refinery interdictions to supply capacity using designed experiment, EXPMT
If EXPMT(entry)>assigned refinery
Limit Refinery Capacity based on time, d>downtime
End If
36 Update Refinery Capacity using experiment parameters from step 35
37 Apply import restrictions to supply capacity using designed experiment, EXPMT
If EXPMT(entry)>assigned import point
Limit Refinery Capacity based on time, Import Distribution
End If
38 Update Import Capacity using experiment parameters from step 37
39 Repeat steps 16-20
40 Calculate Demand Shortfall by product type and calculate value of loss using price
41 Calculate daily supply of middle distillates at critical nodes, MGCrit
If d<D(decisive operations), calculate MGCrit
42
End For
43 Initialize Leontief Model using IO Matrix, resources, and constraints
44 Set up PCDG matrix to mirror size of EXPMT x IO
45 Determine size of IO matrix, aij
46 Scale Value Loss VALLOST to time period of IO matrix
47 Set Aineq and bineq using IO and resource matrix inputs
48 Define and bound objective function, f
49 Execute CPLEX
50 Record output as a percentage of sector productivity
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IV. Results and Analysis
4.1 Data Selection

The implementation of this model requires a realistic data set that represents the known
production and distribution network of a country with robust petroleum refining capacity. The
specific country is not critical to allow demonstration of the model. A country with a national
oil company apparatus that refines, imports, and exports multiple petroleum product lines is an
ideal choice. There is a variety of countries that meet the criteria, and over 80 countries
worldwide possess some refinery capacity (EIA, 2007). The specific country selected for this
demonstration is only a test case used for illustrative purposes, and does not indicate any
possibility of conflict or other potential cause of disruption.
The purpose of this model demonstration is to show how the model produces useful
results using appropriately assigned parameters and factors within the network and associated
experiment. The method of interdiction is not a focus and the model is intended to support any
type of attack where network restoration will occur. While this experiment focuses on
restoration distributions specified in the methodology, the user may select any appropriate
distribution package. Additionally, this demonstrative scenario focuses on minimizing cascading
and collateral effects on the impacted economy while still achieving acceptable levels of
strategic success against military fuel supplies. Users of this model might choose to exacerbate
cascading effects, and similar experimentation methods could also inform appropriate
interdiction strategies for that goal. The modeler and strategist are left to determine which
factors, critical geography, time horizons, interdiction levels, and distributions are most
appropriate based on their adversary and concept of operations. Because this demonstration is
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notional, any adjustment to its implementation parameters or data sets in subsequent studies is
wholly appropriate.
Many unclassified sources exist that provide substantial data on refinery networks and
their capacities. The Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) maintains a
database of supply, demand, and infrastructure data including refined petroleum and other related
industries for all of its member countries. OPEC publishes this information annually in its
statistical yearbook (“OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2013). The Department of Energy of
the United States and many other countries provide detailed data of the national and global
energy markets with specific analysis related to refined petroleum (EIA, 2014). Some national
oil companies are publicly traded and release detailed information regarding their production of
refined products and the associated distribution network. The national oil company of Mexico,
PEMEX, is one such organization. PEMEX publishes a statistical yearbook annually (“PEMEX
Statistical Yearbook, 2003-2013,” 2014).
Additionally, there is a detailed supply data available from the Mexican Secretary of
Energy (SENER) that includes delivery data of refined petroleum products to every distribution
hub within the country of Mexico and other key information regarding the distribution network
(SENER, 2014). For these reasons, Mexico is an appropriate choice for an illustrative test case
that will validate the model and provide insight into the impacts of an interdiction.
Based on data from PEMEX and the Mexican Secretary of Energy, the model requires
information essential to the development of a realistic case study of a refined petroleum
production and distribution network. The essential data components collected from SENER
include refinery locations and output levels, storage locations with consumption quantities and
import capabilities. PEMEX provided a schematic of the distribution network with pipeline
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routes and data regarding end user prices and refinery specific data. SENER provided a much
higher level of disaggregation for production levels, and this data proved useful to populate the
refinery network and distribution facilities.
The production network includes 6 refinery locations with the maximum capacity
determined using the monthly production levels observed over the most recent 12 month period.
Additionally, four known import locations are assigned a maximum capacity based on 40% of
product consumption that is imported (EIA, 2014). Using information provided by SENER to
populate the model, distribution points receive shipments and satisfy a known local demand for
each transshipment node. As per the aggregate model assumptions, this demand represents the
daily average for the most recent 12 month period. Fixed demand is also necessary to feed the
input-output model that operates on an assumption of short term stability. Known fuel oil
consumption by petroleum-fired electrical power plants located throughout Mexico augments the
fuel oil demand component of the data set (GEO, 2014).
The storage capacity of each transshipment node was not available in the data. This gap
was alleviated through the use of equation (3.11). A safety stock factor, inaccessible lower
storage bound, and initial storage quantities are populated in the model using reasonable
estimates from the data set (Miesner and Leffler, 2006: 290-291). Although these values are
subject to significant adjustment based on the known parameters of an individual network, they
are fixed throughout the experimental implementation.
4.2 Case Study Network Development

Using PEMEX data, the geography of the network is established through the creation of
an incidence matrix. This NK matrix includes 10 supply points and 76 pipeline arcs across the
column entries, and 75 distribution nodes including refinery supply points in the row entries.
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The incidence matrix is formulated for each of four product lines including gasoline, diesel,
kerosene, and fuel oil. The incidence matrix is the essential component of the Q*Dem model
that provides the flow balance at the transshipment nodes for each product line in equation (7)(9). This product is too large to allow visual representation in this document.
In the test case problem, six locations are selected based on historical actions and bases of
operation from the Mexican campaign of 1846-47 as depicted in the West Point Atlas series
shown in Figure 7 (“Mexican War Overview Map,” 2014). While the concept of operations
from the Mexican War is strategically obsolete, similar selection criteria should feed the
planning process that determines the location of critical supply points. The application of
planning priorities by an operations staff will enable the analyst to select and prioritize these
locations to best support decisive operations.

Figure 7: Concept of Operation for Selection of Critical Locations (WP Atlas Series)

99

In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of a selective surgical strike, the illustrative
experimentation plan interdicts six of the 76 network distribution nodes and associated facilities
in the indicated region. This plan establishes target regions within the historical example and
takes into account the limited availability of strike capacity, planning resources, and funds
available to allow a combatant commander to complete a strategic interdiction.
For each of the six critical points, there are six associated pipelines and six transshipment
or storage locations in the modern distribution network. Additionally, each of these pipelines is
serviced by the most proximate refinery and point of importation. Pipeline, storage, refinery, and
import locations are all vulnerable to disruption. The interdictor could potentially target any or
all of these vulnerabilities using a variety of means.
In order to limit the number of design points to a combinatorial factor that focuses the
decision space, vulnerable points are rank ordered by their criticality to the network and by
limiting redundancy. For this example the criticality assignments are based on geographical
distance from a point of embarkation with the point of enemy resupply (4) given greater
consideration. There are six pipeline connections and storage locations that are vulnerable.
There are three proximate refinery locations and importation points that service the six critical
nodes. In every case, the interdictor can decide to take no action. The resulting design requires
two factors with seven possible factor levels and two factors with four possible factor levels.
JMP software creates a randomized design for each experiment to ensure that run order does not
impact the results. This design includes four replicates at each setting. Each experimental
design analysis description includes a snapshot of the design utilized to implement the model
best suited to test each hypothesis. The network geography represented in the incidence matrix is
displayed in Figure 8: Petroleum Network Schematic.
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weights, wj,p, that accompany Qj,p are selected using critical locations of conflict and resupply
from the Mexican campaign of 1846-47 (“Mexican War Overview Map,” 2014).
Once the network model is fully populated with the data set, the Q*Dem model is
implemented using the CPLEX solver. The full model using the illustrative test case data set as
described in Table 2 requires 1352 constraints and 1244 decision variables. An initial
implementation of 7 days models the network immediately preceding a planned interdiction.
This time period is characterized by the network manager optimizing shipments to critical
distribution nodes in order to maximize supplies available prior to an anticipated interdiction.
The analyst can vary this time period accordingly based upon the known time lapse between the
manager’s anticipation of a disruption and its actual occurrence. The output from this
initialization provides a more accurate assessment of the initial storage volume of petroleum
products at each distribution hub.
The construction of an input-output matrix for a national economy can be a vast
undertaking as described by Haimes et al. (2005). The data requirements include commodity
purchases and highly specific production numbers for all sectors of industry that are included in
the model. Many agencies publish input-output matrices for various regional and state
economies including the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD,
2014). The publication by OECD is suitable for use in problem methodology, although it has
aggregated the petroleum products industry. The OECD data includes most major industries
including those encompassing critical infrastructure such as transportation, medical care,
agriculture, utilities, and government services. A summary of this Input-Output Matrix for the
country of Mexico as provided by OECD is included in Table 6 (OECD, 2014). The full IO
Matrix is attached in Appendix B. An essential characteristic of this I-O Matrix is the
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petroleum types are produced and distributed using common processes, equipment, labor pools,
and logistical networks (SENER, 2014). Although the decomposition of specific commodity
applications within various dependent industries is widely documented, it would not be valid to
disaggregate the amount of inputs required from other industries to produce each measure of
diesel, gasoline, kerosene, and so forth. For example, since most refined petroleum liquids are
derived from nearly indistinguishable crude stocks and undergo similar distillation processing
that consumes multiple inputs, there is no reliable methodology to determine what percentage of
each input is responsible for rendering a unit of final petroleum product (Inkpen and Moffit,
2011 445). These inputs are assigned to the petroleum refinement process, which is
appropriately represented as the inputs necessary to produce the complete pool of refined
petroleum products.
4.3 Experiment Introduction

The experiments conducted using the notional case study include four scenarios and
associated experiment sets. Significance is determined using a t-statistic provided by JMP11
software with a default 95% confidence setting and a value of α=.05 for all reported results. The
responses tested in each experiment include the availability of fuel summed across critical nodes
between the interdiction and the commencement of decisive operations, defined in the scenario
as 21 days. Additionally, the daily demand shortages at all nodes are summed across the entire
90 day model run in order to inform the analysis of cascading effects. The responses are
collected using a script that collects summations of the appropriate variables for each day of the
90 day interval of the model. For the lost value, the model sums the unmet demand for every
location and product. Independent daily storage volumes are available for all supply nodes
within this automated model, and the user may choose to collect measurements of specific point
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volume fluctuations in support of an applied strategic problem. The script prices this shortfall
using data available from SENER (2014) regarding the value of a barrel of each product,
summarized in Table 7. The model in question uses 2010 fuel price data to provide consistency
with the input output data in Table 6 with consideration of price volatility. The duration of
decisive action and the planning horizon can be set at any level; the 21 and 90 day respective
time horizons used for this illustrative analysis are subject to alteration by the analyst.
Table 7: Cost (Pesos) of a Barrel (42 US Gallons) of Various Fuel Types (SENER, 2014)

Product Type/
Year
Pemex Magna gasoline
Pemex Diesel
Jet fuel
Heavy fuel oil

Cost (Mex$/BBL)
2006
2010
1057.19 1307.94
862.54 1357.19
1001.27 1342.85
517.96
975.11

4.4 Experiment 1: Supply Interdiction Scenario

This initial experiment is intended to test hypothesis 1, which investigates whether supply
interdiction is insufficient to deplete military fuel availability or inflict economic losses.
Experiment 1 will also inform the analysis of cascading effects by determining the value of
economic losses in the targeted economy. The test includes experimentation with all six refinery
locations within the PEMEX production system as well as four prominent importation points as
indicated in Figure 8. The factors for this experiment include the number of refinery
interdictions and the number of importation points subjected to embargo strategy. The refinery
factor requires seven levels ranging from a scenario of no interdictions as the lowest level (0)
through six interdictions as the highest level (6). The factor for embargo of import points
includes four levels ranging from no interdictions (Level 0) to three interdictions (Level 3).
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ordering is in accordance with the labels in Figure 8 for both refineries and importation points.
The system is allowed a 7 day warm up period that models the network manager’s efforts to
maximize storage capacity at critical nodes within the network. This warm up period is
implemented by allowing the script in Appendix A to run for 7 daily iterations without
interdiction using a weighting scheme consistent with the interdiction modeling phase. Each of
the 112 model runs is implemented using the MATLAB script in Appendix A by using the
randomized matrix of the model runs with each replicate as shown in Table 8. As each replicate
of the model runs to completion, the responses are recorded appropriately as shown in columns 5
and 6 of Table 8.
The results are tested using consistent distribution parameters to inform the restoration
timeline. Initial restoration periods (25% capacity) for this experiment use a minimum initial
downtime for disrupted refineries of 10 days, most likely of 21 days, and maximum of 30 days to
inform the β distribution as defined in equation (22)-(25). These inputs replicate historical
norms described by the US Department of Energy (EIA, 2007). An exponential distribution
derived from the β-distribution output determines the time lapse for additional restoration of
resources using increments of 25%. Importation effectiveness is modeled across a uniform
distribution with limits specified between 75% and 90% effectiveness. The high level of
effectiveness results from the dependence on seaborne imports within this economy. Tanker
ships are historically vulnerable to embargo demands due to risk aversion within the shipping
industry that is inherent to their significant expense (Inkpen and Moffett, 2011: 416).
Importation disruptions remain effective throughout the conduct of operations that cease after 60
days.

107

The initial investigation tests the significance of importation and refinery production on
military availability at the onset of operations, set at 21 days from the interdiction. The results of
the experiment of the effects of supply interdictions on the availability of military grade fuel
appear in Figure 9. The resulting empirical models and t-statistic results appear in Table 9. The
information in Table 9 required a screening feature in JMP11 that identifies significant factors,
second order effects, and interactions. The screening feature produces a half-normal plot that
identifies which effects are most appropriate for the model. The results confirm that importation
is not significant to military availability as evident in the red highlighted t-statistic indicating that
the importation factor does not significantly contribute to the model. The model results confirm
hypothesis H1.1 and supports the conclusion that an import embargo will not significantly affect
military fuel availability within this case study. Figure 9 shows the actual output of the model
run against the prediction based on the empirical model produced in equation (29). This figure
provides a snapshot of the predictive power of this empirical model denoted by the distance
between the predicted values on the horizontal axis and actual results on the vertical axis. This
graph shows the ability of the empirical model to estimate the behavior of the system and is
summarized by the ANOVA chart in Table 9 and the R-squared predicted value of .76. This
model is reasonably accurate, but probably insufficient because of its reliance on only two
significant effects that include refinery settings and their second-order effects. Imports, while
included in the model represented in Table 9, do no significantly contribute to the estimates.
It is important to note that the scenario is quite limited in scope for an embargo scenario.
While refinery interdictions necessarily occur briefly before decisive operations because of their
often kinetic nature, sanctions and embargo strategies may remain in place months or years
ahead of military actions. However, the ability of the network manager to prioritize military
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Table 9: Statistical Analysis of Supply Interdiction Impact on Military Availability
Analysis of Variance
Source
DF

Model
Error
C. Total

3
108
111

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Refinery
Import
(Refinery-4)*(Refinery-4)

Sum of
Squares
296492755
94984924
391477679

Mean Square

F Ratio

98830918
879490.03

112.3730
Prob > F
<.0001*

Estimate
35856.36
-708.92
-35.70
-230.09

Std Error
298.32
44.30
79.25
25.58

t Ratio
120.19
-16.00
-0.45
-8.99

Prob>|t|
<.0001*
<.0001*
0.6532
<.0001*

Because importation does not significantly impact the availability of military supplies at
critical nodes for this scenario and time horizon, a streamlined empirical model can adequately
represent the system without including importation as a factor. This model uses the parameter
estimates from Table 9 after removing the Import factor and is represented in equation (29). In
accordance with the hypothesis test convention, Z1 represents the supply factor settings and Z12
accounts for the quadratic effects. This empirical model includes an intercept and these two
terms that show significance in the half-normal plot and statistical analysis.
y  35856.36 -708.92 Z1-230.09 Z12

(29)

Because the interdiction of importation does not significantly impact military availability,
the expected fuel availability summed at critical nodes in the scenario prior to decisive
operations is influenced in this experiment by the level of disruption of refinery operations.
Hypothesis H4.1 is accepted for importation factors, which do not demonstrate statistically
significant effects on the availability of military grade fuels at critical supply locations.
Refinery operations have a significant impact and inform the model in Equation (29) that
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provides reasonably effective predictive power demonstrated by the R-squared adjusted statistic
of .76 that determines the level of correlation.
As evident in Figure 10, the increase in the number of refineries interdicted has an
increasing negative effect on military fuel availability as the system becomes incapable of
providing sufficient supply at those locations. However, even with complete interdiction, these
critical nodes still have access to over 80% of their maximum levels of supply due to their
storage inventory as evident in Figure 10. This result indicates that while statistically significant,
a refinery interdiction does not sufficiently hamper military availability in a manner that is likely
to operationally impede the ability of an adversary to conduct operations during the time horizon.
This test only considered availability at 6 critical node locations, which is less than 8% of total
storage facilities. There is sufficient military grade fuel stored throughout the system to weather
a supply interdiction and maintain a robust stock level at critical nodes. In conclusion, neither
type of interdiction proved capable of substantially depleting the military grade fuel supplies at
critical node locations to a magnitude that a combatant commander might find acceptable for a
short campaign. This alternative is not sufficiently effective as a stand-alone strategy within the
boundaries of this case study and is unlikely to inform an acceptable military course of action
under these circumstances.
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Table 10: Statistical Results of Supply Interdiction on Value of Economic Losses
Summary of Fit

RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)
Analysis of Variance
Source
DF

Model
Error
C. Total

3
108
111

0.853715
0.849652
4.567e+9
2.97e+10
112

Sum of
Squares
1.3148e+22
2.253e+21
1.5401e+22

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Refinery
Import

Mean Square

F Ratio

4.383e+21
2.086e+19

210.0949
Prob > F
<.0001*

Estimate
3.075e+9
5.1658e+9
2.8195e+9

Std Error
1.468e+9
2.158e+8
3.86e+8

t Ratio
2.10
23.94
7.30

Prob>|t|
0.0385*
<.0001*
<.0001*

Codifying the significant factors leads to the empirical model in equation (30), which
represents the expected economic loss at different factor settings of refinery (Z1) and importation
(Z2) interdiction. Replacing Z1 with the number of refinery interdictions and Z2 with the number
of importation disruptions within equation (30) would result in an estimate of the value of
economic loss inflicted by the solution. This model would remain valid for any factor setting
using the same model parameters.
y  3.075e+9 + 5.1658e+9 Z1 + 2.8195e+9 Z2

(30)

The implementation of equation (30) leads to the response surface presented in Figure 12,
which graphically depicts the behavior of economic losses across a range of factor level settings
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refined petroleum sector updates the constraint, Xi* in accordance with equation (21).
Constraining the economic input of petroleum products available to the economy will then
cascade through the economic model using the formulation implemented in equation (19).
The effects of this cascading is presented in Table 11, which shows several critical
industries and the impact of the cascading effects expected for various factor level settings. The
results use data collected from the value of economic loss in the supply interdiction experiment.
This analysis is assessed consistently throughout the results. The t-statistic applied to each of the
four sample points, n is shown in equation (31). This lower bound allows the analyst to state that
95% confidence in the conclusion that the resulting cascading effects will be no worse than the
analytical outcome.
LBCI  x  tinv (.05, n ) s / n

(31)

The color key in Table 11 specifies various levels of degradation within each industries at
the indicated factor level combinations. Within the selected economy, mining and transportation
are at particularly high risk due to their reliance on refined petroleum as a buyer or provider of
resources, respectively. Other key industries such as agriculture, materials production, and
finance begin to suffer increasing effects due to their relation to these activities. In general, this
economy proves relatively robust to all but the highest levels of supply interdiction, indicating
that the economy is not overly dependent of fossil fuels for the duration of the time horizon.
Some industries, such as textile and food production do not appear to suffer significant
degradation despite extreme interdiction of petroleum product supplies. Most courses of action
considered in this scenario would allow for this economy to maintain a basic level of function.
Complete interdiction of the supply network is necessary to severely disrupt the economy as long
as the petroleum network management can implement reasonable efforts to restore capacity
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capacities did not provide a substantial reduction in military grade fuel supplies available to the
end user at critical locations over the 21 day timeframe for decisive operations. Depending on
the goals of the decision maker for an interdiction force, supply interdiction alone is not likely a
sufficient solution to achieve a military or political end state within this economy.
4.5 Experiment 2: Network Interdiction Experiment

The objective of this experiment is to test hypothesis 2, which determines if network
interdiction can effectively deplete military fuel availability or significantly impact economic
losses. Additionally, the experiment will ascertain the cascading effects on the targeted economy
by analyzing the measured value of economic losses over the time horizon. The test includes
experimentation with six storage locations and polyducts within the PEMEX distribution system
that services the critical nodes highlighted in Figure 8. The factors for this experiment include
the number of storage facility interdictions and the number of polyduct disruptions. Both factors
require seven levels ranging from a scenario of no interdictions as the lowest level (0) through
six interdictions as the highest level (6). These are discrete settings for this experiment, as the
decision to interdict a storage facility or pipeline is binary. However, the degree of the
interdiction allows consideration of the factor settings as continuous functions. Variation is
introduced by the random variable generated by the distributions representing the duration of the
disruption or the speed with which a network manager can implement alternative solutions to the
network outage.
Replicating the experiment four times requires 196 model runs to explore the entire
decision space, which required 34 minutes and 41 seconds using an AMD Athlon II X2 215 2.7
GHz Processor. An abbreviated example of the first ten entries of this randomized matrix with
the documented results produced in JMP11 is presented in Table 12. The labels correspond with
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The results are tested using consistent distribution parameters to inform the restoration
timeline. Initial pipeline restoration periods (33% capacity) for this experiment use a minimum
(a) initial downtime of 4 days, most likely (b) of 7, and maximum (c) of 14 days to inform the
PERT analysis and β distribution as defined in equation (25). This distribution is intended to
replicate the full range of options for restoration of commodity flow by the network manager.
This could include restoration of the pipeline, patching the disrupted section of the polyduct, or
reliance on other means of product delivery such as rail or truck transport.
Initial storage facility restoration periods (33% capacity) for this experiment use a
minimum initial downtime of 7 days, most likely of 14, and maximum of 30 days to inform the β
distribution as defined in Equation (25). The distribution allows restoration of 1/3 of the original
storage capacity after this initial downtime period. This distribution is intended to replicate the
full range of options for restoration of storage capacity by the network manager. This could
include repair of the facility, implementation of temporary storage vessels such as tanker trailers
or blivets, or reliance on other means of product delivery such as rail or truck transport (Trench,
2001: 3). An exponential distribution derived from the β parameter output determines the time
lapse for additional restoration of resources using increments of 33.3% for both types of network
architecture.
The initial results using the raw data produce an estimate of the reductions in military
grade fuel availability given increasing levels of network interdiction. These levels indicate the
degree to which higher numbers of interdictions on storage and pipeline facilities within the
scenario will deny fuel stocks to critical locations. The results of the raw experimentation are
presented in Figure 14. These results are promising because they show a significant level of
depletion of fuel availability with a limited number of storage interdictions. For example,
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availability within this case study. This conclusion is valid for both storage interdiction and
pipeline disruption courses of action within this scenario.
Table 13: Statistical Analysis of Supply Interdiction Impact on Military Availability
Summary of Fit

RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)
Analysis of Variance
Source
DF

Model
Error
C. Total

5
190
195

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Arc
Storage
(Arc-4)*(Arc-4)
(Arc-4)*(Storage-4)
(Storage-4)*(Storage-4)

0.903227
0.90068
2310.276
14001
196

Sum of
Squares
9465085787
1014101112
1.0479e+10

Mean Square

F Ratio

1.893e+9
5337374.30

354.67
Prob > F
<.0001*

Estimate
30045.81
-2545.82
-2067.55
314.44
439.26
287.73

Std Error
563.6496
82.50
82.50
47.63
41.25
47.63

t Ratio
53.31
-30.85
-25.06
6.60
10.65
6.04

Prob>|t|
<.0001*
<.0001*
<.0001*
<.0001*
<.0001*
<.0001*

As evident in Table 13, pipeline and storage interdiction factors, the interaction term, and
both second order interactions contribute significantly to the model. The statistical significance
of these factors suggests a predictive model as a response surface that augments the empirical
solution presented in equation (32). This empirical model uses Z3 to represent storage factors
and Z4 to represent pipeline factors and accommodate their interactions and second-order effects.
y  30045.81 -2545.82*Z4 -2067.55*Z3 + 314.44*Z42 + 439.26*Z4*Z3 + 287.73* Z32
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(32)

The response surface developed in JMP11 using the Gaussian process tool is presented in
Figure 16. The model shows how varying levels of network interdictions will impact the
availability of military grade fuel at critical locations across the model run. The response surface
indicates that increasing levels of storage and pipeline interdiction will impact the military
availability in a similar manner. A strategy that combines these interdiction factors shows
significant potential as an effective strategy to interdict the delivery of military grade fuels. The
benefit of an applicable response surface is that higher order effects are effectively captured to
show what region of the decision space is most applicable to achieve the end state of the decision
maker while considering potential operational constraints. It is notable that this process could
also utilize a discrete classification for factor settings. Although the behavior is most certainly
continuous because of potential changes in the impacts of an interdiction, the decision to
interdict a particular target is binary in nature. This analysis could instead utilize a step function
response surface, but the smoothed function shown in Figure 16 is more readily interpreted.
Additionally, a discrete response surface would still require curvature at the edges of each setting
in order to produce a coherent surface.
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leads to the conclusion that H2.2A is accepted; network interdictions of pipelines and storage
facilities will significantly impact the value of economic loss created by unmet demand.
Table 14: Statistical Analysis of Network Interdiction Impacts on Economic Losses
Summary of Fit

RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)
Analysis of Variance
Source
DF

Model
Error
C. Total

3
192
195

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Arc
Storage
(Arc-4)*(Arc-4)

0.814524
0.811626
6.396e+8
1.58e+10
196

Sum of
Squares
3.4492e+20
7.8541e+19
4.2346e+20

Estimate
1.334e+10
639106318
69294350
-94315403

Mean Square

F Ratio

1.15e+20
4.091e+17

281.0586
Prob > F
<.0001*

Std Error
1.469e+8
22842308
22842308
13188013

t Ratio
90.83
27.98
3.03
-7.15

Prob>|t|
<.0001*
<.0001*
0.0028*
<.0001*

In the interdiction experiment, the result of the impact on the value of economic losses is
very similar between the experimental results and the empirical model. As observed in Figure
18, the affect on the value of economic loss at increasing levels of storage and pipeline
interdiction is modest. While there are modest improvements, the test indicates that the network
manager loses more value from their prioritization scheme than is created by the network
interdiction. The network optimization process allows the allocation of fuel storage capacity to
critical locations at the expense of other storage locations. This results in economic losses based
on unmet demand resulting from prioritization strategies rather than interdiction. The effect of
this prioritization on the value of economic loss is apparent in Figure 18 because the setting of
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zero pipeline and arc interdictions does not result in a zero value for economic losses. These
economic losses are a result of the prioritization strategy that requires the networks to limit
distribution to non-critical demand locations in order to build critical storage capacity. The
trends are mirrored in the empirical data on the left and the raw data graphic on the right of
Figure 18. Since the manager anticipates and response to an interdiction based on maintaining
supply at critical locations, other nodes in the system will experience shortfalls based on the
implementation of the Q-Demand maximum flow optimization. This policy is effective in
maintaining supply inventories at the critical locations for as long as possible but at the cost of
increased economic losses elsewhere in the system. If the analyst determines that this scheme is
not realistic, the value of Qj,p requires a minimum value of one to ensure that each supply node
continues to receive shipments capable of replenishing daily demand for as long as possible
within the time horizon.
Although the three factors highlighted in Table 14 indicated significant impacts based on
the t-statistic, Figure 18 shows very limited practical impact within the scenario and time
horizon. Despite the conclusions of the hypothesis, we can observe that network interdiction
results in a less economic impact on the economy represented in the case study than was found in
the supply scenario. The contribution of storage is the most severely limited despite its
statistically significant contribution. Figure 18 shows the relationship between the empirical
representation of the experimental results on the left and the raw data graph on the right. These
representations of the results clearly support the power of the empirical model. Additionally, the
limited impact of network interdiction on economic loss is highlighted by the limited response
adjustments as factor levels increase.
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impact limited areas within the economy and lack the widespread shortages that would instigate
catastrophic cascading effects.
4.6 Experiment 3: Supply and Network Interdiction

Experiment 3 uses a combination of significant factors from experiments 1 and 2 in order
to test Hypothesis 3. The results of experiment 3 will determine what combinations of known
significant factors are best suited to an effective interdiction strategy. Additionally,
combinations of these factors and their interactions will inform a characterization of expected
cascading effects determined using the value of economic losses measured within the
experiment.
Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that storage, pipeline, and refinery interdiction had
significant impacts on the availability of military grade fuel at the critical node locations. The
disruption of imports did not cause a significant decrease in the availability of military grade
fuel. Additionally, there was no statistically significant interaction with refinery interdiction to
indicate a contribution to military availability. Therefore, it is not a viable military strategy
against this particular economy under the parameters for this scenario because the resulting
humanitarian impacts are without military justification. The analyst may consider a lengthened
time period of import point disruption if appropriate given the strategic constraints for their
problem set.
Removing import points as factors in the experiment leaves three remaining factors. In
order to limit the decision space in this experiment, the refineries considered for interdiction are
limited to three locations with proximate location to a critical demand node. This leaves four
factors for refineries and the original seven factors settings for pipeline and storage point
interdiction defined in experiment 2. Implementing this experiment with four replications
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4.6.3 Supply and Network Experiment Results

Because the re-strike scenario constrains the time period over which restoration might
occur, the associated results show a much lower occurrence of variance and produce an empirical
model of substantial predictive power and limited variance. This result is evident in the re-strike
fitted model shown to the right in Figure 19. The results for both models in Figure 19 indicate a
well-fitted empirical representation that adequately captures the experimental results. The restrike scenario has improved predictive power indicated by its R-squared adjusted value of
greater than 97%. This advantage is due to the reduction in variance induced by limiting the
time period of restoration.
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Comparison of the results highlights similar trends in the significance of factors and
various interactions. Within both models, pipeline and storage capacities show significant
impact on the availability of military grade fuel at critical nodes. Similar two-factor interactions
and second order interactions are also significant. The re-strike model includes several three
term interactions that show relevance beyond what is present in the single strike model. In both
models, refinery factors were not independently significant. However, the factor associated with
refineries can remain in the models because both experiments revealed significant interactions
with refinery interdiction levels as a component.
As a result of both experiments, hypothesis H3.1 is rejected, which supports acceptance of
the alternative hypothesis H3.1A; a combined strategy of supply and network interdiction
significantly impacts the availability of military grade fuels at critical locations. Although
refinery interdictions are not significant factors, their significant interaction with other factors
supports their inclusion in the model. This hypothesis is therefore confirmed for both strike
scenarios and across all factors.
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shows the streamlined models for storage and arc interdictions developed in JMP11 for single
strike and re-strike courses of action. These figures represent the empirical model defined by the
parameters in Table 17. The use of high order models produces a surface that allows the analyst
to identify the region best suited to meet the needs of the combatant commander. Within this
scenario, the re-strike response surface clearly demonstrates a greater area of acceptable fuel
availability with options that require fewer independent targets. However, re-strike will require
additional interdiction resources required to ensure that the network infrastructure remains
offline for a deterministically modeled time period.
Determining how these competing scenarios will impact the surrounding economy
requires analysis of the magnitude of economic loss induced by the interdiction strategy. The
results of the experiment reveal that there is a greater magnitude of variation within the data set
for the value of economic losses. Initially, the single strike scenario suggested substantial
violations of the constant variance assumption required to implement design of experiments. As
observed in Figure 22, the predictive model in the left figure and the associated residual model in
the right figure indicate a severe conical shape that indicates the presence of non-constant
variance within the model run.

140

Figure 22: Statistical Residual Analysis of Single Strike Impact on Value of Economic Loss

The presence of non-constant variance violates an underlying principle required for the
use of design of experiments. Therefore, the use of a transformation is appropriate. Due to the
size of the numbers in question, transforming the value of the economic loss by using its
logarithmic value is a possible approach to alleviate issues with increasing variance. The natural
logarithm of each experiment replication transforms the value of economic loss for this result.
The recalculated results appear in Figure 23, which apply the transformation to each response
data point. The residual analysis in the right side of Figure 23 shows a much improved residual
analysis. While there is still some remaining conical shape, several outlying data points
exaggerate its severity. The improvement indicated by the residual analysis for the logarithmic
transformation in Figure 23 indicates a more plausible compliance with constancy of variance
assumptions. The presence of non-constant variance likely resulted from the increasing variation
associated with each interdiction factor setting. As the model adds interdiction targets to the
scenario, they are accompanied by a distribution that increases the variability within the model.
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Fewer interdiction points results in less variation potential within the model. Another method of
reducing the presence of non-constant variance would be an experimental design that limits the
factor settings to a similar amount of interdictions. Although the experiment would explore a
smaller decision space, there would be less variation between the factor settings.

LOG Transformation of Single Strike Impact on Economic Loss

Figure 23: LOG Transform Residual Analysis of Single Strike Impact on Economic Loss

The re-strike scenario statistical analysis shows no indication of the problems with
constant variance that were present in the single strike analysis. In fact, the loss of economic
value shows extremely tight statistical results in comparison to the single strike option. The
results of this experiment are shown in Figure 24 and include a residual chart on the right. The
dispersion pattern of the residual analysis suggests that the assumption of non-constant variance
is achieved. Additionally, the predictive power of this model indicates a more capable model
with an R-squared adjusted value of .99. This result suggests that within this re-strike scenario,
the model can predict value of economic losses with very low levels of variance. This is
particularly useful when precise knowledge of the potential cascading effects is appropriate, such
as a future nation building scenario.
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Table 18: Statistical Comparison of Experimental Results for Single Strike and Re-strike

Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations
Analysis of Variance
Source
Model
Error
C. Total
Model
Error
C. Total

Scenario
Single Strike Restrike
0.891 0.991805
0.889
0.99171
0.083 9.29E+08
23.725 3.01E+10
784
784
DF

SS
MS
F Ratio Prob > F
Single Strike (Using Logarithmic Scaling)
7
44.13
6.30472
897.77
776
5.44
0.00702
Prob > F
783
49.58
<.0001
Restrike
9
8.09E+22 8.99E+21 10408.73
774
6.68E+20 8.64E+17
Prob > F
783
8.16E+22
<.0001

Parameter

Estimate

Intercept
Refinery
Arc
Storage
Refinery*Refinery
Refinery*Arc
Arc*Arc
Refinery*Refinery*Refinery

22.944547
0.24
0.03
0.004
0.047
-0.009
-0.005
-0.021

Intercept
-5.03E+08
Refinery
1.00E+10
Arc
966080122
Storage
75492911
Refinery*Refinery
1.63E+09
Refinery*Arc
-1.74E+08
Arc*Arc
-1.76E+08
Refinery*Refinery*Refinery -6.80E+08
Refinery*Refinery*Arc
-87059715
Arc*Arc*Arc
60036653

Std Error t Ratio
Prob>|t| SS
Single Strike (using Logarithmic Scaling)
0.025965 883.68
<.0001
0.00953
25.4
<.0001
4.53
0.00149 20.29
<.0001
2.89
0.00149
2.86
0.0044
0.057
0.0029
15.9
<.0001
1.77
0.0013
-6.79
<.0001
0.32
0.0008
-6.35
<.0001
0.28
0.0044
-4.76
<.0001
0.15
Restrike
3.43E+08
-1.47 0.1431
1.06E+08
94.86 <.0001 7.77E+21
49548758
19.5 <.0001 3.28E+20
16595406
4.55 <.0001 1.79E+19
33190812
49.02 <.0001 2.08E+21
14843383 -11.72 <.0001 1.19E+20
9581362 -18.41 <.0001 2.93E+20
49477942 -13.74 <.0001 1.63E+20
16595406
-5.25 <.0001 2.38E+19
5975029
10.05 <.0001 8.72E+19
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F
Ratio

645.33
411.54
8.17
252.75
46.14
40.36
22.63

8998.56
380.15
20.69
2402.52
137.25
338.87
188.85
27.52
100.96

Using a comparison of the empirical models developed using the parameters for each
scenario that were shown in Table 18, the modeler can assess suitable response surfaces to
determine the range of the decision space appropriate to support the concept of operations.
Assessing the results from Table 18, the involvement of storage interdiction at target nodes has
considerably less practical impact on economic losses in terms of observed reductions. Despite
its statistical significance, the critical storage node interdictions do not provide nearly the impact
on the value of economic losses that are found in refinery and pipeline disruptions in this
scenario during the specified time horizons. The strategist should anticipate that the network
will continue to deliver fuel to the other 70 demand locations over the time horizon despite the
loss of specific storage capacity locations. Therefore, the most meaningful surface profile
involves refinery and pipeline factors and is presented in Figure 25. This result compares the
resulting model from the single strike scenario on the left of Figure 25 and the re-strike scenario
on the right. Despite the transformation used in the single strike results and the much lower
variance in the re-strike option, the surfaces show striking similarities in shape. This indicates
that the impacts resulting from refinery and pipeline interdictions consistently affected the value
of economic losses. This result is effective in validating the responsiveness of the network
model to parameter adjustments.
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Figure 25: Surface Profile Comparison of Single Strike and Re-strike Empirical Models for
Impact on Lost Economic Value

The practical analysis of impacts on the value of the economic losses shows a large
increase for the re-strike scenario. This is expected because the infrastructure remains off line
for a longer time period, which will force the model to accrue larger unmet demand resulting in
higher economic loss. This impact is evident in the comparison of the practical results shown in
Figure 26. There is a clear increase based on the refinery factor levels that is evident in the chart.
This impact of this difference is essential to determining cascading effects.
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This resulted in a model with greater predictive power and more consistency in the resulting data
points. This consistency leads to a tighter estimate of the value of economic losses. The
magnitude of economic losses is greater, which results in higher levels of degradation across a
range of other industries. However, analysis does not include the effects of economic recovery
during or after a 90-day campaign.
4.7 Experiment 4: Natural Disaster Scenario

Another potential application of the proposed model is prediction of the impact and
cascading effects resulting from the disruption caused by a natural disaster such as a hurricane or
earthquake. A notional example using the network case study data is presented in Figure 27 with
a potential projected path of a weather related disruption. This notional example includes a
disruption to storage and pipeline infrastructure points that are directly in the path of the
disruption. This also includes the precautionary or residual impacts on major infrastructure
including the importation and refinement points that are highlighted in yellow. This scenario
results in a disruption factor for the highlighted refinement and importation points, and two
disruption factors for storage and pipeline facilities. In lieu of military availability, the model
measures the availability of resources at proximate population centers. The weighted value
associated with Qj,p receives an appropriate assignment in order to ensure network consistency,
and the warm-up period is reduced to four days to allow some buildup of resources by the
network manager.
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The results for this experiment were statistically significant. The statistical analysis
presented in Figure 28 show extremely tight variances for the empirical model shown in Table
21. This low variance is partly a result of the practical reduction in the critical availability,
which is only reduced by less than 4% as a result of the natural disaster. However, there are
significant terms present in the statistical model, including the arc, storage, and several
interaction terms highlighted in Table 21.

Figure 28: Predictive Analysis of Natural Disaster Scenario on Critical Availability

The t-statistic presented in Table 21 provides sufficient statistical evidence to reject
hypothesis H4.1 and confirm its alternative H4.1A; Natural Disaster disruptions significantly
impact the availability of fuels at the critical supply locations. This conclusion holds true for arc
and storage factors as well as their interactions and second-order effects. Hypothesis H4.1 is
confirmed for supply factors, which do not show statistical significance in limiting availability to
critical local economies. Additionally, the model shows excellent predictive power with an Rsquared value near 1.These likely results from the limited impact of a single refinery and
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importation point. The network manager has significant resources to apply to circumvent these
supply disruptions within the model. This estimate is realistic due to the greatly increased ability
to recover from a natural disaster of limited scope as opposed to a widespread and potentially
catastrophic interdiction campaign. The network manager can devote the restoration resources to
these specific locations with less collateral risk to recovery operations or employees.
Table 21: Statistical Analysis of Natural Disaster Impacts on Availability
Summary of Fit

RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)
Analysis of Variance
Source
DF

Model
Error
C. Total

5
138
143

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Arc
Storage
(Arc-2)*(Arc-2)
(Arc-2)*(Storage-2)
(Storage-2)*(Storage-2)

0.997307
0.997209
56.90915
57357.37
144

Sum of
Squares
165485603
446934
165932537

Mean Square

F Ratio

33097121
3238.6509

10219.42
Prob > F
<.0001*

Estimate
55798.19
1104.90
118.72
-1198.12
-81.23
-133.99

Std Error
19.55
5.80
5.80
10.06
7.11
10.06

t Ratio
2853.60
190.23
20.44
-119.10
-11.42
-13.32

Prob>|t|
<.0001*
<.0001*
<.0001*
<.0001*
<.0001*
<.0001*

Unfortunately, the results for this analysis do not show visible variation for response
surfaces fitted to the model when using a graphic scaled at zero. However, a graph of the region
of interest is presented in Figure 29. This graphic only shows the response region where the
changes are observed and the vertical axis is not scaled to zero. While representative of the
volatile region of the design, this surface would appear flat to the naked eye with all axes scaled
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The results for the impact on the value of economic loss show statistical significance for
the refinery outage and pipeline disruption as highlighted in Table 22. These results support the
rejection of hypothesis H4.2 . The results confirm the alternate hypothesis for pipeline and
refinery disruption factors; natural disaster disruptions will significantly impact the measureable
value of economic losses based on unmet demand. Storage and Import factors were statistically
insignificant in this experiment, indicating that limited scenario natural disaster disruptions of
similar infrastructure types is not critical enough to increase the value of economic loss in a
national economy. Further analysis of this problem set might apply a similar experiment to a
local or regional economy where high resolution data exists.

Table 22: Statistical Analysis of Natural Disaster Impact on Value of Economic Loss
Summary of Fit

RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)
Analysis of Variance
Source
DF

Model
Error
C. Total

2
141
143

0.685757
0.681299
1.031e+9
1.35e+10
144

Sum of
Squares
3.2704e+20
1.4986e+20
4.769e+20

Parameter Estimates
Term
Estimate
Intercept
8.3152e+9
Refinery
2.9575e+9
Arc
355888489

Mean Square

F Ratio

1.635e+20
1.063e+18

153.8483
Prob > F
<.0001*

Std Error
3.436e+8
1.718e+8
1.052e+8
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t Ratio
24.20
17.21
3.38

Prob>|t|
<.0001*
<.0001*
0.0009*

While the economic loss from oil theft over time is undisputed, the significance of the
effects on the system remains less clear. The methodology from this study contains a
mechanism to assess the losses caused by increasing levels of theft across a network of pipelines.
Within the NK sub-matrices, the network architecture is determined by a series of -1, 0, and 1
values as described in section 3.2. The use of the value 1 indicates that 100% of the refined fuel
shipped from any transshipment node, Dj reaches the subsequent node, Dj+1 in accordance with
the assumptions of flow balance. However, the theft of resources directly from a pipeline is
unknown to the network manager in magnitude and location resulting in unmeasured losses that
occur along the shipment route. The modeler can represent the potential severity of this loss by
applying a multiplier, g to the portion of the matrix that is affected. This multiplier would
transform the 1 in an appropriate location of an NK matrix to a reduced value such as .99 as an
example of the estimate of lost volume. The reduced value describes a pipeline where 99% of
the product shipped reaches its destination while illicit traffickers remove 1% of the flow.
Using such an approximation, the automated model will assess the impacts of increasing
levels of illicit trafficking on the same pipeline segments from the interdiction experiment.
Refinery and storage interdiction remain in effect for the excursion. The factor levels for black
market theft range from 1-5% of the economy for this demonstration. When conducting the
experiment using up to 3% theft rate out of each of the six pipeline segments, there was no
significant impact on the availability of fuel to military locations or on the value of economic
loss within the system. This result appears in Table 24, and the highlighted black market factors
show no substantial contribution to the modeled responses of military availability or the value of
economic losses. The contributions of Storage and Refinery interdictions and measured
responses remain consistent with the results from Experiment 3.
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Table 24: Analysis of Theft Rate up to 3%
Summary of Fit for Value of Economic Loss

RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Analysis of Variance
Source
DF
Model
6
Error
329
C. Total
335

0.885247
0.883154
1.885e+9
1.84e+10

SS
9.0206e+21
1.1693e+21
1.019e+22

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Refinery
Storage
BlkMkt
(Refinery-2.5)*(Refinery-2.5)
(Refinery-2.5)*(Storage-4)

Mean Square
1.503e+21
3.554e+18

Estimate
3.2108e+9
5.0417e+9
164691063
134230789
1.3517e+9
97000060

Std Error
8.962e+8
3.275e+8
51424436
1.26e+8
1.028e+8
45995414

F Ratio
423.0034
Prob > F
<.0001*

t Ratio
3.58
15.40
3.20
1.07
13.14
2.11

Prob>|t|
0.0004*
<.0001*
0.0015*
0.2874
<.0001*
0.0357*

Summary of Fit for Military Availability

RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)
Analysis of Variance
Source
DF
Model
5
Error
330
C. Total
335

0.886763
0.885048
2261.935
22634.12
336

SS
1.3222e+10
1688394821
1.491e+10

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Storage
Refinery
BlkMkt
(Storage-4)*(Storage-4)
(Refinery-2.5)*(Refinery-2.5)

Mean Square
2.6444e+9
5116347.9

Estimate
34844.358
-3116.246
-222.0628
-95.64207
179.939
225.14727
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F Ratio
516.8494
Prob > F
<.0001*

Std Error
536.4057
61.69932
110.3711
151.1319
35.62212
123.3986

t Ratio
64.96
-50.51
-2.01
-0.63
5.05
1.82

Prob>|t|
<.0001*
<.0001*
0.0450*
0.5273
<.0001*
0.0690

However, when the level of interdiction is increased to 5% of the flow rate through all six
critical pipelines, the black market factor impacts the value of economic loss at a statistically
significant level. This result is demonstrated in Table 25 and shows that black market theft up to
a 5% level will significantly impact the value of economic loss during the interdiction campaign.
The removal of 5% of flow rates across these six polyduct accounts for over 300,000 barrels
during a 90 day model run. While this loss is practically minor compared to the interdiction
impacts caused by refinery and storage node disruptions, its presence will not influence the
availability of military grade fuels at critical locations.
Table 25: Analysis of Theft Rate up to 5% on the Value of Economic Loss
Summary of Fit

RSquare
RSquare Adj

0.877908
0.876246

Analysis of Variance
Source
DF

Model
Error
C. Total

6
441
447

Sum of
Squares
1.2336e+22
1.7156e+21
1.4052e+22

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Refinery
Storage
BlkMkt
(Refinery-2.5)*(Refinery-2.5)
(Refinery-2.5)*(Storage-4)
(Refinery-2.5)*(Refinery2.5)*(Refinery-2.5)

Mean Square

F Ratio

2.056e+21
3.89e+18

528.5031
Prob > F
<.0001*

Estimate
2.8716e+9
5.1249e+9
169363887
176588613
1.3854e+9
108694587
-3.026e+8

Std Error
8.066e+8
2.967e+8
46593426
83348854
93186852
41674427
1.389e+8

t Ratio
3.56
17.27
3.63
2.12
14.87
2.61
-2.18

Prob>|t|
0.0004*
<.0001*
0.0003*
0.0347*
<.0001*
0.0094*
0.0299*

The production of this model did call into question the practicality of such wide spread
theft. The removal and illicit trafficking of over 300,000 barrels of fuels constitutes an industrial
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sized undertaking when considering the level of effort required for shipping and profitably
marketing such a huge quantity of liquid. However, further arithmetic analysis presented in
Table 26 shows that this amount of fuel represents approximately 5 daily tanker truck loads
stolen from each of six locations across a vast geographical area of potential infiltration. When
considered in this context, it is not infeasible that a major criminal cartel could potentially move
this much stolen product and remain undetected. A cartel could further diversify this process by
increasing the number of theft locations across a polyduct arc.
Table 26: Feasibility Analysis of 5% Theft Rate

Arithmetic Analysis of Feasibility for 5% Black Market Theft Rate
3163.95 Average Volume of 5% Black Market Loss (Hundreds of Barrels)
316395.10 Average Volume Loss in Barrels
5000.00 Capacity of a Standard Tanker Truck (US Gallons)
42.00 Gallons/Barrel (US)
119.05 Barrels/Truck
2657.72 Total Truckloads Required
90.00 Total Days of Model Run
29.53 Total Truckloads per Day
6.00 Minimum Number of Theft Locations
4.92 Maximum Number of Trucks per Theft Location

While the theft of fuel intended for use in the black market is insufficient to impact the
model of cascading effects, the impacts of this fuel re-entering the local marketplace may bear
consideration in a future study. The manipulation of the automated model to increase the level
of theft would still require a feasibility analysis to ensure that the rates of illicit trafficking are
within the known capacity of the suspected criminal enterprise.
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4.10 Conclusions

The results demonstrate the capacity of an analyst or strategist to investigate factors
within a known distribution network using a methodology that provides insight regarding the
primary and secondary impacts of a fuel network interdiction strategy. The responses measured
in fuel availability and valued using unmet demand provide the statistical means to determine
which factors are most effective at producing desired effects. The propriety and capability of
different courses of action can inform a recommendation for meeting a combatant commander’s
intent.
The network model proved versatile and effective for inclusion in various experiments.
The use of experimentation is an effective means of exploring the decision space and selecting
an appropriate course of action that supports decisive operations. The analyst can implement this
methodology in order to achieve outcomes that improve the success of supported commanders
while limiting the difficulty of follow on missions by managing cascading effects.
While the analysis was confined to critical military areas based on a concept of
operations, the model provides the opportunity to analyze a variety of scenarios. Initial plans are
subject to testing and alteration to meet specific strategic goals or mitigate impacts to a desirable
level. All parameter and factor settings are flexible, allowing a wide variety of analysis.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1 Contributions of Study

The US Armed Forces enjoys the operational advantages provided by an ability to limit
an adversary’s access to strategic commodities. Petroleum and its refined products are key
targets for this type of interdiction due to the prominence of energy resources in many aspects of
military and economic portfolios. A number of tools exist that allow combatant commanders to
conduct these interdictions against various portions of an adversary’s infrastructure. While this
study did not focus on the specific means of interdiction, various kinetic, diplomatic, economic,
and cyber based tools may apply to disruption of a petroleum supply network.
The interdiction of a strategic commodity is a potentially powerful tool. The combatant
commander has an obligation to limit the scope of disruption to the level necessary to reach the
desired operational effect. The network model created in this study demonstrates a methodology
to determine the impact of an interdiction strategy on military availability and adverse effects
using experimentation. The study also demonstrated a tool that is available to investigate the
degree of cascading effects using Leontief input-output modeling.
The results of a related case study showed how some factors may have no statistically
significant impact on the strategic outcome as related to the availability of military grade fuels in
the specified scenario. The strategist might consider the resources and cascading effects related
to an interdiction campaign and determine whether the measureable impacts on the targeted areas
justify the expense. A concept of operations that included future investment in the disrupted
economy has an even higher interest in maintaining economic functionality.
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5.2 Significance of Results

A series of notional scenarios demonstrated the features of the model. The results of the
case study indicated no potential for the limitation of military fuel supplies using interdiction of
refined petroleum imports in the time horizon of the scenario. While specific to this case study,
the results clearly indicated that the network contained sufficient resiliency to ensure delivery of
products to critical locations despite a disruption of imports. Given a longer time horizon, the
effects of a blockade of imports could warrant further investigation. This result informs future
planners that might consider the long term impact prior to initiating diplomatically and
economically expensive boycott or embargo options. Additionally, interdiction of imports will
cascade through other industries if the resulting disruption sufficiently lengthy.
Storage facilities represented the most promising target for limiting the availability of
fuel to military targets while limiting cascading effects based on the scenario results. This
appears to be a foregone conclusion since the lack of a facility to store and transfer fuel is
necessary to maintain a military supply infrastructure. However, historical data from the Gulf
War demonstrated that refinery points are priorities for interdiction with limited military success
(Hall, 1998: 594). Experimental results in the case study showed that limitations on storage and
delivery infrastructure was the most effective means of limiting military availability without
inflicting cascading effects in the investigated scenarios.
Campaign strategies will affect disruption and cascading impacts with much less variance
when the planner possesses the ability to re-strike or disrupt a facility for a consistent time
period. Variance increases quickly as the interdiction campaign expands due to the
unpredictability of restoration times.
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When employed using a natural disaster formulation, the case study proved insufficiently
disaggregated to reasonably predict the network impacts or cascading effects. Ideally, the impact
of a local outage caused by a natural disaster should resource local economic and network data.
The analysis did indicate how to investigate natural disaster scenarios.
5.3 Recommended Paths forward

The model exhibits the extent of constraints, capacities, and network infrastructure
resolution available through open source research and publicly accessible data bases. This data
informed the case study and allowed the construction of a functioning automated network model.
Using more site specific information related to transshipment nodes, pipeline interactions, and
refinery operations, a future endeavor could populate the constraint set with more precise
information. The model could also extend into the supply chain of raw crude stocks that fuel
refinery operations as an additional disruption point or capacity constraint.
Experimentation on this network model used a consistent time horizon implementation
that calculated a daily optimization and updated the starting criteria prior to the subsequent
iteration. Neither the network model nor resulting Leontief formulation involved a truly
dynamic formulation. A potential improvement on this model would implement the network
automation using precise time data involving the production and routing of petroleum products
resourcing time dependent demand patterns. The potential model requires substantial
engineering level data regarding pipeline and refinery function as well as established demand
patterns. Such fidelity, however, will result in a larger model with greater solution complexity.
A model that is unconstrained by national boundaries may better accommodate more
complex petroleum economy such as the OPEC members in the Persian Gulf region. In this
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case, a complete regional supply and distribution network would allow the modeler to best
represent the impacts of a disruption across multiple interdependent nations.
Additionally, an excursion investigating black market effects targeted at specified
network arcs modeled the anticipated level of theft. The results provided insights on the impact
of illicit trade in the refined petroleum industry. However, since this product will ultimately reenter the local marketplace through black market sales, the impact on smaller regional economies
remains unclear. Investigation into the impacts of black market sales on local economic
conditions would provide further refinement on the impact of cascading effects.
While this study did not focus on the efficiency of the recommended automation package,
there is potential for further investigation based on the needs of a strategist. For the purposes of
demonstration and clarity, this study utilized a relatively small decision space. Only six critical
nodes, pipelines, and storage facilities entered consideration. Furthermore, the assigned priority
of these facilities refined the decision space to limit the factor levels rather than assessing the full
combinatorial decision space. Instead of interdicting the most critical storage location as the
initial factor level, the strategist may require a strategy that assesses each possible combination at
every factor level. The 784 runs tested in experiment 3 would quickly become 27,783 potential
courses of action requiring 111,132 model runs. Implementation of experiment 3 using 4
replications requires 784 model runs. This automated model with a CPLEX solver needed 8327
seconds to run to completion using an AMD Athlon II X2 215 2.7 GHz Processor, which equates
to 2 hours, 18 minutes. Running the full factor combinations would require over 327 hours (2
weeks) using the same processor in order to calculate every combination within the current
decision space. Expanding the decision space beyond the 6 critical nodes would further
exacerbate this issue. Implementation of the automation in a supercomputer is a realistic method
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of exploring such a large decision space. An implementation in a high performance computing
environment would provide a potential area of future study for similar problems and allow a
decision maker to explore a large decision space in a much shorter amount of time.
5.4 Conclusions

The versatility of this methodology and its automated solution allow a modeler to
consider a large decision space within the confines of a network. The methodology can expand
to a larger network and that includes multiple countries, smaller regions, and more fully
integrated dependent systems. Sufficient data regarding distribution could extend the supply
chain through independent consumers such as airports or power plants.
This study provides a basis for determining the functionality of a petroleum product
distribution network and measuring impacts to dependent industries. Augmentations to this type
of network could inform interdiction strategies through sound experimentation plans.
Using data sets with improved resolution and completeness enables the most accurate
constraint set and precise network topography when contemplating an experimental analysis of
interdiction strategies. The analyst or campaign planner is well advised to consider collecting
the necessary information on an economy or network of interest as early as possible. The
planner should also consider updating this information for consistency and accuracy as
intelligence improves in order to provide rapid feedback on the effectiveness of an interdiction
strategy. The construction of network topography, an informed experimentation plan, and
possession of current intelligence data including regional input-output analysis will enable a
rapid and consistent recommendation to a decision maker who requires a comprehensive
assessment of an interdiction strategy. Given adequate information, a variety of strategies and
scenarios may receive substantial investigation prior to operations.
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Appendix A. MATLAB 2014 and CPLEX (V 12.5) Implementation
%Required inputs include ArcFO, DSS, Dem, ArcCap
%ArcFO is the incidence matrix of the distribution network
%DSS is the storage quantity based on distance from supply points
%Dem is the demand data
%ArcCap is the capacities of the pipelines
A = ArcFO;
[m,n]=size(A);
%Set number of Products
p = 4;
%Introduces the number of supply points to adjust matrices
numSP = 10;
SP = n-numSP;
%Storage Capacity Builder
%Inaccessible Lower Bound
PercLB = .2;
%Safety stock and Safety Fill Factor
SSF = 1.05;
%Storage Capacity Design uses Cycle Time (DSS) in days distance from
Supply
StorCap = SSF * Dem * diag(DSS(:,:));
% Inaccessible Tank Bottoms
LBStorCap = PercLB * StorCap;
%Set Initial Storage
PercIstor = .5;
IStor = PercIstor * StorCap;
StorInt = StorCap;
LBStorInt = LBStorCap;
%Matrix Build of Flow Constraints for each node Set and product type
AFO = [A zeros(m,n) zeros(m,n) zeros(m,n);
zeros(m,n) A zeros(m,n) zeros(m,n);
zeros(m,n) zeros(m,n) A zeros(m,n);
zeros(m,n) zeros(m,n) zeros(m,n) A];
%Q*Demand decision matrix for each product type
DemQ = [diag(Dem(1,:)) zeros(m,m) zeros(m,m) zeros(m,m);
zeros(m,m) diag(Dem(2,:)) zeros(m,m) zeros(m,m);
zeros(m,m) zeros(m,m) diag(Dem(3,:)) zeros(m,m);
zeros(m,m) zeros(m,m) zeros(m,m) diag(Dem(4,:))];
%Flow Equation LHS
FOEq = [AFO -DemQ zeros(m*p) zeros(m*p)];
%Flow Equation RHS
FOEqC = [zeros(1,m*p)];
%Storage recalculation
%Storage Adjustments at each node
DeltaStor = diag(ones(1,m*p));
SlackDem = diag(ones(m*p,1));
%(Can also be specified by type/location using MTX)
%MPercIstor = diag(PercIstor(:,:));
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%Istor = MPercIstor * StorCap;
MGAvail = 0;
%Storage Adjustment Flow Balance Equality LHS
StorAdjEq = [zeros(m*p,n*p) DemQ -DeltaStor SlackDem];
%Demand Requirements for each of 4 Products Storage Adj RHS
DemC = [Dem(1,:) Dem(2,:) Dem(3,:) Dem(4,:)];
%Storage Capacity Constraints LHS
StorC = [zeros(m*p,n*p) zeros(m*p) DeltaStor zeros(m*p)];
%Arc Flow Constraints LHS
SumArcFO = [zeros(n-numSP,n-SP) diag(ones(1,n-numSP)) zeros(n-numSP,nSP) diag(ones(1,n-numSP)) zeros(n-numSP,n-SP) diag(ones(1,n-numSP))
zeros(n-numSP,n-SP) diag(ones(1,n-numSP))];
SumFO = [SumArcFO zeros(n-numSP,m*p) zeros(n-numSP,m*p) zeros(nnumSP,m*p);
-SumArcFO zeros(n-numSP,m*p) zeros(n-numSP,m*p) zeros(nnumSP,m*p)];
%Initialize Daily Values
StorAdj = zeros(p,m);
Shortfall = zeros(m*p,1);
for d = 1:7
% Adjust storage capacity from previous day's numbers
IStor = IStor + StorAdj;
%Storage Capacity Constraints RHS
StorA = [StorCap] - [IStor];
StorAinv = [IStor]-[LBStorCap];
StorMax = [StorA(1,:) StorA(2,:) StorA(3,:) StorA(4,:)];
StorMin = [StorAinv(1,:) StorAinv(2,:) StorAinv(3,:) StorAinv(4,:)];

%Arc Flow Constraints RHS
UBArcC = ArcCap(1,:);
LBArcC = ArcCap(2,:);
BArcC = [UBArcC -LBArcC];
%Supply Availability Constraint LHS
%Supply Constraint RHS
SupC = [Supply(1,:) inf(1,n-numSP) Supply(2,:) inf(1,n-numSP)
Supply(3,:) inf(1,n-numSP) Supply(4,:) inf(1,n-numSP)];
% Constraint Functions to load CPLEX
Aeq = [FOEq; StorAdjEq];
beq = [FOEqC DemC]';
Aineq = [SumFO; StorC; -StorC];
bineq = [BArcC StorMax StorMin]';
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f = [zeros(1,n*p) QW(1,:) QW(2,:) QW(3,:) QW(4,:) zeros(1,m*p)
zeros(1,m*p)];
%Upper Bound of Q
UBQ = 2;
LBQ = .8;
ub = [SupC UBQ*ones(1,m*p) inf(1,m*p) DemC]';
lb = [zeros(1,n*p) LBQ*ones(1,m*p) -inf(1,m*p) zeros(1,m*p)]';

% Shortfall must be bounded between zero and demand, as slack cannot
exceed the
% demanded quantity of product supply.
%QDem is initially bounded between zero and two. As the system is
%interdicted, QDem can become negative to denote the removal of
commodities
%from local storage nodes.

Aeq;
beq;
Aineq;
bineq;
addpath('I:\setup\Desktop\CPEX\cplex\matlab\x64_win64')
f = -f;

ub = ub;
lb = lb;

options = cplexoptimset;
options.Display = 'off';
[x, fval, exitflag, output] = cplexlp (f, Aineq, bineq, Aeq, beq,
lb, ub, [ ], options);

%fprintf ('\nSolution status = %s \n', output.cplexstatusstring);
%fprintf ('Solution value = %f \n', fval);
%disp ('Values =');
%disp (x');
%Determine how much is added or removed from storage to meet daily
demand
StorAdj1 = zeros(m,1);
StorAdj2 = zeros(m,1);
StorAdj3 = zeros(m,1);
StorAdj4 = zeros(m,1);
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for s = 1:m
StorAdj1(s,1) = x((n*p)+(m*p)+s,1);
StorAdj2(s,1) = x((n*p)+(m*p)+s+m,1);
StorAdj3(s,1) = x((n*p)+(m*p)+s+2*m,1);
StorAdj4(s,1) = x((n*p)+(m*p)+s+3*m,1);
end
StorAdj = [StorAdj1';StorAdj2';StorAdj3';StorAdj4'];
end
IStorInitial = IStor + StorAdj;
%for r = 1:3
for e = 1:784
%Required inputs include ArcFO, DSS, Dem, ArcCap
%ArcFO is the incidence matrix of the distribution network
%DSS is the storage quantity based on distance from supply points
%Dem is the demand data
%ArcCap is the capacities of the pipelines
A = ArcFO;
[m,n]=size(A);
%Set number of Products
p = 4;
%Introduces the number of supply points to adjust matrices
numSP = 10;
SP = n-numSP;
%Storage Capacity Builder
%Inaccessible Lower Bound
PercLB = .2;
%Safety stock and Safety Fill Factor
SSF = 1.05;
%Storage Capacity Design uses Cycle Time (DSS) in days distance from
Supply
StorCap = SSF * Dem * diag(DSS(:,:));
% Inaccessible Tank Bottoms
LBStorCap = PercLB * StorCap;
%Set Initial Storage
IStor = IStorInitial;
StorInt = StorCap;
LBStorInt = LBStorCap;
%Matrix Build of Flow Constraints for each node Set and product type
AFO = [A zeros(m,n) zeros(m,n) zeros(m,n);
zeros(m,n) A zeros(m,n) zeros(m,n);
zeros(m,n) zeros(m,n) A zeros(m,n);
zeros(m,n) zeros(m,n) zeros(m,n) A];
%Q*Demand decision matrix for each product type
DemQ = [diag(Dem(1,:)) zeros(m,m) zeros(m,m) zeros(m,m);
zeros(m,m) diag(Dem(2,:)) zeros(m,m) zeros(m,m);
zeros(m,m) zeros(m,m) diag(Dem(3,:)) zeros(m,m);
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zeros(m,m) zeros(m,m) zeros(m,m) diag(Dem(4,:))];
%Flow Equation LHS
FOEq = [AFO -DemQ zeros(m*p) zeros(m*p)];
%Flow Equation RHS
FOEqC = [zeros(1,m*p)];
%Storage recalculation
%Storage Adjustments at each node
DeltaStor = diag(ones(1,m*p));
SlackDem = diag(ones(m*p,1));
%(Can also be specified by type/location using MTX)
%MPercIstor = diag(PercIstor(:,:));
%Istor = MPercIstor * StorCap;
MGAvail = 0;
%Storage Adjustment Flow Balance Equality LHS
StorAdjEq = [zeros(m*p,n*p) DemQ -DeltaStor SlackDem];
%Demand Requirements for each of 4 Products Storage Adj RHS
DemC = [Dem(1,:) Dem(2,:) Dem(3,:) Dem(4,:)];
%Storage Capacity Constraints LHS
StorC = [zeros(m*p,n*p) zeros(m*p) DeltaStor zeros(m*p)];
%Arc Flow Constraints LHS
SumArcFO = [zeros(n-numSP,n-SP) diag(ones(1,n-numSP)) zeros(n-numSP,nSP) diag(ones(1,n-numSP)) zeros(n-numSP,n-SP) diag(ones(1,n-numSP))
zeros(n-numSP,n-SP) diag(ones(1,n-numSP))];
SumFO = [SumArcFO zeros(n-numSP,m*p) zeros(n-numSP,m*p) zeros(nnumSP,m*p);
-SumArcFO zeros(n-numSP,m*p) zeros(n-numSP,m*p) zeros(nnumSP,m*p)];
%Create a Beta and Exp Distribution for Storage Interdiction Time
aS = 4;
bS = 7;
cS = 14;
muS = (aS+4*bS+cS)/6;
if bS-muS == 0
bS=bS-1;
end
muS = (aS+4*bS+cS)/6;
alpha1S = ((muS-aS)*(2*bS-aS-cS))/((bS-muS)*(cS-aS));
alpha2S = (alpha1S*(cS-muS))/(muS-aS);
pdS = makedist('Beta','a',alpha1S,'b',alpha2S);
downtimeS1 = random(pdS)*(cS-aS)+aS;
downtimeS2 = random(pdS)*(cS-aS)+aS;
downtimeS3 = random(pdS)*(cS-aS)+aS;
downtimeS4 = random(pdS)*(cS-aS)+aS;
downtimeS5 = random(pdS)*(cS-aS)+aS;
downtimeS6 = random(pdS)*(cS-aS)+aS;
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pdeS1
pdeS2
pdeS3
pdeS4
pdeS5
pdeS6

=
=
=
=
=
=

makedist('Exponential','mu',
makedist('Exponential','mu',
makedist('Exponential','mu',
makedist('Exponential','mu',
makedist('Exponential','mu',
makedist('Exponential','mu',

recoveryS1
recoveryS2
recoveryS3
recoveryS4
recoveryS5
recoveryS6

=
=
=
=
=
=

downtimeS1);
downtimeS2);
downtimeS3);
downtimeS4);
downtimeS5);
downtimeS6);

random(pdeS1);
random(pdeS2);
random(pdeS3);
random(pdeS4);
random(pdeS5);
random(pdeS6);

%Create Beta and Exp Distribution Random # for Arc Restoration
aA = 7;
bA = 14;
cA = 30;
muA = (aA+4*bA+cA)/6;
if bA-muA == 0
bA=bA-1;
end
bA = bA;
muA = (aA+4*bA+cA)/6;
alpha1A = ((muA-aA)*(2*bA-aA-cA))/((bA-muA)*(cA-aA));
alpha2A = (alpha1A*(cA-muA))/(muA-aA);
pdA = makedist('Beta','a',alpha1A,'b',alpha2A);
downtimeA1
downtimeA2
downtimeA3
downtimeA4
downtimeA5
downtimeA6
pdeA1
pdeA2
pdeA3
pdeA4
pdeA5
pdeA6

=
=
=
=
=
=

=
=
=
=
=
=

random(pdA)*(cA-aA)+aA;
random(pdA)*(cA-aA)+aA;
random(pdA)*(cA-aA)+aA;
random(pdA)*(cA-aA)+aA;
random(pdA)*(cA-aA)+aA;
random(pdA)*(cA-aA)+aA;

makedist('Exponential','mu',
makedist('Exponential','mu',
makedist('Exponential','mu',
makedist('Exponential','mu',
makedist('Exponential','mu',
makedist('Exponential','mu',

recoveryA1
recoveryA2
recoveryA3
recoveryA4
recoveryA5
recoveryA6

=
=
=
=
=
=

downtimeA1);
downtimeA2);
downtimeA3);
downtimeA4);
downtimeA5);
downtimeA6);

random(pdeA1);
random(pdeA2);
random(pdeA3);
random(pdeA4);
random(pdeA5);
random(pdeA6);

%Create Beta and Exp Distribution Random # for Refinery Restoration
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aR = 10;
bR = 21;
cR = 30;
muR = (aR+4*bR+cR)/6;
if bR-muR == 0
bR=bR-1;
end
bR = bR;
muR = (aR+4*bR+cR)/6;
alpha1R = ((muR-aR)*(2*bR-aR-cR))/((bR-muR)*(cR-aR));
alpha2R = (alpha1R*(cR-muR))/(muR-aR);
pdR = makedist('Beta','a',alpha1R,'b',alpha2R);

% Determine Percentage of Gasoline Production remaining after
Interdiction
PGPub = .25;
pdPGP = makedist('Uniform', 'Lower',0,'Upper',PGPub);
PGP = random(pdPGP);

%Variables for Interdiction or Embargo of Imports, Min/Max
effectiveness
aI = .75;
bI = .9;
%Uniform Distribution used to determine success level of Trade
%Embargo/Blockade
pdI = makedist('Uniform','Lower',aI,'Upper',bI);
Imp = 1-random(pdI);

downtimeR1
downtimeR2
downtimeR3
downtimeR4
downtimeR5
downtimeR6
pdeR1
pdeR2
pdeR3
pdeR4
pdeR5
pdeR6

=
=
=
=
=
=

=
=
=
=
=
=

random(pdR)*(cR-aR)+aR;
random(pdR)*(cR-aR)+aR;
random(pdR)*(cR-aR)+aR;
random(pdR)*(cR-aR)+aR;
random(pdR)*(cR-aR)+aR;
random(pdR)*(cR-aR)+aR;

makedist('Exponential','mu',
makedist('Exponential','mu',
makedist('Exponential','mu',
makedist('Exponential','mu',
makedist('Exponential','mu',
makedist('Exponential','mu',

recoveryR1
recoveryR2
recoveryR3
recoveryR4
recoveryR5
recoveryR6

=
=
=
=
=
=

downtimeR1);
downtimeR2);
downtimeR3);
downtimeR4);
downtimeR5);
downtimeR6);

random(pdeR1);
random(pdeR2);
random(pdeR3);
random(pdeR4);
random(pdeR5);
random(pdeR6);
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%Initialize Daily Values
StorAdj = zeros(p,m);
Shortfall = zeros(m*p,1);

for d = 1:90
% Adjust storage capacity from previous day's numbers
IStor = IStor + StorAdj;
%Interdiction of Storage nodes
if EXPMT(e,2) > 6
if d < downtimeS1
%Node 9; Saltillo

IStor(1:p,13)=0;
StorCap(1:p,13) = 0;
LBStorCap(1:p,13) = 0;

elseif d < downtimeS1 + recoveryS1
StorCap(1:p,13) = .33*StorInt(1:p,13);
LBStorCap(1:p,13) = 0;
elseif d < downtimeS1 + (2*recoveryS1)
StorCap(1:p,13) = .67*StorInt(1:p,13);
LBStorCap(1:p,13) = 0;
else
StorCap(1:p,13) = StorInt(1:p,13);
LBStorCap(1:p,13) = 0;
end

end
if EXPMT(e,2) > 3
if d < downtimeS2
%node 11 Moclova
IStor(1:p,15)=0;
StorCap(1:p,15) = 0;
LBStorCap(1:p,15) = 0;
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elseif d < downtimeS2 + recoveryS2
StorCap(1:p,15) = .33*StorInt(1:p,15);
LBStorCap(1:p,15) = 0;
elseif d < downtimeS2 + (2*recoveryS2)
StorCap(1:p,15) = .67*StorInt(1:p,15);
LBStorCap(1:p,15) = 0;
else
StorCap(1:p,15) = StorInt(1:p,15);
LBStorCap(1:p,15) = 0;
end

end
if EXPMT(e,2) > 1
if d < downtimeS3
% Node 13; Juarez
IStor(1:p,17)=0;
StorCap(1:p,17) = 0;
LBStorCap(1:p,17) = 0;
elseif d < downtimeS3 + recoveryS3

StorCap(1:p,17) = .33*StorInt(1:p,17);
LBStorCap(1:p,17) = 0;
elseif d < downtimeS3 + (2*recoveryS3)
StorCap(1:p,17) = .67*StorInt(1:p,17);
LBStorCap(1:p,17) = 0;
else
StorCap(1:p,17) = StorInt(1:p,17);
LBStorCap(1:p,17) = 0;
end
end
if EXPMT(e,2) > 2
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if d < downtimeS4
% Node 38: Veracruz

IStor(1:p,46)=0;
StorCap(1:p,46) = 0;
LBStorCap(1:p,46) = 0;
elseif d < downtimeS4 + recoveryS4

StorCap(1:p,46) = .33*StorInt(1:p,46);
LBStorCap(1:p,46) = 0;
elseif d < downtimeS4 + (2*recoveryS4)
StorCap(1:p,46) = .67*StorInt(1:p,46);
LBStorCap(1:p,46) = 0;
else
StorCap(1:p,46) = StorInt(1:p,46);
LBStorCap(1:p,46) = 0;
end

end
if EXPMT(e,2) > 4
if d < downtimeS5
%Node 24: SanLuis Potosi

IStor(1:p,59)=0;
StorCap(1:p,59) = 0;
LBStorCap(1:p,59) = 0;
elseif d < downtimeS5 + recoveryS5

StorCap(1:p,59) = .33*StorInt(1:p,59);
LBStorCap(1:p,59) = 0;
elseif d < downtimeS5 + (2*recoveryS5)
StorCap(1:p,59) = .67*StorInt(1:p,59);
LBStorCap(1:p,59) = 0;
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else
StorCap(1:p,59) = StorInt(1:p,59);
LBStorCap(1:p,59) = 0;
end
end
if EXPMT(e,2) > 5
if d < downtimeS6
%Node 36: Puebla

IStor(1:p,75)=0;
StorCap(1:p,75) = 0;
LBStorCap(1:p,75) = 0;
elseif d < downtimeS6 + recoveryS6
StorCap(1:p,75) = .33*StorInt(1:p,75);
LBStorCap(1:p,75) = 0;
elseif d < downtimeS6 + (2*recoveryS6)
StorCap(1:p,75) = .67*StorInt(1:p,75);
LBStorCap(1:p,75) = 0;
else
StorCap(1:p,75) = StorInt(1:p,75);
LBStorCap(1:p,75) = 0;

end
end

%Storage Capacity Constraints RHS
StorA = [StorCap] - [IStor];
StorAinv = [IStor]-[LBStorCap];
StorMax = [StorA(1,:) StorA(2,:) StorA(3,:) StorA(4,:)];
StorMin = [StorAinv(1,:) StorAinv(2,:) StorAinv(3,:) StorAinv(4,:)];

%Arc Flow Constraints RHS
UBArcC = ArcCap(1,:);
LBArcC = ArcCap(2,:);
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% Interdiction of Arc Capacity
if EXPMT(e,3) > 1
%Saltillo
if d < downtimeA1
UBArcC(1,9) = 0;
LBArcC(1,9) = 0;
elseif d < downtimeA1 + recoveryA1
UBArcC(1,9) = .5*UBArcC(1,9);
LBArcC(1,9) = .5*LBArcC(1,9);
elseif d < downtimeA1 + (2*recoveryA1)
UBArcC(1,9) = .75*UBArcC(1,9);
LBArcC(1,9) = .75*LBArcC(1,9);
else
end
end
if EXPMT(e,3) > 4
%Moclova
if d < downtimeA2
UBArcC(1,14) = 0;
LBArcC(1,14) = 0;
elseif d < downtimeA2 + recoveryA2
UBArcC(1,14) = .5*UBArcC(1,14);
LBArcC(1,14) = .5*LBArcC(1,14);
elseif d < downtimeA2 + (2*recoveryA2)
UBArcC(1,14) = .75*UBArcC(1,14);
LBArcC(1,14) = .75*LBArcC(1,14);
else
end
end
if EXPMT(e,3) > 6
%Juarez
if d < downtimeA3
UBArcC(1,13) = 0;
LBArcC(1,13) = 0;
elseif d < downtimeA3 + recoveryA3
UBArcC(1,13) = .5*UBArcC(1,13);
LBArcC(1,13) = .5*LBArcC(1,13);
elseif d < downtimeA3 + (2*recoveryA3)
UBArcC(1,13) = .75*UBArcC(1,13);
LBArcC(1,13) = .75*LBArcC(1,13);
else
end
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end
if EXPMT(e,3) > 3
%Puebla
if d < downtimeA4
UBArcC(1,38) = 0;
LBArcC(1,38) = 0;
elseif d < downtimeA4 + recoveryA4
UBArcC(1,38) = .5*UBArcC(1,38);
LBArcC(1,38) = .5*LBArcC(1,38);
elseif d < downtimeA4 + (2*recoveryA4)
UBArcC(1,38) = .75*UBArcC(1,38);
LBArcC(1,38) = .75*LBArcC(1,38);
else
end
end
if EXPMT(e,3) > 2
%San Luis Potosi
if d < downtimeA5
UBArcC(1,53) = 0;
LBArcC(1,53) = 0;
elseif d < downtimeA5 + recoveryA5
UBArcC(1,53) = .5*UBArcC(1,53);
LBArcC(1,53) = .5*LBArcC(1,53);
elseif d < downtimeA5 + (2*recoveryA5)
UBArcC(1,53) = .75*UBArcC(1,53);
LBArcC(1,53) = .75*LBArcC(1,53);
else
end
end
if EXPMT(e,3) > 5
%Veracruz
if d < downtimeA6
UBArcC(1,35) = 0;
LBArcC(1,35) = 0;
elseif d < downtimeA6 + recoveryA6
UBArcC(1,35) = .5*UBArcC(1,35);
LBArcC(1,35) = .5*LBArcC(1,35);
elseif d < downtimeA6 + (2*recoveryA6)
UBArcC(1,35) = .75*UBArcC(1,35);
LBArcC(1,35) = .75*LBArcC(1,35);
else
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end
end

BArcC = [UBArcC -LBArcC];
%Supply Availability Constraint LHS
%SumSupOP = [diag(ones(1,numSP)) zeros(numSP,m-1) diag(ones(1,numSP))
zeros(numSP,m-1) diag(ones(1,numSP)) zeros(numSP,m-1)
diag(ones(1,numSP)) zeros(numSP,m-1)];
%bineq = [Supply(1,:) Supply(2,:) Supply(3,:) Supply(4,:)]';
%Supply Constraint RHS
SupC = [Supply(1,:) inf(1,n-numSP) Supply(2,:) inf(1,n-numSP)
Supply(3,:) inf(1,n-numSP) Supply(4,:) inf(1,n-numSP)];

%Interdiction of Refinery Supplies
if EXPMT(e,1) > 1
%Cadereyta
if d < downtimeR1
SupC(1,5) = PGP*SupC(1,5);
SupC(1,92) = 0;
SupC(1,179) = 0;
SupC(1,266) = 0;
elseif d < downtimeR1 + recoveryR1
SupC(1,5) = .25*SupC(1,5);
SupC(1,91) = .25*SupC(1,91);
SupC(1,177) = .25*SupC(1,177);
SupC(1,263) = .25*SupC(1,263);
elseif d < downtimeR1 + (2*recoveryR1)
SupC(1,5) = .50*SupC(1,5);
SupC(1,91) = .50*SupC(1,91);
SupC(1,177) = .50*SupC(1,177);
SupC(1,263) = .50*SupC(1,263);
elseif d < downtimeR1 + (3*recoveryR1)
SupC(1,5) = .75*SupC(1,5);
SupC(1,91) = .75*SupC(1,91);
SupC(1,177) = .75*SupC(1,177);
SupC(1,263) = .75*SupC(1,263);
else
end
end
if EXPMT(e,1) > 3
%Tula
if d < downtimeR2
SupC(1,7) = PGP*SupC(1,7);
SupC(1,94) = 0;
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SupC(1,181) = 0;
SupC(1,268) = 0;
elseif d < downtimeR2 + recoveryR2
SupC(1,7) = .25*SupC(1,7);
SupC(1,93) = .25*SupC(1,93);
SupC(1,179) = .25*SupC(1,179);
SupC(1,265) = .25*SupC(1,265);
elseif d < downtimeR2 + (2*recoveryR2)
SupC(1,7) = .50*SupC(1,7);
SupC(1,93) = .50*SupC(1,93);
SupC(1,179) = .50*SupC(1,179);
SupC(1,265) = .50*SupC(1,265);
elseif d < downtimeR2 + (3*recoveryR2)
SupC(1,7) = .75*SupC(1,7);
SupC(1,91) = .75*SupC(1,91);
SupC(1,179) = .75*SupC(1,179);
SupC(1,265) = .75*SupC(1,265);
else
end
end
if EXPMT(e,1) > 2
%Minatatlan
if d < downtimeR3
SupC(1,9) = PGP*SupC(1,9);
SupC(1,95) = 0;
SupC(1,181) = 0;
SupC(1,267) = 0;
elseif d < downtimeR3 + recoveryR3
SupC(1,9) = .25*SupC(1,9);
SupC(1,95) = .25*SupC(1,95);
SupC(1,181) = .25*SupC(1,181);
SupC(1,267) = .25*SupC(1,267);
elseif d < downtimeR3 + (2*recoveryR3)
SupC(1,9) = .50*SupC(1,9);
SupC(1,95) = .50*SupC(1,95);
SupC(1,181) = .50*SupC(1,181);
SupC(1,267) = .50*SupC(1,267);
elseif d < downtimeR3 + (3*recoveryR3)
SupC(1,9) = .75*SupC(1,9);
SupC(1,95) = .75*SupC(1,95);
SupC(1,181) = .75*SupC(1,181);
SupC(1,267) = .75*SupC(1,267);
else
end
end
if EXPMT(e,1) > 4
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%Madero
if d < downtimeR4
SupC(1,6) = PGP*SupC(1,6);
SupC(1,92) = 0;
SupC(1,178) = 0;
SupC(1,264) = 0;
elseif d < downtimeR4 + recoveryR4
SupC(1,6) = .25*SupC(1,6);
SupC(1,92) = .25*SupC(1,92);
SupC(1,178) = .25*SupC(1,178);
SupC(1,264) = .25*SupC(1,264);
elseif d < downtimeR4 + (2*recoveryR4)
SupC(1,6) = .50*SupC(1,6);
SupC(1,92) = .50*SupC(1,92);
SupC(1,178) = .50*SupC(1,178);
SupC(1,264) = .50*SupC(1,264);
elseif d < downtimeR4 + (3*recoveryR4)
SupC(1,6) = .75*SupC(1,6);
SupC(1,92) = .75*SupC(1,92);
SupC(1,178) = .75*SupC(1,178);
SupC(1,264) = .75*SupC(1,264);
else
end
end
if EXPMT(e,1) > 5
%Salina Cruz
if d < downtimeR5
SupC(1,10) = PGP*SupC(1,10);
SupC(1,96) = 0;
SupC(1,182) = 0;
SupC(1,268) = 0;
elseif d < downtimeR5 + recoveryR5
SupC(1,10) = .25*SupC(1,10);
SupC(1,96) = .25*SupC(1,96);
SupC(1,182) = .25*SupC(1,182);
SupC(1,268) = .25*SupC(1,268);
elseif d < downtimeR5 + (2*recoveryR5)
SupC(1,10) = .50*SupC(1,10);
SupC(1,96) = .50*SupC(1,96);
SupC(1,182) = .50*SupC(1,182);
SupC(1,268) = .50*SupC(1,268);
elseif d < downtimeR5 + (3*recoveryR5)
SupC(1,10) = .75*SupC(1,10);
SupC(1,96) = .75*SupC(1,96);
SupC(1,182) = .75*SupC(1,182);
SupC(1,268) = .75*SupC(1,268);
else
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end
end
if EXPMT(e,1) > 6
%Salamanca
if d < downtimeR6
SupC(1,8) = PGP*SupC(1,8);
SupC(1,94) = 0;
SupC(1,180) = 0;
SupC(1,266) = 0;
elseif d < downtimeR6 + recoveryR6
SupC(1,8) = .25*SupC(1,8);
SupC(1,94) = .25*SupC(1,94);
SupC(1,180) = .25*SupC(1,180);
SupC(1,266) = .25*SupC(1,266);
elseif d < downtimeR6 + (2*recoveryR6)
SupC(1,8) = .50*SupC(1,8);
SupC(1,94) = .50*SupC(1,94);
SupC(1,180) = .50*SupC(1,180);
SupC(1,266) = .50*SupC(1,266);
elseif d < downtimeR6 + (3*recoveryR6)
SupC(1,8) = .75*SupC(1,8);
SupC(1,94) = .75*SupC(1,94);
SupC(1,180) = .75*SupC(1,180);
SupC(1,266) = .75*SupC(1,266);
else
end
end

%Eliminate Percentage of Imported Middle Distillate Supply
if d < 60
if EXPMT(e,4) > 1
%import point 1
SupC(1,88) = Imp*SupC(1,88);
SupC(1,175) = Imp*SupC(1,175);
SupC(1,262) = Imp*SupC(1,262);
end
if EXPMT(e,4) > 3
%Import point 3
SupC(1,90) = Imp*SupC(1,90);
SupC(1,177) = Imp*SupC(1,177);
SupC(1,264) = Imp*SupC(1,264);
end
if EXPMT(e,4) > 2
%import point 4
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SupC(1,91) = Imp*SupC(1,91);
SupC(1,178) = Imp*SupC(1,178);
SupC(1,265) = Imp*SupC(1,265);
end
end
% Constraint Functions to load CPLEX
Aeq = [FOEq; StorAdjEq];
beq = [FOEqC DemC]';
Aineq = [SumFO; StorC; -StorC];
bineq = [BArcC StorMax StorMin]';

f = [zeros(1,n*p) QW(1,:) QW(2,:) QW(3,:) QW(4,:) zeros(1,m*p)
zeros(1,m*p)];
%Upper Bound of Q
UBQ = 2;
LBQ = -1;
ub = [SupC UBQ*ones(1,m*p) inf(1,m*p) DemC]';
lb = [zeros(1,n*p) LBQ*ones(1,m*p) -inf(1,m*p) zeros(1,m*p)]';

% Shortfall must be bounded between zero and demand, as slack cannot
exceed the
% demanded quantity of product supply.
%QDem is initially bounded between zero and two. As the system is
%interdicted, QDem can become negative to denote the removal of
commodities
%from local storage nodes.

Aeq;
beq;
Aineq;
bineq;
addpath('I:\setup\Desktop\CPEX\cplex\matlab\x64_win64')
f = -f;

ub = ub;
lb = lb;

options = cplexoptimset;
options.Display = 'off';
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[x, fval, exitflag, output] = cplexlp (f, Aineq, bineq, Aeq, beq,
lb, ub, [ ], options);

%fprintf ('\nSolution status = %s \n', output.cplexstatusstring);
%fprintf ('Solution value = %f \n', fval);
%disp ('Values =');
%disp (x');
%Determine how much is added or removed from storage to meet daily
demand
StorAdj1 = zeros(m,1);
StorAdj2 = zeros(m,1);
StorAdj3 = zeros(m,1);
StorAdj4 = zeros(m,1);

for s = 1:m
StorAdj1(s,1) = x((n*p)+(m*p)+s,1);
StorAdj2(s,1) = x((n*p)+(m*p)+s+m,1);
StorAdj3(s,1) = x((n*p)+(m*p)+s+2*m,1);
StorAdj4(s,1) = x((n*p)+(m*p)+s+3*m,1);
end
StorAdj = [StorAdj1';StorAdj2';StorAdj3';StorAdj4'];

%Measure the shortfalls of each commodity type
SGas = zeros(m,1);
SDiesel = zeros(m,1);
SJetF = zeros(m,1);
SFOil = zeros(m,1);
for s = 1:m
SGas(s,1) = x((n*p)+(2*m*p)+s,1);
SJetF(s,1) = x((n*p)+(2*m*p)+s+m,1);
SDiesel(s,1) = x((n*p)+(2*m*p)+s+2*m,1);
SFOil(s,1) = x((n*p)+(2*m*p)+s+3*m,1);

end
Shortfall = Shortfall + [SGas; SJetF; SDiesel; SFOil];
if d < 21
MGCrit = IStor(2,13) + IStor(3,13) + IStor(2,15) + IStor(3,15) +
IStor(2,17) + IStor(3,17) + IStor(2,46) + IStor(3,46) + IStor(2,59) +
IStor(3,59) + IStor(2,75) + IStor(3,75);
UAStor = LBStorCap(2,13) + LBStorCap(3,13) + LBStorCap(2,15) +
LBStorCap(3,15) + LBStorCap(2,17) + LBStorCap(3,17) + LBStorCap(2,46) +
LBStorCap(3,46) + LBStorCap(2,59) + LBStorCap(3,59) + LBStorCap(2,75) +
LBStorCap(3,75);
else
MGCrit = 0;
UAStor = 0;
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end
MGAvail = MGAvail + (MGCrit - UAStor);
end
EXPMT(e,6) = MGAvail;
IStor';
Shortfall';
GShortfall
JShortfall
DShortfall
FShortfall

=
=
=
=

0;
0;
0;
0;

for g = 1:m
GShortfall
JShortfall
DShortfall
FShortfall
end

=
=
=
=

Shortfall(g,1) + GShortfall;
Shortfall(g+m,1) + JShortfall;
Shortfall(g+2*m,1) + DShortfall;
Shortfall(g+3*m,1) + FShortfall;

TOTALS = [GShortfall;
JShortfall;
DShortfall;
FShortfall];
SUMTOTAL = GShortfall + JShortfall + DShortfall + FShortfall;
VALLOST = 100*TOTALS' * PRICE;
EXPMT(e,5) = VALLOST;
EXPMT(e,7) = SUMTOTAL;
end
%if r == 1
%EXPMT1 = EXPMT;
%elseif r == 2
% EXPMT2 = EXPMT;
%elseif r == 3
% EXPMT3 = EXPMT;
% else
% end
%end
PCDG = [zeros(784,32)];
PercDeg = [zeros(1,32)];
for j = 1:784
[m,n] = size(aij);
I = eye(m);
IO = (I-aij);
Resource = rij;
ConsOP = C;
ExRes = P;
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VALLOST = 4*EXPMT(j,5)/1000000;
Aineq = [IO;Resource; -IO];
bineq = [ConsOP; ExRes; zeros(m,1)];
fbuild = MaxOP;

f = [ones(1,n)];

ub = [inf(1,n)];
ub(1,7) = 275482.846-VALLOST;
lb = [zeros(1,n)];

Aineq;
bineq;
addpath('I:\setup\Desktop\CPEX\cplex\matlab\x64_win64')
f = -f;

ub = ub;
lb = lb;

options = cplexoptimset;
options.Display = 'on';
[x, fval, exitflag, output] = cplexlp (f, Aineq, bineq, [],[], lb,
ub, [ ], options);

fprintf ('\nSolution status = %s \n', output.cplexstatusstring);
fprintf ('Solution value = %f \n', fval);
disp ('Values =');
disp (x');
for g = 1:m
PercDeg(1,g) = x(g,1)/MaxOP(1,g);
PCDG(j,g) = PercDeg(1,g);
end

end
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Appendix B. Mexico Input-Output Model (OECD, 2014)

Country Mexico
Variable Total
Period Period mid-2000s
Currency National currency, million

Row Sector
C01T05 Agriculture, hunt ng,
forestry and f shing
C10T14 Min ng and quarrying
C15T16 Food products,
beverages and tobacco
C17T19 Textiles, textile
products, leather and footwear
C20 Wood and products of wood
and cork
C21T22 Pulp, paper, paper
products, printing and publishing
C23 Coke, refined petroleum
products and nuclear fuel
C24 Chemicals and chemical
products
C25 Rubber and plastics
products
C26 Other non-metallic mineral
products
C27 Basic metals
C28 Fabricated metal products
except machinery and
equipment
C29 Machinery and equipment
n.e.c
C30 Office, accounting and
comput ng machinery
C31 Electrical machinery and
apparatus n.e.c
C34 Motor vehicles, trailers and
semi-trailers
C36T37 Manufacturing n.e.c;
recycling
C40T41 Electric ty, gas and
water supply
C45 Construction

C15T16 Food
products,
beverages
and tobacco

C10T14
M ning and
quarry ng

C01T05
Agriculture,
hunting,
forestry and
Column Sector
fishing

C24
C20 Wood C21T22 Pulp, C23 Coke,
Chemicals
ref ned
and products paper, paper
petroleum and chemical
products,
of wood and
products
printing and products and
cork
nuclear fuel
publish ng

C17T19
Textiles,
textile
products,
leather and
footwear

C27 Basic
metals

C26 Other
non-metallic
mineral
products

C25 Rubber
and plastics
products

C30 Off ce, C31 Electrical C34 Motor
machinery
accounting
veh cles,
and apparatus trailers and
and
computing
semi-trailers
n.e.c
mach nery

C29
Machinery
and
equipment
n.e.c

C28
Fabricated
metal
products
except
machinery
and
equipment

i
50573 06669

1.740573509

194206.9139

9856.769339

9509 756321

32.89344964

10.5313423

1794.674451

487.2864306

441 3841074

1.729945648

13.63495862

3.060514285

29.11387825

8.003124928

150.4099937

106.3086275

7672.073741

1126.817217

118 6776672

9.00774192

90.11421542

158712.152

88475.4184

59.37414437

11333.07001

17781.94064

83.34216195

243.0569374

169.3435244

157.7253221

197 9369063

33278 70853

222.4224148

112593.0889

4705.413385

49.58915033

491.768614

81.36711771

1554.487224

211.4776355

226 2023401

232.9115405

170.2447114

111.3816414

419.46996

126.1243724

673.4221462

903.2449808

54.22247439

2330.710955

79273.20545

132.6317463

3043.748469

178.6388905

979.113383

2440.670473

770 6698505

1173.420218

982.9575459

765.5737187

4389.815117

2009.990154

18670.15176

270.0815135

767 9935307

225.7208165

217.022106

4941.40219

209.4566048

39.65836178

209.1008637

145.3766916

487.1625708

185.2983322

247.5225715

133.2213812

2828.137067

535.8995913

1112.234028

965.353492

52.070117

11184.76253

3047.020244

167.8005319

28425.38177

232.2107127

3837.065585

2057.763857

2950.115592

504.5391518

1162 283422

732.8469199

6776 53662

2375.742963

3267.299007

353.1194083

4332.049779

7657.266447

1133.851069

462.3523855

1132.60416

2315.84744

5998.894051

593.5326973

4082.520309

5788.292981

719.1725868

291.9824433

476.6467999

649.569077

1625.490759

18213 78528

20111.01527

18302.61746

6596.565292

614.5484452

6344.247268

12414.42034

78689.4711

25463.03578

6325.177325

2967.954309

2552 560789

2374.082346

10722 26421

4606.442874

11384.16014

3018.139745

320 9984708

16296.01777

4556.673951

182.1514695

2898.488864

571.7991339

2986.196563

6166.750087

1050.778063

691.4366645

2322 666939

2201.530177

20218 55091

8938.874702

33037.23754

77 98714805

1828.781013

6854.204878

215 7727714

111.4666305

293.1406389

33.40244594

754.4315694

268.1979401

9949.711254

529.3664998

935.4016745

367.4280174

4456.650472

1777.297413

4315.423115

266.2813232

4846.539894

316.3334701

636 2479589

72.12281375

352.1596204

159.6858557

782.4001202

2658.223054

1531.31838

58718.31183

27599.18535

8777.379008

14161 96744

18143.16468

30248.62506

1909.938967

934 0410399

3328.979407

1455.718712

233.5434263

347.2442791

1581.655908

964.7715599

2044.661488

637 2068812

1349.103729

8297 966296

3229.906463

8120.227125

6349.4161

17405.17423

250.0468611

873 0519691

881.7343191

949.887385

139.1066036

365.1814676

1333.146688

576.9626995

1028.441234

409.1192599

896.107605

1809.485291

6103.032444

6161.756719

3335.181306

7811.571331

168 29856

167.4600983

970.0987219

1518.893112

73.88186452

1015.891186

339.6531654

2007.025641

2946.994396

1313.224028

692.3255087

2603 204696

4778.872817

203518.9994

14870.45645

27128.53887

137.0783431

120 6408624

359.7249389

1353.797308

43.92117501

515.8857708

198.3469301

409.4814834

2307.061683

644 5443374

1060.946107

2447 888499

4026.921699

43535 59314

27973.5716

32977.96282

1672.673911

1427.65153

5354.29756

2886.779074

169.1247678

1213.187231

318.8812865

1695.648851

1846.351952

1710.988447

3018.384417

1943.31878

1634.801007

5471.579101

3015.455214

152776.1423

201.3410011

166 0133463

1011.176253

2341.831866

134.8780592

525.1204455

92.9816872

1296.647156

798.7936272

573 2611519

425.7548908

655.0079865

404.1344459

3648 69346

1538.549943

1825.461108

5027.762336

2897.385138

11563.41046

3273.396217

499.8228793

2631.504707

312.5289145

3604.895933

2409.886999

3896.504686

7353.543426

1577 813982

690.7579501

2703.527529

1604.289282

3932.282046
854 7626121

910.9032244

348.4826271

2263.26349

226 6336193

7 590042079

63.18903907

643.460937

452.5146759

145.5414288

250 9638007

85.36795117

117.3318496

59.98613151

615.3306974

407.911531

C50T52 Wholesale and retail
trade repairs
C55 Hotels and restaurants

24570 81105

13669 6079

83341.37126

14882.00011

3169 654733

10571.71104

4960.202179

28002.5638

9473.699904

11476 8404

21137.58392

9285 679308

5709.874026

14461 54121

8374.349914

68611.7303

72 84568803

1172.417603

1263.111757

1421.840272

52.21343678

241.5382754

99.22229397

1352.849521

468.8634808

264 6441945

218.9887602

508.2352426

341.3550254

2642.099948

1028.037019

2636.539069

C60T63 Transport and storage

8608.568357

5532.498679

28722.76181

5333.030579

1355 977349

4698.763736

1620.399426

9518.048579

3608.090091

3685.673528

4846.22699

2525.420064

1854.632629

7643 99178

3552.543798

16619.57422

C64 Post and
telecommunications
C65T67 Finance and insurance

1463.901657

1077.308956

6373.5923

964 7072113

132.3793761

977.9292557

306.8365736

6170.627863

618.8348689

922 5928186

214.8736137

789.2926853

419.2675898

1522.469895

493.7081326

3020.406948

5730.628607

12378.11491

6319.967279

1142.604152

108.9006636

1298.886965

1482.458624

4227.313375

535.1067287

1375.845904

966.9299702

896.3420306

478.9991371

550.5699741

467.9309325

2954.729876

C70 Real estate activities

108.0383124

358 0641888

5163.963479

2467.565946

196.1869351

1519.700317

198.874583

2184 31626

1755.096693

1247.893261

470.4488433

1262 037142

686.5959553

2053.981903

1268.971905

2290.269479

851.6396777

8365.274834

4171.706138

449 2565722

20.23863228

668.1097482

157.4231763

3367.696969

609.97813

891.1278339

223.2468874

332.1833408

772.1682878

1606.534074

499.9129426

3267.126328

C71 Rent ng of machinery and
equipment
C72 Computer and related
activities
C74 Other Business Activities

17 91310126

19 2425037

82.97530642

15.30530366

1 940599632

11.66638215

3.466236702

29.41295035

11.77961858

9.22501443

4.115085485

11.68295978

8.579490523

16 71383128

5.984403226

15.13581396

5867.145984

10237.37964

30753.92364

7414.378734

425.1069233

4857.978512

12941.00075

16645 93949

4926.813692

6513.843371

3593.064562

4043 518481

2797.77532

10153.15277

3557.287596

11647.85169

C75 Public adm n. and defence;
compulsory social security
0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

C80 Education

0.919370761

1.700074886

112.00996

12.10260036

0 672995181

17.06053494

4.125848286

157.5607006

6.22091987

17.73951995

1.944669766

8 201468107

5.296089393

10 99205506

7.182307205

61.21619245

C85 Hea th and social work

12 35638504

0.239

6.701690592

48.19431693

10.72743656

1 889756821

6.857780731

2.686730282

17.15864015

6.681725053

6.46204738

10.37319651

6 075513996

3.617574857

10.17266162

5.668851734

38.05036861

45 80025991

274.4119478

224.7964779

38 9480195

4.192790763

46.98495155

8.596515269

113.085911

27.07934671

32.00783524

19.56530566

19.2687091

24.41296585

61 37820998

29 83165885

115.2482987

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

C90T93 Other community, social
and personal serv ces
Domestic purchases by nonresidents
Non-comparable imports(cif/fob
adj, D rect purchases abroad by
residents)
Total Imports

0.031

0.137

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

59499.256

10852.999

84481.445

115179.338

11204 714

51746.998

32929.549

211888.122

116410.733

20520.524

94648.721

84680 515

146326.769

383923.134

167072.019

257406.742

460672.1644

Total Intermediate consumption
/final use at basic prices
Taxes, less subsidies, on
products
VALU Value added at basic
prices
GOPS Gross Operating Surplus
LABR Compensation of
Employees
OTXS Other taxes, less
subsidies, on product on
PROD Gross output (Production)
at bas c pr ces

165654.9274

100237 3878

563405.5133

158516.6235

23024.05244

74908.39529

201355.6621

268855.7754

76127.6668

75027.81813

135164.0975

75928.92704

50032.66715

379157.8014

117715.0752

1798.624145

1013.264796

1640.986318

1132.775703

157.6371308

404.7546048

638.7870891

1780.546169

292.9029837

970 2463302

1535.325894

340.6995746

250.161514

325.2129851

303.9909502

1531.989287

279600.6177

439201 5894

370036.8844

85265.74584

17044.08043

40421.42409

40558.84778

132993.1805

37027.58222

85213.31554

77290.66458

40350.85939

30266.07333

74602 02058

41394 05088

202929 2614

229272.4097

148859 8764

278267.1244

46737.26684

11336.31943

24369.12209

23305.04778

83815 53846

19733.65022

60978.92954

58009.94658

21871.20939

8200.946333

42445 59558

21561 58588

131423 6564

50211.942

34662.957

89920.16

37749.493

5660.52

15552.005

17206.066

47149.952

16812.949

23891.135

18899.035

17981 395

21674.198

31406.196

19363.695

70576.748

116.266

255678.756

1849.6

778.986

47 241

500.297

47.734

2027 69

480.983

343.251

381.683

498 255

390.929

750.229

468.77

928.857

453763.438

540452.242

935083.384

244915.145

40225.77

115734.574

242553.297

403629.502

113448.152

161211.38

213990.088

116620.486

80548 902

454085.035

159413.117

665133.415
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C72
C71 Renting
of mach nery Computer and
and
related
equipment
activities

C70 Real
estate
activities

C60T63
C65T67
C55 Hotels
C40T41
C64 Post and
C45
C50T52
C36T37
Transport and telecommunic Finance and
and
Manufacturing Electr city, Construct on Wholesale
nsurance
restaurants
ations
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